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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE
Adrian Aycan Corum
Doron Levit
In the first chapter, “Activist Settlements”, I provide a theoretical framework to study the
economics of settlements between activist investors and boards. The activist can demand
that his proposal be implemented right away (”action settlement”) or demand a number
of board seats (”board settlement”), which also gives the activist access to better informa-
tion. I find that the incumbent’s rejection of board settlement reflects more of its private
information than the rejection of action settlement does. Therefore, demanding board set-
tlement increases the activist’s credibility to run a proxy fight upon rejection and leads to a
higher likelihood of reaching a settlement in the first place. I draw several implications and
empirical predictions of my model, e.g., related to shareholder value, costs of proxy fight,
and activist expertise.
The second chapter, “Corporate Control Activism”, co-authored with Doron Levit, studies
the role of activist investors in the M&A market. Our theory proposes that activist investors
have an inherent advantage relative to bidders in pressuring entrenched incumbents to sell.
As counterparties to the acquisition, bidders have a fundamental conflict of interests with
target shareholders from which activist investors are immune. Therefore, unlike activists,
the ability of bidders to win proxy fights is very limited. This result is consistent with the
large number of activist campaigns that have resulted with the target’s sale to a third party
and the evidence that most proxy fights are launched by activists, not by bidders.
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CHAPTER 1 : Activist Settlements
1.1. Introduction
Shareholder activism is on the rise.1 To influence the corporate policies of their target firms,
activist investors employ a variety of tactics, some more antagonistic than others. For ex-
ample, under many jurisdictions, one path utilized by activists to exert control on firms
is to challenge boards with a contested election (“proxy fight”), which is widely studied
in literature.2 However, there is a second path an activist can pursue to influence con-
trol: The activist can negotiate directly with the incumbent board, and if the incumbent
agrees to the activist’s demands, they reach a settlement, thereby effectively bypassing the
shareholders. Interestingly, as documented by Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017)
and Schoenfeld (2017), such settlements are common and their number has surpassed the
number of proxy fights launched.3 In spite of the prevalence of activist settlements, they
have not received much attention in literature. The objective of this paper is to provide a
theoretical framework in order to study the economics behind activist settlements.
Importantly, there are two types of settlements that can be reached between activists and
incumbents. In a “board settlement”, the activist obtains board seats and joins the decision-
making in the boardroom to execute his agenda. For example, in 2008, Carl Icahn first
received representation on the board of Motorola with two directors after approaching the
1One example of this rise is the tremendous growth in activist hedge funds over the last two decades,
recently exceeding $170 billion in assets under management (see HLS Forum on Corporate Governance
and Financial Regulation, “The Activist Investing Annual Review 2017”, 02/21/2017.). Moreover, there is
empirical evidence suggesting that there are positive returns around activist interventions (see, e.g., Brav,
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015), and
Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2017)).
2For empirical literature, see, e.g., Dodd and Warner (1983), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989), Ikenberry
and Lakonishok (1993), Mulherin and Poulsen (1998), Alexander, Chen, Seppi, and Spatt (2010), Buchanan,
Netter, Poulsen, and Yang (2012), Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012), Gantchev (2013), Fos and Tsout-
soura (2014), Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016), Fos and Jiang (2016), Fos (2017). For theoretical literature,
see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Harris and Raviv (1988), Bhattacharya (1997), Maug (1999), Yılmaz
(1999), Bebchuk and Hart (2001), Gilson and Schwartz (2001), Corum and Levit (2017).
3Schoenfeld (2017) documents that in the US the total number of agreements reached between a firm
and its shareholder is over 4,400 from 1996 to 2015. Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017) focus on
campaigns by activist hedge funds and report that while 167 settlements were reached from 2007 to 2011,
in the same time frame 109 proxy fights were initiated. Moreover, 51 of the latter were settled and therefore
did not to go to a shareholder vote.
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firm with the aim of splitting it.4 Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017) document that
87% of the settlement contracts with activist hedge funds between 2007-2011 resulted in the
appointment of new directors to the board. On the other hand, in an “action settlement”,
the incumbent agrees to implement the activist’s proposal right away.5 For example, in
2012, AOL agreed to sell more than 800 patents for $1.1bn to Microsoft after pressured
by the hedge fund Starboard Value, although Starboard did not have any presence on the
board of AOL.6
Given that the activist can demand that the firm implement his proposal, why do we see so
many board settlements? More generally, what are the trade-offs between board and action
settlements, and what determines the likelihood of reaching a settlement? Also, as share-
holders in general are left out of the settlement negotiation, do shareholders benefit from
these settlements? For example, Blackrock, the world’s largest asset manager, has expressed
that “there is a real concern among investors that standard negotiated settlements—such
as giving board seats to a dissident or announcing a stock buyback—may favor short-term
gains at the expense of long-term performance”.7
I tackle these questions by analyzing a model in which the activist can either settle (i.e.,
negotiate a compromise) with the incumbent board or run a proxy fight to replace it. The
incumbent board is privately informed about the value of the project on the table, and the
incumbent enjoys private benefits from keeping the status quo. The activist is uninformed
about the project’s value but he is aligned with the shareholders, an assumption which I
relax later. The novel feature of my model is that the activist can demand a settlement;
specifically, he can demand that the incumbent implement the project (action settlement) or
4Motorola eventually split into two subsidiaries in 2011, one of which got acquired shortly after by Google
for $12.5bn. See The New York Times, “Motorola and Icahn Reach Compromise on Directors”, 4/08/2008;
The New York Times, “In Google’s Motorola Deal, Icahn Gets His Wish (Again)”, 8/15/2011.
5Moreover, many of these settlements are not explicit, implying that the real number of settlements
reached between activists and firms is even larger than those measured by contracts.
6The share price of AOL jumped 43% upon the announcement of this sale. See Wall Street Journal,
“AOL’s Deal Eases Pressure”, 9/04/2012.
7See HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, “Getting Along with BlackRock”,
11/06/2017.
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give him several board seats (board settlement), the latter of which provides the activist with
better information regarding the value of the project and some level of decision authority
over the implementation of the project.
A key insight in my findings is that compared to action settlement, the response of the
incumbent to the demand of board settlement is more sensitive to the incumbent’s private
information, because the future decision of the activist in the board depends on the value
of the project. If the activist demands action settlement, the incumbent’s incentives to
reject are stronger for project returns that are smaller. Therefore, although the incumbent
rejects some positive NPV projects (due to the private benefits it keeps by doing so), it
always rejects when the project NPV is negative, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. This rejection
behavior of the incumbent upon action settlement demand leaves the activist in the dark
regarding whether the project return is large enough to justify the costs of launching a proxy
fight. Moreover, the weak credibility of the activist to run a proxy fight further encourages
the incumbent to reject the action settlement in the first place.
In contrast, if the activist demands board settlement, the incumbent’s incentive to accept
is non-monotonic with respect to the project return. Specifically, the incumbent accepts
board settlement when the project is negative NPV because it knows that the activist will
not implement the project upon joining the board. Thus, compared to action settlement,
there are two advantages in demanding board settlement: First, the activist saves the cost
of a proxy fight when the project is negative NPV. Second, upon rejection of his demand
the activist perfectly understands that the project NPV is positive. This inference of the
activist increases the credibility of his proxy fight threat upon rejection, which in turn pushes
the incumbent to accept the settlement with higher likelihood even when the project has a
positive NPV.
I start my analysis in Section 1.3.1 with a baseline version of the model where the activist
always learns the value of the project upon joining the board. In this case, the activist
demands board settlement if and only if it provides him with a high decision authority.
3
The model has several interesting implications and predictions. First, acceptance of action
settlements always leads to higher average shareholder return than acceptance of board set-
tlements. This result is consistent with Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017), who find
that a settlement that contracts departure of the CEO leads to an average announcement
return of about 6-12%, while a settlement that gives the activist board seats on average
yields an announcement return of about 1%. Therefore, one may raise the question of
whether the ability of activists to demand board seats through settlements decreases share-
holder value. However, I find that demanding a high number of board seats in fact increases
ex-ante shareholder value more than demanding action settlement, because it increases the
likelihood of reaching a settlement, as well as the likelihood of a proxy fight upon rejection.
Related, given any settlement demand, decreasing the cost of waging a proxy fight reduces
the shareholder return conditional on settlement as well as conditional on proxy fight, al-
though the shareholder value conditional on the activist’s demand increases.8 For these
reasons, when evaluating the effects of shareholder activism, proxy fights and settlements
should be taken into account together. In other words, measuring shareholder value condi-
tional on the demand of the activist rather than conditional on the ex-post response of the
incumbent may yield more accurate estimates for the effect of activism on firm value.
Second, the probability that the activist’s proposal is implemented conditional on obtaining
access to the board is lower if these board seats were obtained through a settlement than
through a proxy fight (even if the number of board seats is identical in both cases). This
observation follows from the result that the incumbent rejects board settlement only if the
project NPV is positive, while it always accepts if the project NPV is negative. Therefore,
although some might interpret activists’ insistence on their proposal after winning a proxy
fight as short-termism or as overconfidence, this result provides another explanation as to
why activists might be more aggressive with their agenda in the boardroom after a successful
proxy fight. Third, the number of board seats demanded by the activist, the likelihood of a
8Gantchev (2013) finds that a campaign ending in a proxy fight has average costs of $10.7 million for the
activist and that these costs are equal to the two-thirds of the mean abnormal activist return, pointing to
significance of these costs from the perspective of the activist.
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proxy fight, and shareholder value can be non-monotonic with respect to the cost of waging
a proxy fight. Therefore, making activist interventions difficult can improve value of the
firm even when the activist’s preferences do not conflict with maximizing firm value. This
result complements the policy proposals to curb activism that often build on the argument
that activists destroy firm value due to their short-term focus.9
While the assumption in the baseline model that the activist always learn the project’s
value upon joining the board is a simplifying one, it is not realistic. Importantly, it masks
a disadvantage of board settlement relative to action settlement: Upon rejection of board
settlement, the activist cannot immediately infer whether the project NPV is negative or
positive. In other words, an important trade-off the activist faces between demanding ac-
tion settlement and board settlement is that in the latter, the information of the activist
becomes finer upon rejection, but it becomes coarser upon acceptance. Therefore, an im-
portant factor determining the activist’s choice of settlement demand is his ability to learn
the project’s value upon joining the board, i.e., his expertise in the industry of the target.
To analyze how this ability affects the activist’s demand, in Section 1.3.2, I endogenize the
decision of the incumbent to disclose the value of the project to the activist after the activist
joins the board. In this case, if the activist is likely to be informed upon board settlement of
the project’s value, then he demands board settlement. On the other hand, if the activist is
likely to remain uninformed upon board settlement, then he is often unable to exercise his
authority after board settlement, and therefore the activist prefers demanding action settle-
ment instead. However, I show that by demanding fewer seats, which reduces the activist’s
formal control within the board, or by nominating candidates with less industry expertise,
the activist can incentivize the incumbent to disclose the project’s value, increasing the
probability that the project is implemented. This result can help explain why the number
9One example is the Brokaw Act proposed in 2016 by the US senators Tammy Baldwin and Jeff Merkley.
The bill introduces more stringent disclosure rules for activists, aiming to make it more difficult for activists
to accumulate shares in firms, which would therefore make intervention more costly per share owned by
activists. In the press release of the proposal, it is stated that “Activist hedge funds are leading the short-
termism charge in our economy. [...] They often make demands to benefit themselves at the expense of the
company’s long-term interests.” See www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/brokaw-act.
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of board seats activists obtain in board settlements is fairly low (around 2).10 Moreover,
this result also suggests that “generalist” activists with low industry expertise can be more
effective than “specialized” activists in that industry.
Finally, in Section 1.4, I relax the assumption that the activist’s preferences are aligned with
shareholders, allowing for the activist to be willing to undertake value-destroying projects.
Specifically, I examine the question of whether activists destroy value through settlements,
as some shareholders have expressed concern that settlements may harm shareholder value.
Interestingly, I show that whenever a proxy fight occurs with positive probability, the activist
never destroys shareholder value through settlements but only after the activist wins a proxy
fight with the support of the shareholders.
My paper is related to the literature on corporate governance and shareholder activism. In
general, there are two kinds of governance mechanisms: Voice and exit.11 My paper belongs
to the strand of literature that focuses on voice. Typically, this strand does not distinguish
between different types of intervention methods and builds on the notion that the activist
can force his intervention on the firm without persuading the incumbent or shareholders.12
On the contrary, my paper includes settlements as a form of voice mechanism, alongside
proxy fight. Moreover, the success of the activist’s intervention attempts depends on the
belief of the incumbent regarding the activist’s threat of running a proxy fight and on the
belief of the shareholders regarding the value the activist will create in the event of a proxy
fight. The role of proxy fights in exerting control is extensively studied in literature.13
Distinctively from this literature, however, here I focus on the trade-off between different
types of settlements, and their interaction with the activist’s decision to run a proxy fight
10See Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017).
11For surveys on voice and exit, see, e.g., Edmans (2014) and Edmans and Holderness (2017). For the
literature on exit, see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), Goldman and Strobl (2013), and
Edmans et al. (2017).
12See, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Kyle and Vila (1991), Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994),
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Maug (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), Bolton and von Thadden
(1998), Noe (2002), Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), Edmans and
Manso (2011), and Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015).
13See, e.g., the papers listed in footnote 2 on page 2.
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as a result of the activist’s inference. My paper is also related to Levit (2017) who studies
communication, alongside with voice and exit, as a form of shareholder activism. Although
both models share the idea that voice (i.e., a proxy fight) is an outcome of a failure to
resolve the conflict by other means, Levit (2017) focuses on persuasion (i.e., communication
of private information) by the activist, while my model focuses on settlements as a form of
bargaining. I show that a key factor behind the activist’s demand is the information content
of the incumbent’s response, and that this endogeneity results in many novel predictions.
Cohn and Rajan (2013) also study the effect of an activist investor on the board’s decision-
making. However, in their model the role of the activist is to produce information, and the
board acts as an unbiased arbitrator between the management and the activist with the aim
of maximizing shareholder value. The focus of their analysis is the interaction between the
“internal governance” determined by the board and the “external governance” provided by
the activist. In contrast, in my model I treat the board and management as a monolithic
entity, who is conflicted with maximizing shareholder value, and I study the relation among
different kind of intervention methods (i.e., settlements and proxy fight) the activist can
utilize to correct this behavior.
In order to estimate the costs of various stages of activism, Gantchev (2013) builds a sequen-
tial decision model where the activist decides at each stage whether to exit or escalate his
intervention tactic. However, since he employs structural estimation, he deliberately leaves
other aspects exogenous, including the intervention method at each stage.14 In contrast, a
novel feature of my framework is that I explicitly model the critical differences between a
proxy fight and settlements, as well as within settlements. I show that these differences,
combined with the endogeneity of the decisions of the incumbent and shareholders, shape
the activist’s settlement demand as well as the decision to run a proxy fight.
The distinction between real and formal control was coined by Aghion and Tirole (1997).
In this literature, my paper relates to Dessein (2005), who builds on this distinction and
14Boyson and Pichler (2017) also empirically focus on the resistance of activists’ targets and the counter-
resistance by activists.
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studies the allocation of control rights between a privately informed entrepreneur and an
investor. While both papers show that lower formal control can be associated with higher
real control, the dynamics behind this result are quite different between the two models. In
Dessein (2005), as the information asymmetry increases, the entrepreneur relinquishes more
formal control to signal to the investor the congruence of their preferences, increasing the
entrepreneur’s real control. In my paper, by contrast, the activist utilizes his information
inference from prior negotiations to increase his real control. In particular, by demanding
lower formal control, the activist increases his credibility to implement the project upon
the incumbent’s nondisclosure, which in turn incentivizes the incumbent to disclose the
project’s value when it is negative.
Finally, my paper is also related to the literature on bargaining under asymmetric informa-
tion (See Kennan and Wilson (1993) for an early survey). In comparison to this literature,
I allow the parties to negotiate on two different dimensions, as opposed to one dimension:
actions and board composition. The latter is effectively a bargaining over rights on ac-
cess to information and decision making authority. However, negotiations on action versus
board seats do not lead to the same outcome since negotiations over rights can incorporate
private information. In this sense, my paper is related to Eraslan and Yılmaz (2007) who
consider bargaining with securities that allow eventual payoffs to depend on privately held
information at the time of negotiations.
1.2. Setup
Consider a model with an activist investor, a publicly traded firm which is initially run
by its incumbent board of directors, and passive shareholders of the target. The activist
and the incumbent own some shares in the firm as well. There is a project that the firm
can implement. I use “project” and “action” interchangeably. Denote by x = 1 if the
project is implemented, and x = 0 otherwise (i.e., status quo). The project creates a value
of ∆ per share for the activist and shareholders, while the incumbent’s payoff per share
from implementation is ∆ − b, where b represents the private benefit that the incumbent
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loses (per share owned) if project is implemented (i.e., x = 1).15 In Section 1.4, I relax
the assumption that the preferences of the activist and shareholders are aligned. ∆ follows
the cumulative distribution function F , which is continuous with full support on (∆, b),
which is the activist’s and shareholders’ prior information about ∆. On the other hand,
the incumbent privately knows ∆. The timeline of the game consists of three phases and is
illustrated in Figure 1.2.
In the first phase, the activist and the incumbent negotiates. This phase consists of two
stages.
1. (Proposal stage) First, the activist decides whether to make any demand. I denote
his demand by η. If the activist does not make any demand, η = ∅. Alternatively,
the activist can demand one of the following:
• Action settlement (η = A): The activist demands the incumbent to implement
the project.
• Board settlement with activist control of αB > 0 (η = B(αB)): The activist de-
mands board seat(s) that give him αB control in the board. A board control of α
gives the activist decision authority in the implementation stage with probability
α.
2. (Response stage) If the activist has made a settlement demand, then the incumbent
can accept the demand or reject it. If the incumbent accepts a settlement, I assume
that the activist cannot run a proxy fight, e.g., due to a stanstill agreement. If the
incumbent accepts action settlement, then the project is implemented, payoffs are
realized, and the game ends.
The second phase occurs if the incumbent has rejected the activist’s demand, or the activist
has not made any demand. This phase consists of two stages.
15Denoting the incumbent’s stake by nI and absolute private benefits from keeping status quo by BI , b
can be expressed as b = BI
nI
. Therefore, if nI∆ < BI < ∆, then implementing the project is the efficient
outcome even when the incumbent’s private benefits are considered.
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1. (Proxy fight stage) The activist decides whether to launch a proxy fight by incurring
a cost of κ > 0 per share he owns. Let e = 1 if a proxy fight is launched, and e = 0
otherwise. If the activist runs a proxy fight, the incumbent incurs a cost of cp,1 > 0.
2. (Voting stage) If the activist has launched a proxy fight, with probability 1−φ < 1 it
fails for exogenous reasons, e.g., lack of legal expertise of the activist, the shareholders’
fear for retaliation by the incumbent.16 With probability φ, shareholders vote on
the merit of the activist’s proposal, and the proxy fight succeeds if and only if the
shareholders support the activist. Let τ = 1 if the shareholder support the activist,
and τ = 0 otherwise. If the activist wins a proxy fight, then he obtains a control of
αP = 1 in the board, and the incumbent incurs a cost of cp,2, which is in addition to
cp,1.
17 I let cp ≡ cp,1 + φcp,2 and assume that
cp < (1− φ) (b−∆) . (1.1)
If the activist has not launched a proxy fight or loses it, the payoffs are realized, and
the game ends.
The third and final phase takes place if the activist has achieved some α > 0 board control,
either through board settlement or proxy fight. This phase consists of three stages.
1. (Learning stage) The activist receives a signal s = ∆ with probability q, and does not
receive any signal otherwise.
2. (Disclosure stage) The incumbent chooses whether to disclose ∆ to the activist. This
disclosure is verifiable.18
16In unreported analysis, I show the results qualitatively do not change under the alternative assumption
that the activist does not run a proxy fight with probability φ for exogenous reasons, e.g., exit due to a
liquidity shock, finding out that the cost of a proxy fight will be too high, etc.
17Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014) find that facing a direct threat of removal is associated with $1.3-2.9 million
in foregone income until retirement for the median incumbent director. They also find that after a proxy
fight, not only incumbent directors that were up for re-election during the proxy fight lose on average 0.71
on other boards, but also the other incumbent directors (who were not up for re-election) lose on average
0.45 seats on other boards.
18I assume that the incumbent cannot disclose ∆ unless the activist joins the board. The rationale
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3. (Implementation stage) The activist obtains decision authority with probability α,
and the incumbent obtains decision authority otherwise. Whoever has the decision
authority decides whether to implement the action. Payoffs are realized, and the game
ends.
1.2.1. Payoffs
Denoting the payoff of the incumbent, activist, and shareholder by ΠI , Πa, and Πsh respec-
tively,
ΠI(∆, e, τ) = x · (∆− b)− e · (cp,1 + φ · τ · cp,2) , (1.2)
Πa(∆, e) = x ·∆− e · κ, (1.3)
Πsh(∆, e) = x ·∆. (1.4)
As mentioned earlier, I modify the model in Section 1.4 such that the activist has a bias as
well.
1.3. Analysis
I solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game, where I allow for mixed strategies.
All proofs not in the main text are in the Appendix. Throughout the analysis, I denote the
probability that the activist runs a proxy fight if no settlement is reached by ρ. I start with
the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1. (i) Consider the implementation stage.
(a) If the incumbent board has the decision authority and an action settlement has
behind this assumption is that due to Regulation FD, outside the board, the incumbent has to make public
disclosure of any material information disclosed to a shareholder that is likely to trade, such as an activist.
However, public disclosure of proprietary information may harm the firm value and therefore may result in
the breach of fiduciary duty of the incumbent. Consistent with this, upon joining the board many directors
nominated by activists sign confidentiality agreements that restrict their information sharing outside the
board. See http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/12/15/sullivan-cromwell-reviews-and-analyzes-2016-u-
s-shareholder-activism/
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not been reached, then the incumbent does not implement the project.
(b) If the activist has acquired board seat(s), has the decision authority, and has
received a signal (or ∆ is disclosed), then the activist implements the project if
∆ > 0 and does not implement if ∆ < 0.
(ii) In any equilibrium where the activist runs a proxy fight with positive probability, he
wins with probability φ.
At the implementation stage, the incumbent strictly prefers not implementing the project
for any ∆ since its private benefits b per share from keeping status quo is always strictly
larger than the increase ∆ in the share value from implementing the project. On the other
hand, since the activist does not have private benefits from keeping the status quo, if he
learns ∆ in the board then he pushes for the project if ∆ > 0 and prefers status quo if
∆ < 0.
If the activist runs a proxy fight, as described in Section 1.2, with probability 1 − φ the
proxy fight fails for exogenous reasons, and with probability φ the shareholders vote on the
merit of the activist’s proposal. For the activist to be willing to incur to cost of a proxy
fight, it must be that ∆ > 0 with positive probability since the source of the activist’s profit
is the increase in the share price. Since the preferences of the shareholders and the activist
are aligned, in the event of a proxy fight, the activist wins with probability φ.
Throughout the rest of this section, I assume that the activist’s cost of proxy fight κ
satisfies19
κ ≤ κ0 ≡ φE [max {0,∆}] . (1.5)
19This assumption ensures that in any equilibrium upon rejection the activist runs a proxy fight with
positive probability. In the Appendix I relax this assumption and show that the only additional equilibria
to those described in the main text are the ones where the activist never runs a proxy fight upon rejection.
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1.3.1. Baseline model: Non-strategic disclosure
In this section, I assume that whenever the activist joins the board (through board settle-
ment or proxy fight) he learns ∆, either because q = 1 or because the incumbent always
discloses ∆.
1.3.1.1. No settlement offer
I start the analysis with the subgame where the activist has not demanded any settlement.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the activist has demanded no settlement. Then, an equilibrium of
this subgame exists, is unique, and in equilibrium the activist always runs a proxy fight.
If the activist has not made any demand, then upon running a proxy fight then the activist
wins with probability φ. Therefore, the expected increase in the share value if the activist
runs a proxy fight is given by κ0 = φE [max {0,∆}]. Since κ < κ0, the activist always runs
a proxy fight.
1.3.1.2. Action settlement
In this section, I consider the subgame where the activist has demanded action settlement.
The proposition below characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then, an equi-
librium of this subgame exists, is unique, and in equilibrium:
(i) The incumbent accepts the action settlement if and only if ∆ > ∆∗A, where
∆∗A (φ) ≡ max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1− φ
}
∈ (0, b) , (1.6)
where ∆̂A (φ) is unique and given by the solution of
κ = φE
[
max {0,∆} |∆ ≤ ∆̂A
]
. (1.7)
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(ii) Upon rejection, the activist runs a proxy fight with probability
ρ∗A (φ) ≡ min
{
1,
1
φ+
cp
b−∆̂A
}
> 0. (1.8)
A key driver behind Proposition 1 is that in equilibrium the incumbent follows a threshold
strategy. Intuitively, for given ∆ and the probability ρ that the activist runs a proxy fight
upon rejection, accepting action settlement gives the incumbent a payoff of ∆ − b, while
rejecting gives it an expected payoff of ρ[−cp + φ(∆ − b)] if ∆ ≥ 0 and −ρcp if ∆ < 0.
Specifically, for the incumbent there are two differences of rejecting compared to accepting
action settlement: While it bears the risk of facing a proxy fight and the associated expected
cost of ρcp, the probability that the project will be implemented, 1{∆≥0}ρφ, is smaller than
one. For ∆ values that are close to b, the incumbent is better off by just accepting to
implement the project instead facing the risk of proxy fight. On the other hand, for smaller
∆, the incumbent is willing to incur the damages of a proxy fight in order to decrease the
probability that the project is eventually implemented. Therefore, the incumbent’s incentive
to accept the settlement is strictly increasing in ∆, and there is a threshold ∆∗A (φ, ρ) such
that the incumbent accepts action settlement if and only if ∆ > ∆∗A (φ, ρ), where if ρ <
1
φ+
cp
b
then
∆∗A (φ, ρ) ≡ b−
cp
1
ρ − φ
(1.9)
and ∆∗A (φ, ρ) > 0. Although ∆
∗
A (φ, ρ) decreases further and becomes nonpositive if ρ is
any larger, this never takes place in equilibrium since otherwise the activist would have no
incentive to launch a proxy fight upon rejection.
Combined with the threshold strategy of the incumbent, the activist’s cost κ of running a
proxy fight pins down the equilibrium ρ∗. Since the activist is willing to run a proxy fight
upon rejection if and only if there is sufficient potential to increase the value of the firm, the
activist has a unique threshold ∆̂A given by (1.7) such that upon rejection he always runs a
proxy fight if ∆∗A > ∆̂A, never runs a proxy fight if ∆
∗
A < ∆̂A, and is indifferent otherwise,
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where ∆̂A is increasing in κ. Specifically, if the cost of proxy is small, i.e., ∆̂A(κ) < b−
cp
1−φ ,
then the threshold strategy that the incumbent follows is always larger than ∆̂A, and hence
the activist always run a proxy fight upon rejection, resulting in ρ∗ = 1. However, if the
cost of proxy fight is relatively large, i.e., ∆̂A(κ) ≥ b −
cp
1−φ , then ρ
∗ is sensitive to the
incumbent’s strategy ∆∗A. This results in ∆
∗
A = ∆̂A, because if ∆
∗
A is any larger then the
activist’s threat is too large to justify the large ∆∗A, and if ∆
∗
A is any smaller then the
activist has no threat on the incumbent. In turn, ∆∗A = ∆̂A determines ρ
∗, given by (1.8).
The next Corollary lays out some important implications of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then, in the
equilibrium,
(i) Upon winning a proxy fight, the activist sometimes does not implement the project.
(ii) The average shareholder return of action settlement is strictly larger than the average
shareholder return of a proxy fight. Moreover, the announcement return of action
settlement is positive.
(iii) Compared to the equilibrium where the activist does not demand any settlement, the
expected payoff of the activist is strictly larger, while expected shareholder value is
strictly smaller if and only if
ρ∗A < 1−
1− φ
φ
P (∆ > ∆∗A)E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
A]
P (∆ ∈ [0,∆∗A])E
[
∆|∆ ∈ [0,∆∗A]
] (1.10)
Corollary 1 starts with two simple observations. First, even if the incumbent rejects the
action settlement and the activist runs and wins a proxy fight, the activist may end up not
pushing for the project. This is because the activist does not know upon running a proxy
fight whether the project is negative or positive NPV, and therefore if it turns out that it
is negative NPV, the activist will not implement the project even if he achieves decision
authority in the board. As I will show in the next section, this will be in contrast with the
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activist’s behavior upon rejection if he has demanded board settlement. Second, the action
settlement is always the better outcome from the perspective of shareholders since it occurs
if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆∗A. This observation also implies that the announcement return of
action settlement should be positive and larger than the combined announcement returns
of the incumbent’s rejection and the activist’s proxy fight.
Part (iii) of Corollary 1 describes a more subtle implication of Proposition 1. The activist
strictly prefers to demand action settlement over demanding nothing since demanding action
settlement not only guarantees project implementation in the region ∆ ≥ ∆∗A, but it also
saves the activist the cost of launching a proxy fight in this region. Interestingly, however,
while the first effect is an advantage for the shareholders as well, the second effect is a
disadvantage for them when it reduces ρ∗ below one, since if the activist demands nothing
then ρ∗ = 1. For this reason, if the former effect is dominated by the decrease in ρ∗,
shareholders are in fact worse off by the activist’s demand of action settlement compared to
making no demand. Therefore, even though the preferences of the activist and shareholders
are aligned, shareholders can be adversely affected by the activist’s ability to make demands
from the incumbent.
The next Corollary specifies some comparative statics with respect to κ and cp.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then, in the
equilibrium,
(i) As κ decreases, the expected shareholder value conditional on settlement as well as
conditional on proxy fight decreases, while the unconditional expected shareholder value
increases.
(ii) As cp increases,
(a) If cp < (1 − φ)(b − ∆̂A), then part (i) strictly holds. Moreover, the activist’s
expected payoff strictly increases.
16
(b) If cp ≥ (1 − φ)(b − ∆̂A), then expected shareholder value strictly decreases, the
activist’s expected payoff does not change.
In part (i), as the activist’s cost κ of running a proxy fight increases, the activist’s threat
ρ∗ increases. Therefore, the incumbent is more likely to accept the settlement, resulting in
a drop in ∆∗A, which in turn decreases both the expected shareholder value conditional on
settlement, E [∆|∆ > ∆∗A], and the expected shareholder value conditional on proxy fight,
φE [max {0,∆} |∆ ≤ ∆∗A]. On the other hand, the unconditional shareholder value becomes
larger for two reasons: The probability of reaching an action settlement, P (∆ > ∆∗A),
increases, which always creates more value than a proxy fight would for the same ∆, and the
probability ρ∗ of a proxy fight upon rejection increases as well. Importantly, part (i) points
out how careful empirical findings should be interpreted when evaluating the effectiveness
of activism. Specifically, measuring the shareholder returns following only settlements or
only proxy fights might be misleading, because they are intertwined.
The comparative statics of shareholder value with respect cp, the damages incurred by the
incumbent if it loses a proxy fight, share the same characteristics with the comparative
statics with respect to κ if cp is small as described in part (ii.a). This is because as cp
increases, the incumbent again becomes more likely to accept the settlement, resulting
in a drop in ∆∗A, although the activist’s threat ρ
∗ = 1 does not change. The activist
becomes better off as well since in addition to the increase in the shareholder value, the
probability that he will need to run a proxy fight decreases since the rejection likelihood
P (∆ ≤ ∆∗A) decreases. On the other hand, if cp is already large as specified by part
(ii.b), then interestingly shareholder value is strictly decreasing in cp. To understand this
result, note that ∆∗A = ∆̂A since ∆
∗
A cannot be any lower for the activist has a credible
threat on the incumbent. Therefore, as cp increases, for the incumbent to still choose the
threshold ∆∗A = ∆̂A, due to (1.9) it must be that the activist’s threat ρ
∗ decreases, which
results in a drop in shareholder value. However, the activist does not internalize this loss
in shareholder value, because upon rejection he is indifferent between running a proxy fight
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and not since ∆∗A = ∆̂A. Combined with part (ii.a), this implies that overall the activist
weakly prefers larger cp, although increasing cp too much harms shareholder value and the
activist is unbiased. Therefore, even when shareholders believe that their preferences are
aligned with an activist, they should beware activist campaigns for policies that increase
cp, such as eliminating golden parachutes.
1.3.1.3. Board settlement
In this section, I assume that the activist has demanded board settlement with control
αB > 0. The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with activist con-
trol of αB ∈ (0, 1]. Then, an equilibrium of this subgame with on the equilibrium path proxy
fight exists, is unique, and in this equilibrium:20
(i) The incumbent accepts the settlement if and only if ∆ ∈ B∗ (αB) ≡ (∆, 0)∪(∆
∗
B(αB), b),
where ∆∗B ∈ (0, b) is given by
∆∗B (αB) ≡





b−
cp
αB−φ
, if αB > α̂L
∆̂B (φ) , otherwise
, (1.11)
where
α̂L ≡ φ+
cp
b− ∆̂B (φ)
, (1.12)
and ∆̂B is unique and given by the solution of
κ = φE
[
∆|0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆̂B
]
. (1.13)
20Throughout the analysis, I focus on this “proxy fight equilibrium”, where proxy fight is on the equilibrium
path. As I show in the Appendix, the only other equilibrium that exists is the “acceptance equilibrium”
where the incumbent accepts for all ∆, which exists if and only if αB ≤ φ+
c
b
. However, this equilibrium is
not robust to perturbations (e.g., consider any distribution Gn(·) of ∆ such that Gn(∆) > 0 for all ∆ ≤ b,
and suppose that the activist makes a mistake with probability εn > 0 at the implementation stage. Then,
as Gn(·)
p
→ F (·) and εn → 0, no equilibrium converges to the acceptance equilibrium, while proxy fight
equilibrium does emerge). Nevertheless, I show in the Appendix that many of the results continue to hold
qualitatively under the alternative selections of equilibrium.
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(ii) Upon rejection the activist runs a proxy fight with probability ρ∗B (αB) ≡ min
{
1, αBα̂L
}
.
Proposition 2 starts with the simple observation that in equilibrium the probability ρ that
the activist runs a proxy fight upon rejection is positive. Indeed, if ρ∗ = 0, then the incum-
bent strictly prefers to reject for all ∆ > 0, because the incumbent knows that if it accepts
board settlement, the activist will implement the project whenever he has the decision au-
thority, which will occur with probability αB . Since the incumbent would reject for all
∆ > 0, a proxy fight would be strictly profitable for the activist since κ < φE [max {0,∆}].
To understand the incumbent’s strategy, there are two cases to consider. If ∆ < 0, then
the incumbent does not have anything to fear from having the activist in the board, since
the activist will learn that ∆ < 0 and hence will not push to implement the project. On
the other hand, the incumbent faces the risk of a proxy fight if it rejects. Therefore, the
incumbent strictly prefers to accepts board settlement for all ∆ < 0. On the other hand,
if ∆ ≥ 0, then the incumbent knows that if the activist gets decision authority in the
board then he will implement the project, and therefore the incumbent follows a threshold
strategy. Specifically, the incumbent accepts board settlement if and only if
αB(∆ − b) > ρ[−cp + φ(∆ − b)], (1.14)
or, equivalently for all ∆ > ∆∗B (αB , ρ), where if ρ <
αB
φ+
cp
b
then
∆∗B (αB , ρ) ≡ b−
cp
αB
ρ − φ
, (1.15)
and ∆∗B (αB , ρ) > 0. Although ∆
∗
B (αB , ρ) decreases further and becomes nonpositive if ρ
is any larger, this would imply that the incumbent accepts for all ∆, which does not take
place in the equilibrium where proxy fight is on the equilibrium path.
In turn, ρ∗ is pinned down in a similar fashion to the case where the activist demands
action settlement. Specifically, there is a unique threshold ∆̂B such that upon rejection the
activist always runs a proxy fight if ∆∗B > ∆̂B , never runs a proxy fight if ∆
∗
B < ∆̂B , and is
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indifferent otherwise, where ∆̂B is increasing in κ. If the control demand of the activist is
high, i.e., αB > α̂L, then since the threshold strategy that the incumbent follows is always
larger than ∆̂B, the activist always run a proxy fight upon rejection, resulting in ρ
∗ = 1.
However, if the control demand of the activist is low, i.e., αB ≤ α̂L, then ρ
∗ is sensitive to
the incumbent’s strategy ∆∗B , resulting in ∆
∗
B = ∆̂B, which in turn determines ρ
∗
B .
The next Corollary establishes some implications of Proposition 2.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with activist control
of αB > 0. Then, in any equilibrium of this subgame where proxy fight is on the equilibrium
path,
(i) Upon board settlement the activist sometimes does not implement the project even if
he achieves the decision authority, while upon winning a proxy fight the activist always
implements the project if he achieves the decision authority.
(ii) The average shareholder return of board settlement is always strictly smaller than
the average return of an action settlement. Moreover, ∆∗B (αB) ≤ ∆
∗
A for any αB,
and the average shareholder return of board settlement is strictly smaller than the
average shareholer return of a proxy fight if and only if ∆∗B (αB) > ∆̄B(αB), where
∆̄B(αB) ∈ (0, b) is unique and given by
αBE
[
max {0,∆} |∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̄B
]]
= φE
[
∆|∆ ∈
[
0, ∆̄B
]]
. (1.16)
(iii) Suppose αB = 1. Then,
(a) The expected payoff of the activist is strictly larger than in the equilibrium where
he has not demanded any settlement or where he has demanded action settlement.
(b) The expected shareholder value is strictly larger than in the equilibrium where he
the activist demanded action settlement if ρ∗A < 1.
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Upon any board settlement, it is revealed that the project NPV is negative with some
probability. Therefore, whenever this is the case, the activist does not push for the project
in the boardroom. On the other hand, upon rejection the activist perfectly understands that
the project NPV is nonnegative. Therefore, if the activist runs a proxy fight upon rejection,
then upon winning he will be very aggressive with his agenda in the boardroom, always
implementing the project as long as he has the decision authority. Note that this is also in
contrast with the activist’s behavior upon winning a proxy fight if the board has rejected
an action settlement as described in Corollary 1 part (i). For this reason, the dynamics
in the boardroom not only depend on the amount of control the activist has achieved, but
also heavily depend on the path the activist has achieved that control (i.e., proxy fight vs.
board settlement) as well as on the prior demand of the activist.
Part (ii) compares the average return of board settlement with the return of action settle-
ment as well as proxy fight upon rejection of board settlement. An important difference
action settlement and board settlement is that while action settlement takes place if and
only ∆ ≥ ∆∗A, where the project is implemented with probability one, board settlement
takes place for all ∆ ∈ (∆, 0) ∪ (∆∗B(αB), b), where ∆
∗
B(αB) ≤ ∆
∗
A. Moreover, under board
settlement the project is implemented at most with probability αB. Therefore, the average
return of board settlement is strictly smaller than that of action settlement, consistent with
Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017) who find that board settlements have an average
announcement return of about 1%, while settlements that specify the departure of the CEO
have an average announcement return of 6-12%. In fact, if ∆∗B (αB) is close to b then board
settlement also has a lower average announcement return than that of a proxy fight, because
the announcement of board settlement reveals that with high likelihood ∆ < 0 and hence
the project will not be implemented, while proxy fight reveals that ∆ ≥ 0. The fact that
this result holds even if αB = 1 once again emphasizes the point that for the final decisions
that come out of the new board, in addition to the amount of control the activist has gained
in the board, the way with which the activist has achieved this control is also crucial.
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Although part (ii) of Corollary 3 state that if looked at the data, the return of board settle-
ments will seem small compared to action settlement, this does not mean that demanding
board settlement produces less value then demanding action settlement. Part (iii) articu-
lates this contrast, and tells that both the activist and shareholders always prefer demanding
board settlement with αB = 1 over demanding action settlement. To see this result, note
that compared to demanding action settlement, when the activist demands board settle-
ment with αB = 1, (1) the board accepts board settlement if ∆ < 0, saving the activist
the cost of launching a proxy fight, (2) the activist increases his proxy fight threat from ρ∗A
to ρ∗B because upon rejection the activist understands that ∆ ≥ 0, increasing shareholder
value, and (3) the increase in ρ∗ incentivizes the incumbent to accept the settlement offer
more, i.e., ∆∗B ≤ ∆
∗
A, benefiting both the the activist and shareholders. The last point
has a double benefit for the activist, because not only it increases shareholder value, but it
further saves him cost of a proxy fight. Moreover, when demanding board settlement, the
activist can further increase his expected payoff by adjusting his demand αB , as I show in
Section 1.3.1.4.
The next Corollary specifies some comparative statics with respect to κ and cp.
Corollary 4. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with activist control
of αB > 0. Then, in any equilibrium of this subgame where proxy fight is on the equilibrium
path,
(i) As κ decreases, the expected shareholder value conditional on settlement as well as con-
ditional on proxy fight decreases, while the unconditional shareholder value increases.
(ii) As cp increases:
(a) If cp < (αB − φ) (b − ∆̂B), part (i) strictly holds. Moreover, the activist’s ex-
pected payoff strictly increases, while the incumbent board’s ex-ante expected pay-
off strictly decreases.
(b) If cp ≥ (αB − φ) (b − ∆̂B), then expected shareholder value strictly decreases,
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the activist’s expected payoff does not change, and the incumbent board’s ex-ante
expected payoff strictly increases.
The comparative statics with respect to κ and cp are similar with their counterpart under
action settlement demand in Corollary 4, with one addition: If cp is small as specified by
part (ii.a), then the incumbent’s rejection threshold is so high that ρ∗ = 1, and hence the
incumbent is strictly worse of by an increase in cp. However, if cp is large as described
by (ii.b), then surprisingly incumbent’s ex-ante expected payoff is strictly increasing in cp!
This is because ∆∗B = ∆̂B for all such cp, and for ∆
∗
B to stay constant upon an increase
in cp, the activist’s threat ρ
∗ decreases so much that this decrease dominates the increase
in cp, increasing the incumbent’s expected payoff in the region ∆ ∈ [0, ∆̂B ] from rejecting.
Therefore, even though some incumbent boards may willingly make themselves more vul-
nerable for a proxy fight, for example by reducing or eliminating golden parachutes, doing
so may effectively shield them more from activists and does not necessarily mean that the
boards in these firms are not conflicted with the shareholders. In fact, the incumbent prefers
larger cp if and only if doing so decreases shareholders value, i.e., cp ≥ (αB − φ)
(
b− ∆̂B
)
.
Moreover, since the activist always prefers higher cp, if this condition holds, then activists
and incumbents are in agreement for policies that increase cp, although it harms shareholder
value.
1.3.1.4. Equilibrium demand
In this section, I endogenize the settlement demand of the activist. Empirically, we do not
observe an incumbent board handing all of the board seats to an activist in a settlement
(see, e.g., Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017)). Therefore, in this section I restrict
the level of control the activist can demand in board settlement to αB ∈ (0, αh], where
αh ∈ (0, 1] is exogenous.
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21One of the possible justifications for this assumption is that it may be costly for the incumbent board
to give board seats to the activist. In an unreported analysis, I endogenize αh and show that the incumbent
rejects board settlement for all ∆ if and only if αB > αh under the assumption that the incumbent board
suffers additional cost that increases monotonically with the activist’s control α.
23
As αB decreases to zero, the activist’s payoff from demanding board settlement diminishes
to zero as well, because not only the activist’s decision authority upon board settlement be-
comes insignificant, but also upon rejection the activist becomes indifferent between running
a proxy fight and not. In contrast, by Corollary 3, the activist strictly prefers demanding
board settlement with control αB over demanding action settlement if αB is sufficiently
large. Moreover, the activist’s payoff from demanding action settlement is strictly posi-
tive by Proposition 1, because then action settlement is reached with positive probability.
Therefore, when deciding whether to demand action settlement or board settlement, the
activist demands board settlement if and only if αh is large. The next result formalizes this
finding, as well as characterizing the equilibrium α∗B the activist demands when he decides
to demand board settlement.
Proposition 3. Suppose that for any αB > 0, the equilibrium with on the equilibrium
path proxy fight is in play. Then, an equilibrium always exists, and there exists a unique
αl ∈ (0, 1) such that in any equilibrium the activist demands board settlement if and only
if αh > αl. Moreover, if αh > αl, then in any equilibrium the activist demands board
settlement with α∗B ∈ Λ ≡ argmaxmin{αh,α̂L}≤αB≤αh Πa (αB) and
(i) In equilibrium, α∗B is unique if any of the following holds:
(a) If α̂L ≥ αh, then, α
∗
B = αh.
(b) If α̂L < αh, κ <
cp
2 , and f
′ (∆) ≥ 0 for all ∆ ∈
[
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
αh−φ
]
, then
α∗B =











αh, if Π
′
a (αh) ≥ 0,
α̂L, if Π
′
a (α̂L) ≤ 0,
α∗∗B ∈ (α̂L, αh) s.t. Π
′
a (α
∗∗
B ) = 0, otherwise.
(1.17)
(ii) There exists α∗sh ∈ (0, αh] that maximizes shareholder value, and α
∗
sh ≥ min {αh, α̂L}.
Moreover, any α∗sh satisfies α
∗
sh > maxΛ if α̂L < maxΛ < αh, and α
∗
sh ≥ maxΛ
otherwise.
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(iii) Suppose that ∆ ∼ U (∆, b). Then,
(a) In equilibrium α∗B is unique and α
∗
B = αh if α̂L ≥ αh or κ ≤
cp
2 , and α
∗
B = α̂L
otherwise, where α̂L(κ) = φ+
cp
b− 2κ
φ
.22
(b) Πsh(αB |κ) is strictly increasing in αB for any κ. Moreover, if κH >
cp
2 and αh >
φ, then in equilibrium Πsh(α
∗
B |κ) is maximized if and only if κ ∈ (0,
cp
2 ] ∪ {κH},
where
κH ≡
φ
2
·
(
b−
cp
αh − φ
)
.
To see how the activist determines the level of control αB to demand when he decides
to demand board settlement, note that the activist’s expected profit by demanding board
settlement is given by
Πa (αB) = αB
∫ b
∆∗B(α)
∆dF (∆) +
∫ ∆∗B(αB)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) , (1.18)
where the first and second terms represent the activist’s expected payoff upon acceptance
of board settlement and upon rejection, respectively. If αB < α̂L, then ∆
∗
B (αB) = ∆̂B does
not change with αB , and hence ΠA (αB) is strictly increasing in αB. This is because for the
activist to have credibility against the incumbent, ∆∗B (αB) has to be sufficiently large, i.e.,
∆∗B (αB) ≥ ∆̂B . When αB < α̂L, this constraint binds, resulting in ∆
∗
B (αB) = ∆̂B. On
the other hand, if αB > α̂L, then
Π′a (αB) =
∫ b
b−
cp
αB−φ
∆dF (∆)−
cp
(αB − φ)
2 f
(
b−
cp
αB − φ
)[
(αB − φ)
(
b−
cp
αB − φ
)
+ κ
]
.
(1.19)
In this case, demanding higher αB has three distinct effects: While it gives the activist higher
control conditional on board settlement, as represented by the first term in (1.19), it also
increases the likelihood of rejection, as represented by the second term. In the latter case,
not only the activist has to incur the cost of a proxy fight to have the project implemented,
22If κ =
cp
2
and αL < 1, the activist’s profit is maximized at any α ∈ [αL, 1].
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but also the probability that it will be eventually implemented drops from αB to φ even
though the activist runs a proxy fight. These effects determine in equilibrium the level of
αB the activist demands.
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 points outs that the optimal αB for shareholders is larger than
the equilibrium choice of the activist. To see this result, note that the expected shareholder
value is given by
Πsh (αB) = αB
∫ b
∆∗B(αB)
∆dF (∆) + ρ∗B(αB)φ
∫ ∆∗B(αB)
0
∆dF (∆) . (1.20)
When αB < α̂L, shareholder value is strictly increasing in αB since ρ
∗
B(αB) strictly increases.
Therefore, for all αB < α̂L, the interests of the activist and shareholders are aligned, and
both prefer larger αB. In contrast, if αB > α̂L, then shareholders and the activist may
differ about what αB should be demanded. Specifically, as αB increases, the likelihood of
rejection increases; however, shareholders do not internalize the increased expected proxy
fight cost the activist will incur due to higher probability of rejection. In other words,
Π′sh (αB) = Π
′
a (αB |κ = 0), and hence Π
′
sh (αB) ≥ Π
′
a (αB). Therefore, shareholders may
end up wishing that the activist were more aggressive in his demand and would demand
higher αB .
If α̂L(κ) > αh, then the activist demands α
∗
B = αh, and hence Corollary 4 implies that
expected shareholder value is decreasing in κ and cp. In the case where cp is small such that
α̂L(
cp
2 ) < αh, part (iii) of Proposition 3 implies some additional interesting comparative
statics with respect to κ and cp. Under uniform distribution, shareholder value is strictly
increasing in αB . Therefore, if the cost of a proxy fight is small, i.e., κ <
cp
2 , the activist
makes the highest demand possible, α∗B = αh, and the shareholder value is maximized.
On the other hand, increasing κ over this threshold results in a drop in the demand of
the activist to α̂L, because the importance the activist puts on minimizing the need of a
proxy fight outweighs the benefits of maximizing shareholder value. Note that this drop is
substantial if α̂L(
cp
2 ) is small, e.g., if b is large or cp is small. Therefore, small changes in
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policies that affect the activist’s ability to run a proxy fight or the incumbent’s ability to
resist might have significant effects on the activist’s demand and, therefore, on shareholder
value. Futhermore, even more interestingly, although increasing κ from below
cp
2 to above
it results in a loss of shareholder value, further increasing it can raise shareholder value!
Specifically, if
cp
2 < κ < κH , raising κ strictly increases the equilibrium demand α
∗
B of
the activist since α∗B = α̂L(κ) and α̂L(κ) increases with κ. Intuitively, upon larger κ, the
lowerbound ∆̂B(κ) for the rejection threshold ∆
∗
B of the incumbent increases, since upon
rejection the activist must have sufficient incentives to challenge the incumbent. Therefore,
demanding αB lower than the new, larger α̂L(κ) has no benefit to the activist anymore,
because doing so does not decrease ∆∗B as it did under smaller κ. In other words, under
larger κ, since the activist has a credible threat to run a proxy fight only if the expected
project return upon rejection is larger, the activist demands higher α∗B so that it is rejected
more often. Therefore, as κ increases, not only the activist becomes more aggressive in the
number of seats he demands, but also negotiations end in a proxy fight more frequently.
The increase in α∗B with respect to κ continues up to κ = κH , which results in α̂L(κ) = αh
and hence forces the activist to demand α∗B = αh, once again maximizing shareholder
value. More generally, I show in the Appendix that under any distribution, as long as
for some κ the activist does not demand the highest level of control he can demand, then
expected shareholder value is nonmonotonic with respect to κ and is maximized if and only
if κ ∈ [0, κL] ∪ {κH} for some 0 < κL < κH .
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1.3.2. Strategic disclosure
In this section, I assume that the activist does not always receive a signal that reveals ∆ to
him upon getting α > 0 control in the board, i.e., q ∈ (0, 1), and the incumbent is strategic
when deciding to disclose ∆ to the activist in the boardroom. Upon gaining board control
through board settlement (proxy fight), I denote by γB (γP ) the probability with which
the activist implements the project when he does not receive a signal and the incumbent
23In the Appendix, I also derive the sufficient conditions under which α∗B is nonmonotonic under alternative
selections of equilibrium.
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does not disclose ∆. Noting that Lemma 1 still holds, I start the analysis with another
preliminary lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the activist has acquired α > 0 control, and consider any equi-
librium. Then, after acquiring board seats, if the activist believes that ∆ > 0 with positive
probability, then in any equilibrium γ∗ = 1 or γ∗ = 0. Moreover,
(i) If γ∗ = 0, the incumbent weakly prefers not to disclose ∆ for any ∆. Moreover, the
project is not implemented if the activist does not receive a signal.
(ii) If γ∗ = 1, the incumbent strictly prefers to disclose ∆ if ∆ < 0, and is indifferent
between disclosing and not if ∆ > 0. Moreover, the project is implemented if the
activist has decision authority and ∆ > 0, and is not implemented if ∆ < 0.
Intuitively, upon joining the board if the activist believes that ∆ > 0 with positive prob-
ability, which will be the case in any equilibrium as we will see in the following sections,
then it cannot be that γ∗ ∈ (0, 1), because if it were then the incumbent would always
disclose ∆ to the activist whenever ∆ < 0, inducing the activist to update his belief upon
nondisclosure to ∆ ≥ 0. Therefore, in any equilibrium, γ∗B , γ
∗
P ∈ {0, 1}.
If γ∗ = 0, then the incumbent knows that the activist will not implement the project
if he does not get any signal, and thefore has no incentive to disclose ∆ to the activist.
Moreover, if the activist will push for the project with positive probability upon disclosure,
e.g., ∆ > 0, then the incumbent strictly prefers not to disclose. Therefore, the incumbent
does not engage in any disclosure that might result in the implementation of the project,
and the project is implemented only if the activist learns on his own that ∆ ≥ 0.
On the other hand, if γ∗ = 1, then the incumbent has strict incentives to disclose if ∆ < 0,
because doing so will change the activist’s mind to not implementing the project. If ∆ > 0,
however, then disclosing or not disclosing will not make a difference since the activist will
implement the project either way.
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Throughout the rest of the analysis, whenever multiple equilibria exist, for exposition pur-
poses I select the equilibria where the incumbent does not disclose if it is indifferent between
disclosing and not disclosing. This selection does not have any material impact on the out-
come, because by Lemma 3, conditional on γ∗ ∈ {0, 1}, in equilibrium the disclosure policy
of the incumbent when it is indifferent does not affect the implementation probability of
the project. In addition, for technical reasons, whenever multiple equilibria exist I also
select the equilibria where the activist implements the project if he is indifferent between
implementing and not.24 Finally, for simplicity I assume that E [∆] > 0.25
1.3.2.1. No settlement offer
As I did in the baseline model, I start the analysis with the subgame where the activist has
not demanded any settlement.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the activist has not demanded any settlement. Then, an equilib-
rium of this subgame exists, and in equilibrium the activist runs a proxy fight and γ∗P = 1.
In equilibrium it can never be that γ∗P = 0, because if it were then the incumbent would never
disclose ∆ for any ∆ > 0, and therefore upon nondisclosure the activist would deviate to
implementing the project. Therefore, in equilibrium γ∗P = 1, and the equilibrium is identical
to the equilibrium in Lemma 2 in the baseline model, with the exception that the incumbent
does not disclose ∆ if ∆ ≥ 0. However, this difference does not have any impact on the
equilibrium outcome, because neither it changes the ex-ante incentives of the activist to run
a proxy fight or of the shareholders to elect the activist in the event of a proxy fight, nor it
changes the ex-post incentives of the activist to implement the project at any ∆, including
in the event of nondisclosure, which occurs only if ∆ ≥ 0.
24In the Appendix I derive the equilibria without any of these selections, and show that they do not have
a material effect on the outcome.
25This assumption constitutes a more interesting scenario by ensuring that the equilibrium where the
incumbent does not disclose ∆ to the activist once the activist gets board seat does not always exist. Again,
I relax this assumption in the Appendix and show that many of the results continue to hold qualitatively.
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1.3.2.2. Action settlement
In this section, I consider the subgame where the activist has demanded action settlement.
The next Proposition characterizes the equilibria.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then, an equilib-
rium of this subgame exists, and in any equilibrium the incumbent accepts action settlement
if and only if ∆ > ∆∗A(φβ
∗
P ), upon rejection the activist runs a proxy fight with probability
ρ∗A (φβ
∗
P ), and γ
∗
P ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover,
(i) (Disclosure equilibrium) An equilibrium where γ∗P = 1 always exists. Moreover, in
equilibrium, β∗P = 1, and if the activist runs and wins a proxy fight then the incumbent
discloses ∆ if and only if ∆ < 0.
(ii) (Nondisclosure equilibrium) An equilibrium where γ∗P = 0 exists if and only if
E[∆|∆ ≤ ∆∗A(φq)] < 0.
26 Moreover, in equilibrium, β∗P = q, and if the activist runs
and wins a proxy fight then the incumbent discloses ∆ if and only if ∆ < 0.
In the disclosure equilibrium, γ∗P = 1, and hence the incumbent discloses ∆ to the activist
upon board settlement if ∆ < 0. Therefore, the disclosure equilibrium is identical to the
equilibrium in Proposition 1 in the baseline model, with the exception that the incumbent
does not disclose ∆ if ∆ ≥ 0. However, again, this difference does not have any impact
on the equilibrium outcome because it does not affect the probability that the project is
implemented for any ∆. Importantly, this equilibrium always exists, because γ∗P = 1 implies
that the incumbent discloses ∆ to the activist for all ∆ < 0, which justifies γ∗P = 1.
In contrast, in the nondisclosure equilibrium the incumbent does not disclose ∆ to the
activist for any ∆, with the expectation that the activist will not implement the project
if he has not received a signal. In turn, the activist does not implement the project upon
nondisclosure (i.e., γ∗P = 0) if and only if E [∆|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] < 0, which is therefore also the
26This inequality holds weakly without the focus on the equilibria where the activist implements the
project when he is indifferent between implementing and not implementing.
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existence condition of the equilibrium. Therefore, although the activist has a decision
authority with probability 1 upon winning a proxy fight, he can utilize this control as long
as he learns ∆ himself, i.e., only with probability q. In other words, while the activist has a
formal control of αP = 1 upon winning a proxy fight, his effective control is β
∗
P = q, where
βP (γP ) ≡ αP [q + (1− q) γP ] . (1.21)
On the other hand, in the disclosure equilibrium, the effective control of the activist is equal
to his formal control, i.e., β∗P = αP = 1. Therefore, the underlying difference between the
disclosure and nondisclosure equilibrium is the effective control of the activist, which is the
probability that the activist has the decision authority and is able to make an informed
decision. Specifically, apart from its existence condition and change in the disclosure policy
of the incumbent, the nondisclosure equilibrium plays out the same way the equilibrium in
Lemma 2 in the baseline model would play out if the formal control of the activist αP = 1
were to be replaced with β∗P = q.
The next result lists some of the implications of Proposition 4.
Corollary 5. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then,
(i) Consider the disclosure or the nondisclosure equilibrium. Then, Corollary 1 except
for part (iii) and Corollary 2 hold for any q ∈ (0, 1), where φ everywhere is replaced
with φβ∗P .
(ii) Suppose that q < 1 and nondisclosure equilibrium exists. Then,
(a) The activist and shareholders are strictly better off under the disclosure equilib-
rium.
(b) The incumbent is strictly better off under the nondisclosure equilibrium if κ <
κ0 (φq) and ∆̂A (φ) ≤ b−
cp
1−φ .
(iii) Suppose that nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, the ac-
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tivist’s expected payoff is maximized if and only if q ∈ (0, qA], where qA is unique and
given by
E
[
∆|∆ ≤ max
{
∆̂A (φqA) , b−
cp
max{1 − φqA,
cp
b−∆}
}]
= 0. (1.22)
Within the disclosure and nondisclosure equilibrium, Corollaries 1 and 2 mostly hold since in
both equilibria the outcomes are the same with the version of the baseline model where the
formal control αP of the activist is replaced with his effective control β
∗
P . The exception to
this is Corollary 1 part (iii), because it compares the case where the activist has demanded
action settlement with the case where the activist has not the demanded anything. In this
comparison, while in the baseline model the activist always preferred demanding action
settlement over demanding nothing, under strategic disclosure this is not necessarily true
anymore. Specifically, the activist prefers demanding nothing if nondisclosure equilibrium
is in play when he demands action settlement and q is small.27 This is because if the
activist demands action settlement, as the effective control of the activist β∗P = q upon
winning a proxy fight decreases, not only the probability that a positive NPV project is
implemented after a successful proxy fight is reduced, but also the incumbent is incentivized
to reject more often, increasing ∆∗A and hence decreasing the probability of settling on the
implementation of the project. This observation also implies that the activist is worse
off under the nondisclosure equilibrium than under disclosure equilibrium. On the other
hand, the incumbent is better off under nondisclosure equilibrium if the probability that
the activist runs a proxy fight is not substantially larger compared to the nondisclosure
equilibrium, e.g., if the condition in part (ii.b) holds.
Interestingly, the activist can overcome the nondisclosure problem by committing to a low
q. Suppose that the activist could also choose q while demanding action settlement in
27An example is ∆ ∼ U(∆, b),∆ = −40, b = 60, φ = 0.9, cp = 12, κ = 3, q = 0.5. Under these parameters,
if the activist demands action settlement and nondisclosure equilibrium is in play, then the expected payoff
of the activist is Π∗a = 11.64. However, if the activist does not demand anything, then in equilibrium
Π∗a = 13.2. Therefore, the activist strictly prefers the latter.
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conjunction with the demand he is making. Since q represents the expertise of director
nominees of the activist, the activist can adjust q through his candidates for the board.
Specifically, nondisclosure equilibrium exists if and only if q > qA, and therefore setting
q ≤ qA maximizes the activist’s expected payoff. The intuition behind this result is that
for large q, the incumbent is more likely to accept action settlement, resulting in a low
∆∗A(φq) and hence E [∆|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A(φq)]. Therefore, in the boardroom, upon nondisclosure of
the incumbent, the activist does not implement the project. In other words, the activist
cannot credibly threaten the board with implementing the project if the board does not
disclose, because the board knows that the activist does not have sufficient incentives to
implement the project if he is uninformed about ∆. On the other hand, as q decreases,
in the nondisclosure equilibrium the incumbent becomes more likely to reject because the
activist’s effective control in the board decreases. However, this drives ∆∗A(φq) up, and
therefore for low q, the expected value of the project upon proxy fight, E [∆|∆ ≤ ∆∗A(φq)],
becomes positive. Therefore, in the boardroom the activist credibly threatens the board
by implementing the project in the event of nondisclosure, triggering disclosure if ∆ < 0.
For this reason, the activist can eliminate the nondisclosure equilibrium with q ≤ qA, and
the activist’s expected profit is maximized at q ≤ qA. This finding demonstrates how a
“generalist” activist with low expertise in the industry of the target firm can be as effective
as, or even more effective than a “specialized” activist in that industry.
While the activist can overcome the nondisclosure equilibrium by setting q low, there is
a commitment issue involved. Specifically, within the nondisclosure equilibrium, at the
proposal stage if the activist tells the incumbent that he will run a proxy fight with a specific
q if the incumbent rejects action settlement, the activist has no reason to actually do it in
the case of a rejection. To the contrary, at the proxy fight stage the activist strictly prefers
highest q possible to maximize this profits. Therefore, the activist’s inability to commit
to low q at the proxy fight stage increases the likelihood of the existence nondisclosure
equilibrium. As I will show in the next section, demanding board settlement will make the
activist immune to this commitment problem.
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1.3.2.3. Board settlement
In this section, I assume that the activist has demanded board settlement with control
αB > 0. The next proposition characterizes the equilibria.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with activist con-
trol of αB ∈ (0, 1]. Then, an equilibrium of this subgame with on the equilibrium path proxy
fight exists,28 and in this equilibrium ρ∗ = ρ∗B(β
∗
B), γ
∗
P = 1, γ
∗
B ∈ {0, 1}, and the incumbent
accepts the settlement if and only if ∆ ∈ B∗(β∗B) = (∆, 0) ∪ (∆
∗
B (β
∗
B) , b), where
β∗B(αB) ≡ αB [q + (1− q) γ
∗
B] . (1.23)
Moreover,
(i) (Disclosure equilibrium) Such an equilibrium with γ∗B = 1 always exists. Moreover,
in this equilibrium the incumbent discloses ∆ upon board settlement if and only if
∆ < 0.
(ii) (Nondisclosure equilibrium) Such an equilibrium with γ∗B = 0 exists if and only
if29
E [∆|∆ /∈ [0,∆∗B (β
∗
B)]] < 0. (1.24)
Moreover, in this equilibrium the incumbent does not disclose ∆ for any ∆ upon board
settlement .
As in the baseline model, in any equilibrium with on the equilibrium path proxy fight, the
incumbent accepts board settlement for all ∆ < 0 since it can disclose ∆ to the activist
and prevent project implementation. Therefore, upon rejection, the activist perfectly un-
28Similar to in Section 1.3.1.3, throughout the analysis I focus on this “proxy fight equilibrium”, where
proxy fight is on the equilibrium path. As I show in the Appendix, the only other equilibrium that exists is
the “acceptance equilibrium” where the incumbent accepts for all ∆, which exists if and only if αB ≤ φ+
c
b
.
However, this equilibrium is again not robust to perturbations. Nevertheless, I show in the Appendix that
many of the results continue to hold qualitatively under the alternative selections of equilibrium.
29Without the focus on the equilibria where the activist implements the project when he is indifferent
between implementing and not implementing, this equilibrium also exists when (1.24) holds with equality.
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derstands that ∆ ≥ 0. Moreover, for the activist to make profit by running a proxy fight,
it must be that ∆ > 0 with positive probability. Therefore, as in the baseline model, the
activist always implements the project upon running and winning a proxy fight. This holds
true regardless of whether the activist learns ∆ or not, resulting in γ∗P = 1, and mak-
ing the disclosure policy of the incumbent is irrelevant after proxy fight. For this reason,
the effective control of the activist upon proxy fight is equal to his formal control. i.e.,
β∗P = αP = 1, and strategic disclosure matters only upon board settlement. Specifically,
“disclosure” and “nondisclosure” in the categorization of the equilibria in Proposition 1
refers to the dynamics upon board settlement.
In the disclosure equilibrium, γ∗B = 1, and hence the incumbent discloses ∆ to the activist
upon board settlement if ∆ < 0. Therefore, the disclosure equilibrium is identical to the
equilibrium in Proposition 1 in the baseline model, with the exception that the incumbent
does not disclose ∆ if ∆ ≥ 0. However, this difference does not have any impact on the
equilibrium outcome, because neither it changes the ex-ante incentives of the activist to
run a proxy fight and of the shareholders to elect the activist in the event of a proxy fight,
nor it changes the ex-post incentives of the activist to implement the project at any ∆ in
the event of nondisclosure, which occurs only if ∆ ≥ 0. Importantly, the effective control
of the activist upon board settlement is equal to his formal control. i.e., β∗B = αB . This
equilibrium always exists, because upon nondisclosure the activist infers that ∆ ≥ 0, which
justifies γ∗B = 1.
In the nondisclosure equilibrium the incumbent does not disclose ∆ to the activist upon
board settlement, with the expectation that the activist will not implement the project if
he has not received a signal. In turn, the activist does not implement the project upon
nondisclosure (i.e., γ∗B = 0) if and only if E [∆|∆ ∈ B
∗] < 0, which is therefore also the
existence condition of the equilibrium. Therefore, in this equilibrium the effective control
of the activist in the board is reduced to β∗P = αBq, although he has a formal control of
αB . For this reason, the underlying difference between the disclosure and nondisclosure
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equilibrium is the effective control of the activist upon board settlement, and apart from its
existence condition and change in the disclosure policy of the incumbent, the nondisclosure
equilibrium plays out the same way the equilibrium in Proposition 1 in the baseline model
would play out if the formal control of the activist αB upon board settlement were to be
replaced with β∗B = αBq.
Since in nondisclosure equilibrium the probability that the activist implements the project
upon board settlement decreases, the incumbent prefers the nondisclosure equilibrium over
disclosure equilibrium. The next corollary formalizes this result, and also states that Corol-
laries 3 and 4 mostly holds within the disclosure and disclosure equilibrium since in both
equilibria the outcomes are the same with the version of the baseline model where the formal
control αB of the activist upon board settlement replaced with his effective control β
∗
B .
Corollary 6. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with αB ∈ (0, 1].
Then, in any equilibrium where proxy fight is on the equilibrium path,
(i) Consider the disclosure or nondisclosure equilibrium. Then, Corollary 3 except for
part (iii) and Corollary 4 hold, where αB is replaced with β
∗
B (αB) given by Proposition
5.
(ii) The incumbent’s ex-ante expected payoff is strictly decreasing with β∗B.
An implication of part (i) is that the lack of disclosure is a second reason why activists
might be more aggressive with their agenda after winning proxy fights, compared to after
board settlements. This is because upon rejection the activist learns that ∆ ≥ 0, but upon
board settlement not only the activist does not know whether ∆ is positive or negative, but
also even if it is positive he may not implement the project unless he receives a positive
signal.
Corollary 3 part (iii) compares the case where the activist has demanded board settlement
with αB = 1 to the cases where the activist has demanded action settlement and where the
has not demanded anything. If disclosure equilbrium is in play when the activist demands
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board settlement with αB = 1, then the activist still prefers demanding board settlement as
in the baseline model, and even more so because if the activist demands action settlement,
then nondisclosure equilibrium might be in play, which drives the activist’s expected profit
further down. However, if nondisclosure equilibrium is in play when the activist demands
board setlement, then the activist might prefer demanding action settlement or demanding
nothing instead. However, even if this is the case, interestingly the activist might overcome
this problem associated with nondisclosure equilibrium and trigger disclosure by demanding
board setttlement with lower αB , as I show next.
By Proposition 5, nondisclosure equilibrium exists if and only if (1.24) holds. Since ∆∗B(αBq)
is decreasing in αB with a lowerbound of ∆̂B , if E
[
∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]
]
≥ 0, then there exists
α̂D > 0 such that nondisclosure equilibrium exists if and only if αB > α̂D. Intuitively,
if the activist demands large αB , then ∆
∗
B(αBq) is high since the incumbent is reluctant
to give the activist large control when ∆ ≥ 0. Since the incumbent always accepts board
settlement when ∆ < 0, the conditional expectation of ∆ upon board settlement is negative.
Therefore, the activist cannot credibly threaten the incumbent with implementing the action
upon nondisclosure. On the other hand, as αB decreases, then the incumbent becomes
more likely to accept board settlement, which drives ∆∗B(αBq) down. Once the conditional
expectation of ∆ upon board settlement becomes positive, the activist can start credibly
threatening the incumbent with implementing the action upon nondisclosure, triggering
disclosure, and therefore eliminating nondisclosure equilibrium. Therefore, for αB ≤ α̂D,
the effective control of the activist increases from αBq to αB . Moreover, interestingly,
the threshold α̂D(q) that triggers disclosure gets larger as q decreases, because for a given
αB , in nondisclosure equilibrium decreasing q incentivizes the incumbent to accept the
board settlement, making the nondisclosure equilibrium more fragile. The next corollary
formalizes these results and the associated α̂D, as well as giving details on the the effective
control the activist can achieve in equilibrium with adjusting αB.
Corollary 7. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with some αB > 0,
and consider any equilibrium where proxy fight is on the equilibrium path. Then,
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(i) Nondisclosure equilibrium exists if and only if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] < 0, or E[∆|∆ /∈
[0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and αB > α̂D(q), where α̂D(q) is unique and is given by
E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, b−
cp
qα̂D (q)− φ
]]
= 0. (1.25)
Moreover, α̂D(q) ≥ α̂L, and α̂D(q) is strictly decreasing in q.
(ii) Suppose that nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, β∗B (αB) =
β for some αB ∈ (0, 1] if and only if β ∈ (0, β̄], where
β̄ (q) =











q, if E[][∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] < 0,
1, if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and α̂D (1) ≥ 1
min{1,max{q, α̂D (q)}}, if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and α̂D (1) < 1
(1.26)
Moreover, if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and α̂D (1) < 1, then there exist unique q
B
L , q
B
H ∈
(0, 1) such that qBL < q
B
H and
β̄ (q) =











q, if qBH ≤ q,
α̂D (q) , if q
B
L < q < q
B
H ,
1, if q ≤ qBL ,
(1.27)
As mentioned earlier, if the activist demands board settlement, then the activist’s effective
control upon winning a proxy fight is equal to his formal control, i.e., β∗P = αP = 1, and
therefore the only underlying difference between the disclosure and nondisclosure equilib-
rium is the effective control of the activist upon board settlement. Suppose that nondisclo-
sure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists.30 Then, there is a maximum effective control β̄
such that the activist can achieve an effective control of β by demanding some αB > 0 if and
only if β ≤ β̄. Specifically, if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] < 0, then nondisclosure equilibrium exists
30One justification behind this selection would be that the incumbent is strictly better off under the
nondisclosure equilibrium by Corollary 6, and ultimately it is the incumbent who is deciding whether to
disclose ∆ to the activist.
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for all αB . Therefore the effective control of the activist for a given αB is β
∗
B(αB) = αBq,
and β̄ = q. In this case, the activist prefers larger q, because it gives the activist more
choices of β∗B by varying αB . If E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and α̂D (1) ≥ 1, then nondisclosure
equilibrium does not exist for any αB . Therefore β
∗
B(αB) = αB for any αB, and β̄ = 1.
Since the set of effective controls the activist can choose from does not change with q, the
activist is indifferent among all q.
On the other hand, the dynamics change if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and α̂D (1) < 1. Then,
for any q > qBL , the nondisclosure equilibrium exists if and only if αB > α̂D(q). Therefore,
β∗B(αB) = αBq if αB > α̂D, and β
∗
B(αB) = αB if αB ≤ α̂D. This implies that β̄ =
max {q, α̂D}, because the activist either achieves maximum effective control by demanding
α∗B = 1 or by demanding α
∗
B = α̂D. If q is large, i.e, if q ≥ q
B
H , then demanding αB = 1
yields the activist the largest effective control, as it might be expected. However, if q is
relatively smaller, i.e., q ∈ (qBL , q
B
H), then the activist achieves β
∗
B(αB) = β̄ if and only if
αB = α̂D. In other words, the activist can achieve higher effective control in the board by
demanding less formal control! Therefore, an important reason why activists receive about 2
board seats on average in settlements (Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch (2017)) although
the activist could (and sometimes do) ask for more seats may be to increase the probability
that project is implemented by enhancing communication in the boardroom. Moreover,
interestingly, whenever this is the case, i.e., q ∈ (qBL , q
B
H), the activist can further increase β̄
by decreasing q, because as explained earlier, decreasing q increases α̂D(q) by incentivizing
the incumbent to accept settlement more often, making the nondisclosure equilibrium more
fragile. In fact, if the activist chooses q ≤ qBL , then nondisclosure equilibrium does not exist
for any αB , and therefore the activist can achieve the maximum effective control that he
could achieve in the baseline model, i.e., when q = 1. For this reason, the activist prefers
q ∈ (0, qBL ]. Again, as in the case where the activist demanded action settlement, this
finding demonstrates how a “generalist” activist with low expertise in the industry of the
target firm can be as effective as, or even more effective than a “specialized” activist in that
industry.
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Under strategic disclosure, another advantage of demanding board settlement over demand-
ing action settlement is that in the former, the activist is not subject to the commitment
problem that he would have in the latter and that would make it difficult to get rid of
the nondisclosure equilibrium. Specifically, setting q low when demanding board settlement
does not pose a commitment problem on the activist, because in equilibrium q does not
affect proxy fight stage since upon rejection the activist perfectly knows that ∆ ≥ 0, unlike
when he demanded action settlement. In contrast, as explained in Section 1.3.2.2, if the
activist demands action settlement and it is rejected, then at the proxy fight stage he always
prefers nominating candidates with higher q, making difficult committing a low q at the
negotiations stage.
1.3.2.4. Equilibrium demand
In this section, I allow the activist the choose among demanding nothing, action settlement,
board settlement with any αB . First, I characterize the equilibrium conditional on the
activist demands board settlement. Since the only underlying difference between disclosure
and nondisclosure equilibrium is the effective control of the activist upon board settlement,
and by Corollary 7 the activist can achieve an effective control β by demanding some αB
if and only if β ≤ β̄, the activist’s maximization problem at the proposal stage where
he decides what αB to demand is very similar to his maximization problem in the baseline
model, where he could choose from any effective control β ≤ 1. Therefore, the only difference
under strategic disclosure is that the activist optimizes over a more restricted set of effective
controls, β ≤ β̄. The next corollary formalizes this result by characterizing equilibrium β∗B
and providing sufficient conditions for uniqueness of β∗B .
Corollary 8. Suppose that the activist can only demand board settlement, and if rejected,
consider any subgame equilibrium where proxy fight is on the equilibrium path. Moreover,
suppose that nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, an equilibrium
always exists, and in any equilibrium the activist demands board settlement with α∗B such
that β∗B (α
∗
B) ∈ Λ (q) ≡ argmaxβ∈[min{β̄(q),α̂L},β̄(q)]ΠA (β), where β̄ (q) is given by (1.26).
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Moreover,
(i) In equilibrium, β∗B is unique if any of the following holds:
(a) If α̂L ≥ β̄, then, α
∗
B = β̄.
(b) If α̂L < β̄, κ <
cp
2 , and f
′ (∆) ≥ 0 for all ∆ ∈
[
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
β̄−φ
]
, then
β∗B =











β̄, if Π′A
(
β̄
)
≥ 0,
α̂L, if Π
′
A (α̂L) ≤ 0,
β∗∗B ∈
(
α̂L, β̄
)
s.t. Π′A (β
∗∗
B ) = 0, otherwise.
(1.28)
(ii) There exists β∗SH ∈ (0, β̄] that maximizes shareholder value, and β
∗
SH ≥ min
{
β̄, α̂L
}
.
Moreover, any β∗SH satisfies β
∗
SH > maxΛ if α̂L < maxΛ < β̄, and β
∗
SH ≥ maxΛ
otherwise.
(iii) Suppose that ∆ ∼ U (∆, b). Then,
(a) In equilibrium β∗B is unique and β
∗
B = β̄ if α̂L ≥ β̄ or κ <
cp
2 , and β
∗ = α̂L
otherwise.31
(b) Shareholder value is strictly increasing in βB .
Next, I allow the activist to make any demand from the incumbent. In the baseline model
the activist always prefers demanding board settlement by Corollary 3 part (iii), because
the activist was not restricted in the maximum effective control he could achieve upon board
settlement, which was always equal to his formal control. Therefore, the activist continues
to demand board settlement under strategic disclosure as well if and only if the maximum
effective control the activist can achieve upon board settlement in equilibrium is sufficiently
high. The next Proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 6. Consider any subgame equilibrium where proxy fight is on the equilibrium
31If κ =
cp
2
and αL < β̄, the activist’s profit is maximized at any β ∈ [αL, 1].
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path if the activist’s demand is rejected. Moreover, suppose that nondisclosure equilibrium is
in play whenever it exists. Then, an equilibrium always exists. Moreover, there exists unique
β ∈ (0, 1) such that there is an equilibrium where the activist demands board settlement if
and only if β̄ ≥ β.
An important implication of Proposition 6 is that since β̄ converges to one as q increases
to one, for sufficiently large q the activist always demands board settlement. In other
words, if q is sufficiently large, then the restriction it puts little restriction on the effective
control the activist can achieve upon board settlement, and therefore the activist is still
strictly better off by demanding board settlement. For this reason, the activist demands
action settlement only if q is small. The next Corollary formalizes this result and also
gives sufficient conditions under which the activist prefers demanding action settlement
over demanding board settlement.
Corollary 9. There exists q̄ < 1 such that the activist demands board settlement if q > q̄.
Moreover, if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] < 0 and nondisclosure equilibrium described by Proposition 5
is in play for any αB, then there exists q ∈ (0, q̄) such that if q < q then the activist strictly
prefers demanding action settlement over demanding board settlement with any αB.
To see why the activist would prefer demanding action settlement over demanding board
settlement, suppose E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] < 0. Then, if the activist has demanded board
settlement, for any αB, nondisclosure equilibrium exists and under this equilibrium the
activist’s expected payoff converges to zero as q decreases to zero, because not only the
activist’s effective control upon board settlement decreases, but also upon rejection he
becomes indifferent between running a proxy fight and not. On the other hand, if the
activist demands action settlement, as shown by Corollary 5, as q decreases only disclosure
equilibrium survives, enabling the activist to get the expected payoff he would get in the
baseline model where q = 1. Therefore, whenever q is small, i.e., q < q, the activist prefers
demanding action settlement over demanding board settlement.32
32An example is ∆ ∼ U(∆, b),∆ = −50, b = 55, φ = 0.8, c = 3, κ = 10. Then, q ≈ 0.22.
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1.4. Biased activist
In this section I generalize the setup by allowing for a bias of bA ∈ (−∞,∞) in the activist’s
payoff. Specifically, I assume that the activist’s payoff when the project is implemented is
∆− bA, and hence with this modification the activist’s payoff is given by
ΠA(∆, x, e) = x · (∆− bA)− e · κ, (1.29)
where e = 1 if the activist runs a proxy fight and x = 1 if the project is implemented.
Therefore, compared to the shareholders, bA > 0 (bA < 0) means that the activist has
a bias against (in favor) of implementing the project. I let q > 0, and allow strategic
disclosure.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the activist has a bias of bA ∈ (−∞,∞) and has demanded
a settlement. Then, an equilibrium always exists. Moreover,
(i) Suppose bA < 0. Then, there always exists an equilibrium where the project is never
implemented upon settlement if ∆ < 0. Moreover, in any equilibrium where proxy fight
is on the equilibrium path, for any ∆ < 0 the project is never implemented following
a settlement, while for all bA < ∆ < 0 the activist runs and wins the proxy fight and
implements the project with positive probability.
(ii) Suppose bA ≥ 0. Then, in any equilibrium, the project is never implemented if ∆ < 0.
If the activist has a bias against the project (i.e., bA > 0), then a shareholder value destroy-
ing project is never implemented since both the activist and the incumbent are against such
a project. Therefore, if a value destroying project is ever implemented in equilibrium, it
must be that the activist has a bias in favor of the project, i.e., he must be profiting from
the implementation of the project if bA < ∆ < 0 for some bA < 0. Therefore, a question
that arises is that since shareholders are not at the negotiation table when settlements are
reached, could the activist be destroying shareholder value through settlements?
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However, even if bA < 0, Proposition 7 tells that in any equilibrium where proxy fight is
on the equilibrium path, the project is never implemented upon settlement if the project
destroys shareholder value. On the other hand, in any such equilibrium, negative NPV
projects do get implemented, and interestingly this takes place exclusively after the activist
runs and wins a proxy fight! To see the intuition behind this result, note that if proxy
fight is on the equilibrium path, it must be that the shareholders elect the activist with
positive probability. Consider any settlement demand that can be made by the activist. If
the activist has demanded action settlement, then similar to the intuition in Proposition
1, the incumbent follows a threshold strategy ∆∗A such that it accepts if and only if ∆ >
∆∗A. Therefore, for any value destruction to take place through settlement, it must be
∆∗A < 0. However, then upon rejection and the activist’s proxy fight, shareholder perfectly
understand the activist will destroy value if he gets seats in the board, and therefore they
never elect him. For this reason, value destroying projects are implemented only after the
activist runs a proxy fight. The case where the activist demands board settlement is similar.
In this case, the incumbent accepts board settlement for all ∆ < bA, because it knows that
the activist will not push for the project once he learns ∆. Similar to the case with the
unbiased activist in Proposition 2, there is a second threshold ∆∗B such that the incumbent
rejects if and only if ∆ ∈ [bA,∆
∗
B ]. However, it cannot be that ∆
∗
B < 0, because then the
shareholders never elect the activist to the board in the case of a proxy fight. Therefore,
again, no value destroying project is implemented upon board settlement, but such projects
do get implemented with positive probability after the activist runs a proxy fight.
The next result states that an activist that does not suffer from information asymmetry
after joining the board always prefers demanding board settlement over demanding action
settlement, regardless of his bias bA.
Corollary 10. Suppose that q = 1 or for all ∆ the incumbent discloses ∆ to the activist
if he gets board seat(s). Then, the activist weakly prefers demanding board settlement with
αB = 1 over demanding action settlement.
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The intuition behind this result is similar to the intuition in the baseline model. Compared
to demanding action settlement, by demanding board settlement the activist not only saves
cost of running a proxy fight if ∆ < bA, but also increases his credibility upon rejection
since he learns that ∆ ≥ bA, which therefore pushes the incumbent to accept settlement
more.
However, instead of demanding board settlement, the activist might prefer demanding noth-
ing, and running a proxy fight right away! To understand this result, note that if the ac-
tivist demands board settlement, upon rejection information regarding ∆ is revealed not
only to the activist, but also to the shareholders. To be precise, if the larger rejection
threshold ∆∗B of the incumbent is small, then upon a rejection, the shareholders are in-
different between supporting the activist and not if the activist runs a proxy fight since
E [∆|∆ ∈ [bA,∆
∗
B ]] = 0, and they will not always elect him to the board. On the other
hand, if the activist does not demand anything, then no information is revealed to the
shareholders, and therefore the shareholders strictly prefer to elect the activist to the board
if E [∆|∆ ∈ [bA, b]] > 0. Therefore, if the information advantage of demanding board set-
tlement for the activist is dominated by its disadvantage due to the information revealed
to the shareholders, the activist decides to demand no settlement, and run a proxy fight
directly.33
This observation has to two interesting implications. First, shareholders might actually be
worse-off under the choice of the activist to make no demand than under his board settle-
ment demand, although the reason why the activist chooses the former in the first place is
because the shareholders do not always support him in the latter. In other words, sharehold-
33An example is ∆ ∼ U(−10, 15), φ = 0.8, cp = 4, cp,2 = 2.5, κ = 1, bA = −10, q = 1. Suppose that proxy
fight equilibrium is in play if the activist demand board settlement. Then, under these parameters, the
activist’s expected payoff from demanding board settlement strictly increases with αB , yielding an expected
payoff of Π∗a = 6.9 if αB = 1, where the shareholders support the activist with probability σ
∗ = 0.5. On the
other hand, making no demand and running a proxy fight gives the activist an expected payoff of Π∗a = 9,
where the shareholders always elect the activist upon running a proxy fight, i.e., σ∗ = 1. Morever, the
ex-ante expected payoff of shareholders is Π∗sh = 2.5 in the former, while it is Π
∗
sh = 2 in the latter, which
is the equilibrium. If the shareholders could commit to σ∗ = 1, then the activist would demand board
settlement with α∗B = 1, resulting in Π
∗
sh = 2.8.
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ers’ information inference from the demand of the activist may actually hurt themselves, and
hence shareholders may desire remaining uninformed, or alternatively, committing to sup-
port the activist in a proxy fight, even though the activist is biased. Second, the probability
that the activist runs a proxy fight can be increasing with his bias.
1.5. Conclusion
In this paper, I study the economics of settlements between activist investors and incum-
bent boards. The activist can demand an action to be implemented right away (“action
settlement”) or demand a number of board seats (“board settlement”) which gives the ac-
tivist partial decision authority and access to better information about the prospects of the
proposal.
I find that compared to action settlement, demanding board settlement increases the ac-
tivist’s credibility upon rejection and real control upon a successful proxy fight. Therefore,
the activist prefers demanding board settlement unless the real control he can achieve upon
board settlement is too small. Interestingly, the activist can mitigate this obstacle and
achieve higher real control by demanding lower formal control (i.e., fewer seats) or nomi-
nating candidates with less expertise. On the other hand, to minimize the risk of rejection,
activists may demand too few seats and not maximize shareholder value. Surprisingly,
increasing the cost of a proxy fight can alleviate this conflict and make the activist more
aggressive. The model has several other implications and empirical predictions, e.g., re-
lated to shareholder value, costs of proxy fight, and activist expertise. Importantly, the
characteristics of ex-ante shareholder value conditional on the demand of the activist are
different than those of ex-post shareholder value conditional on the outcome (e.g., reaching
a settlement or a proxy fight). Specifically, the latter might be smaller under the activist’s
demand of board settlement than under action settlement or might be increasing (decreas-
ing) in the cost of a proxy fight for the activist (the incumbent). However, the opposite
may be true for the ex-ante shareholder value. Therefore, when trying to identify the effects
of activism on firm value, measuring shareholder value at the demand level of the activist
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might produce more accurate results. Finally, I examine whether activists destroy value
through settlements when not aligned with shareholders, and show that value destroying
proposals are not typically implemented following settlements, but rather, after the activist
wins a proxy fight.
One of the potential routes for future research is to study the effect of proxy advising on the
demands of the activist. Proxy advising, provided by firms such as Institutional Shareholder
Services and Glass Lewis, is a relatively new phenomenon in corporate governance, and
it aims to help shareholders make an informed decision when they vote. However, the
impact of proxy advisors on the decision-making of shareholders, firms, and activists is
not fully understood. For example, their overall effect on shareholder value is unclear,
since shareholders are sometimes better-off by remaining uninformed, e.g., in order not to
adversely affect the activist’s demand as demonstrated in Section 1.4.
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Figure 1.1: The incumbent’s equilibrium behavior under different settlement demands
Notes: Figure illustrates of the incumbent’s equilibrium behavior under different settlement
demands.
Figure 1.2: The timeline
Notes: Figure depicts the timeline of the model.
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CHAPTER 2 : Corporate Control Activism
(with Doron Levit)
“I’d like to thank these funds [Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz, Jana Partners, Third Point] for
teeing up deals because they’re coming in there and shaking up the management and many
times these companies are being driven into some form of auction.” Thomas H. Lee, a
private equity fund manager.1
2.1. Introduction
Corporate boards have the power to resist a takeover of their company, for example, by
issuing a shareholder rights plan (“poison pill”).2 In principle, directors should use this
power to negotiate a higher takeover premium or to reject coercive bids. However, the
separation of ownership and control creates agency conflicts (Berle and Means (1932)):
There is a risk that this power would be abused to protect insiders’ private benefits of
control and block takeovers that would otherwise create a shareholder value. In those cases,
the resistance to takeovers can be overcome only if the majority of directors are voted out in
a contested election (“proxy fight”). In fact, the power of shareholders to unseat directors
is often used by the courts as the basis for allowing boards to block takeovers in the first
place (Gilson (2001)).
Shareholders, however, cannot vote out the incumbent directors unless an alternative slate
is put on the ballot. Empirically, bidders rarely launch proxy fights to replace all or part
of the resisting target board.3 Most proxy fights are launched by activist hedge funds (Fos
(2017)), who often demand from companies they invest in to sell all or part of their assets
1The New York Times, “Will Credit Crisis End the Activists’ Run?”, 8/27/2007.
2Under most jurisdictions, including Delaware, merger proposals can be brought to a vote for a shareholder
approval only by the board of directors. Alternatively, tender offers do not require a vote, but they are
vulnerable to poison pills, which can be adopted on short notice and make a takeover virtually impossible.
3Fos (2017) find that only 5% of all proxy fights between 2003 and 2012 were sponsored by corporations
(i.e., potential bidders).
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(Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2017)).
Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017) document
hundreds of activist campaigns that resulted with a takeover bid by a third party, and
argue a causal link. For example, in 2014, the board of PetSmart agreed to be bought out
for $8.7 billion after facing months-long pressure, which included the threat of a proxy fight
from one of its largest shareholders, the activist hedge fund Jana Partners.4 As another
example, in 2013, the private-equity firm KKR acquired Gardner Denver for $3.7 billion
after the activist hedge fund ValueAct Capital accumulated a 5% stake in the company,
filed a schedule 13D, and agitated for its sale. Highlighting the activist’s role in the deal,
KKR’s co-CEO, George Roberts, said: “We wouldn’t have bought Gardner Denver had not
an activist shown up. They are a nicer form of what in the old days the green mailers and
the hostile raiders used to do. They were great for our business.”5
In principle, both bidders and activist investors can use proxy fights to pressure companies
to sell, but the evidence suggests that this tactic is mostly employed by activists, not bidders.
Why? What is the relative advantage of activists, if any? In this paper we propose a novel
theory that answers these questions and explains the unique role of activist investors in the
M&A market. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, our main argument is simple. We argue that,
as counterparties to the acquisition, bidders have a fundamental conflict of interests with
target shareholders from which activist investors are immune, and as a result, the ability of
bidders to win proxy fights is very limited. Since activist investors have a relative advantage
in pressuring corporate boards to relinquish control, our theory proposes that their unique
role in the M&A market is making corporate assets available for sale.6 This result holds even
if bidders and activists have similar expertise and can use similar techniques to challenge
incumbents.
4See The New York Times, “Under Pressure From Jana, PetSmart Says It Will Explore Potential Sale”,
8/19/2014; The New York Times, “Elliott and Jana, Activist Investors, Are Behind 2 Big Buyouts”,
12/15/2014; and The Deal Pipeline, “Jana Unveils Potential Board Slate for PetSmart”, 11/21/2014.
5Reuters, “Activism, Economy Weighed on M&A in 2013, Issues Could Linger”, 12/19/2013.
6We focus on takeovers, but our theory can be applied to divestitures and assets sales as well.
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In Section 2.2 we formalize our key argument. We analyze a simple dynamic bargaining
model in which the identity of the target board, who is negotiating an acquisition agreement
on behalf of target shareholders, is endogenized by an interim proxy fight stage. The
incumbent board, who has private benefits from controlling the target, can at least partially
resist a takeover. A proxy fight to oust the resisting incumbent can be initiated by the
bidder or the activist, but its success requires the vote of target shareholders. Crucially,
a proxy fight is not a referendum on the terms of the takeover, but rather a vote on the
composition of the board. We show that once the bidder’s nominees are elected, the bidder
will be tempted to abuse his control of the target board, exploit its access to the target’s
proprietary information, and low-ball the takeover premium. Indeed, as their counterparty,
the bidder has the opposite preferences of target shareholders. In other words, a buyer
cannot be expected to act in the best interests of the seller. This is the fundamental conflict
of interests between the bidder and target shareholders. Since this conflict cannot be easily
solved, target shareholders cannot trust the bidder; they will vote against his nominees and
the proxy fight will fail. By contrast, activist investors buy shares with the expectation
that the target will be acquired. Unlike bidders, activists are typically on the sell-side of
the negotiating table and have incentives to bargain the highest takeover premium possible.
Since activists enjoy a higher credibility when campaigning against incumbents, they are
also more successful in winning proxy fights. As a result, the threat of activists to launch
a proxy fight and replace the incumbent is sufficient to induce the latter to accept takeover
offers that they would have otherwise rejected.
As a whole, our theory proposes that activist investors have an inherent advantage relative
to bidders in pressuring entrenched incumbents to sell. Importantly, our key observation
is in relative terms. It does not imply that bidders can never use proxy fights to pressure
incumbents to sell the firm, but it does suggest that these events are less frequent than
campaigns in which an activist pushes for the sale of the target company. This prediction
is supported by the empirical evidence that bidders rarely run proxy fights (Fos (2017)),
while activist investors frequently launch campaigns with the objective of selling the target
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company (Greenwood and Schor (2009), Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017)). In
addition, our analysis emphasizes the benefit from separating the capacity to disentrench
boards from the capacity to increase firm value through acquisitions; one party cannot
combine two roles that rely on opposing preferences. The complementarity between the
activist and the bidder suggests that the role of activist investors in the M&A market is
unique.
To further study the implications of activist interventions on the M&A market, we consider
two extensions to the baseline model. In Section 2.3 we consider the possibility that the
activist would start a proxy fight in anticipation of a takeover offer. Why would an activist
start a proxy fight before a specific bidder arrives? Intuitively, overcoming the resistance of
the incumbent requires the bidder to offer the target a hefty takeover premium. Knowing
that a takeover is likely to be pricey discourages the bidder from performing due-diligence
of the target. By replacing the entrenched incumbent, the activist and other shareholders
effectively incentivize potential bidders to perform due-diligence by assuring them that they
will be able to negotiate a “fair” deal with the new board. Unlike the baseline model, here
proxy fights are not only used as threats; they are actually initiated and completed by the
activist on the equilibrium path.
The analysis offers a number of interesting empirical implications. First, it predicts a non-
monotonic relationship between the frequency of proxy fights and board entrenchment.
Intuitively, if the incumbent is not entrenched then a proxy fight is not needed; the bidder
will be able to reach an agreement even without the activist’s intervention (or threat to
do so). However, if the incumbent is highly entrenched then all parties involved correctly
anticipate the strong incentives of the activist to intervene, and as a result, the threat of
a proxy fight is sufficient to pressure the incumbent to sell. In all other cases, the activist
launches a proxy fight since the threat of doing so is not strong enough to encourage the
bidder to engage with the target. Second, the model predicts that proxy fights with a stated
objective of selling the target should be observed before a specific bidder arrives. Moreover,
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when such a proxy fight is taking place, it is expected to increase the probability that
the target receives a takeover offer afterwards, and as a result, the expected shareholder
value should be higher. As we discuss in Section 2.3, this prediction is consistent with the
empirical evidence: Announcements of proxy fights with a stated goal of selling the firm to
a third party generate positive abnormal stock returns for the target firm, and these target
firms are significantly more likely to be acquired within two years after the proxy fight.
In Section 2.4 we endogenize the decision of the activist to become a target shareholder.
In general, activists invest either because they believe the company is likely to become a
takeover target or because they can facilitate its takeover by putting the company into
play. In the former case, the activist uses her private information to speculate on the
possibility of a takeover, but her investment has no real effect on the target. We refer to
these cases as “selection,” since the activist’s investment in the target is correlated with a
higher probability of a takeover, but the link is not causal. By contrast, in the latter case,
the activist uses her private information to identify firms that could be a takeover target,
and by doing so, the activist increases the probability of a takeover. Essentially, bidders
interpret the presence of an activist as a signal that the target is available for sale, and as a
result, they are more likely to start takeover negotiations with the target. In other words,
the activist is soliciting offers by assuring bidders that they will face a weaker opposition
to the takeover. We refer to these cases as “treatment,” since the activist’s investment in
the target directly affects the probability of a takeover and its terms.
While the aforementioned empirical literature finds evidence that is consistent with the
treatment effect (e.g., the probability of a takeover is several times higher when an activist
hedge fund is a shareholder of the target), it is hard to rule out the possibility of a selection
effect, especially when a proxy fight is not observed. We show that the model’s comparative
statics with respect to the incumbent’s private benefits of control and the cost of running a
proxy fight are sensitive to the existence of the treatment effect in equilibrium. Importantly,
this feature can be used to create identification strategies for empirical research. For exam-
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ple, if only the selection effect is in play, the volume of M&A decreases with the severity
of the agency problems in target firms. This is intuitive, as with more private benefits of
control the incumbents are more likely to resist takeover bids. However, when the treatment
effect is in play, more resistance of incumbents to takeovers can result in a higher volume of
M&A. Intuitively, the resistance of incumbents to takeovers provides activist investors with
opportunities to facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have taken place. The ex-
pectation that incumbents would be pressured to accept their takeover offers increases the
incentives of potential bidders to approach these companies, thereby increasing the overall
probability of a takeover. Based on this logic, the treatment effect can be identified in data
by a positive relationship between the severity of agency problems in the cross section of
target firms and the likelihood of a takeover.
Our paper contributes to the literature on takeovers and shareholder activism (for surveys,
see Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2003 and Edmans, 2014, respectively). Unlike studies in
which the bidder is also a target shareholder (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer
and Titman (1990); Kyle and Vila (1991), Burkart (1995), Maug (1998), Singh (1998), Bu-
low, Huang, and Klemperer (1999)), our analysis emphasizes the benefit from separating
the capacity to disentrench boards from the capacity to increase firm value through acquisi-
tions, and highlights the complementarity between shareholder activism and takeovers. The
interaction between bidders and target blockholders was also studied by Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi (2000), Cornelli and Li (2002), Gomes (2012), and Burkart and Lee (2017).
Different from these papers, however, we focus on agency problems within the target firm
and on the ability of activists to relax the resistance of incumbents to takeovers. Finally,
models in which the target board can resist a takeover offer were studied by Bagnoli, Gor-
don, and Lipman (1989), Baron (1983), Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), Hirshleifer and
Titman (1990), Harris and Raviv (1988), and Ofer and Thakor (1987). Proxy fights as a
mechanism to transfer corporate control were studied by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Harris
and Raviv (1988), Bhattacharya (1997), Maug (1999), Yılmaz (1999), Bebchuk and Hart
(2001), and Gilson and Schwartz (2001). We add to these two strands of the literature by
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identifying the advantage of activist investors relative to bidders in utilizing proxy fights to
relax managerial resistance.
2.2. Baseline model
2.2.1. Setup
We consider a model with a bidder, an activist investor, passive shareholders, and one
public firm, the target. The target is run by its incumbent board of directors. We do not
distinguish between the manager and other board members; we treat them as one. At the
outset, the bidder decides whether to perform due-diligence of the target and start takeover
negotiations with its board. There are two rounds of negotiations which are separated by a
proxy fight stage. All agents are risk-neutral and have a zero discount rate. As we describe
below, the fundamental conflict of interests among the bidder, the incumbent, and target
shareholders will play a central role in the analysis. Figure 2.1 describes the sequence of
events.
A successful acquisition of the target firm requires at least 50% of its voting rights. Each
target share carries one vote. We normalize the number of shares to one and assume that
they are perfectly divisible. The standalone value of the target is normalized to zero. The
expected value of the target post-acquisition is x ∈ {∆,−∞}, where ∆ > 0 and Pr [x = ∆] =
τ ∈ (0, 1). The bidder is initially uninformed about x. If x = ∆ then the acquisition is
expected to create value. For example, ∆ is an operational or financial synergy from a
strategic merger, or operational improvements from a going private transaction. If x = −∞
then the acquisition destroys value. Intuitively, acquisitions often involve transaction costs,
distraction to management and employees, higher uncertainty, and heightened scrutiny from
regulators, but only rarely they create significant synergies to the buyer. Assuming x can
be sufficiently negative guarantees that the bidder will never acquire the target without
first performing due-diligence about x. Specifically, the bidder can pay a cost c ≥ 0 and
privately learn the exact value of x. The cost c, which is independent of x, is drawn from a
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continuous density distribution f with full support on [0,∞). If the bidder did not perform
due diligence or if he learned that x = −∞, he would walk away from the deal and the
target remains independent. However, if the bidder performed due-diligence and learned
that x = ∆, he would start takeover negotiations with the target as we describe below.
Notice that by construction the bidder’s decision to start takeover negotiations reveals that
x = ∆.
The bidder negotiates with the target board a cash offer to acquire all target shares. The
bidder cannot bypass the target board and make a tender offer directly to target share-
holders, possibly because the target board can block these attempts using poison pills,7 or
because overcoming the free-rider problem of Grossman and Hart (1980) is too costly. In
Appendix B we show that the only important assumption is that the incumbent can at
least partially resist a takeover. There are two rounds of negotiations which are separated
by a proxy fight stage. In each round, the proposer is decided randomly and independently.
With probability s ∈ (0, 1) the proposer is the target board, and with probability 1− s the
proposer is the bidder. The proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party,
and so, s represents the bargaining power of the target firm.8 Any acquisition agreement
must be approved by a majority of the target shareholders in a vote. At any voting stage,
target shareholders do not play weakly dominated strategies. If target shareholders approve
the agreement, each shareholder receives the agreed upon takeover premium for each share
he owns, and the target is acquired by the bidder.
If no agreement is reached at the first round or if shareholders vote down a proposed
agreement, the bidder and the activist decide simultaneously whether to start a proxy fight
to replace the incumbent board.9 If a proxy fight is initiated, the challenger incurs a non-
7Corporate boards can adopt a poison pill on a short notice; it does not have to be in place prior to the
takeover to deter bidders (“shadow pills”). Triggering a poison pill by moving forward with a tender offer
significantly dilutes the bidder and is therefore extremely costly. Virtually all tender offers are conditioned
on the redemption of a poison pill exactly for this reason (nonredeemable pills are illegal in most states,
including New York and Delaware). Moreover, a poison pill has never been intentionally triggered, which is
consistent with the pill being a powerful takeover deterrent.
8The Nash bargaining protocol can be microfounded using Rubinstein’s (1982) model of alternating offers.
9We implicitly assume that the majority of directors stand for reelection. In 2013, only 11% of the S&P
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reimbursable campaigning cost κ > 0. Target shareholders then decide whether to vote for
the incumbent or one of the rival teams. The team that receives the largest number of votes
is elected and takes control of the target board. If shareholders are indifferent between
electing the rival (the bidder or the activist) and retaining the incumbent, they choose the
latter.10
Winning a proxy fight gives the rival team the right to negotiate on behalf of the target
shareholders an acquisition agreement with the bidder in the second round. That is, the
newly elected directors can redeem the poison pill, if such exists, and resume negotiations.
The newly elected directors maximize the value of the party with which they are affiliated,
even if it conflicts with maximizing target shareholder value. In other words, the enforce-
ment of directors’ fiduciary duties is limited, and the bidder and the activist cannot commit
to act in the best interests of target shareholders. Once the proxy fight stage ends, a second
round of negotiations between the bidder and the target board (which may now be popu-
lated with the newly elected directors) takes place. The second round has the same protocol
as the first round, with the exception that if no agreement is reached or shareholders reject
the deal, the target remains independent and its standalone value is realized.
2.2.1.1. Payoffs
Incumbent: The incumbent board owns n ≥ 0 target shares and has private benefits of
control B > 0. These private benefits, which are lost if the firm is acquired or if shareholders
elect a new board, may include excessive salaries, perquisites, investment in ‘pet’ projects,
500 companies had a classified board, down from 57% in 2003 (see sharkrepellent.net: “Governance Activists
Set Their Sights on Netflix’s Annual Meeting” and “2003 Year End Review”). Alternatively, winning a short
slate proxy fight is sufficient to change the dynamic in the board and the ability of the incumbents to protect
their private benefits of control. Since taking control of a staggered board requires winning two proxy fights,
staggered boards can also be viewed as a mechanism to increase the cost of a proxy fight. See Bebchuk,
Coates IV, and Subramanian (2002) for a discussion on staggered board.
10Intuitively, if the target firm were to remain independent under the control of the rival team, the rival
team would divert corporate resources, for example, by exploiting the privileged access of directors to the
target’s proprietary information or through self-dealing transactions. See Atanasov, Black, and Ciccotello
(2014) for a discussion on the various forms of tunneling, and Atanasov, Boone, and Haushalter (2010),
Bates, Lemmon, and Linck (2006), and Gordon, Henry, and Palia (2004) for evidence on tunneling in the
U.S.
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access to private information, pleasure of command, prestige, or publicity. We assume that
compensation contracts, including golden parachutes, cannot fully align the incentives of
the incumbent board with the shareholders, which is consistent with the evidence by Jenter
and Lewellen (2015) who show that managers are reluctant to relinquish control due to
career concerns.11 We denote the incumbent’s private benefits per share by b ≡ B/n.
Activist: The activist owns α ≥ 0 shares of the target, which we endogenize in Section
2.4. The activist cannot affect the standalone value of the target or make a takeover bid.
These assumptions are discussed in Section 2.2.3.2 and relaxed in Appendix C. While the
activist is a target shareholder, she may be conflicted with other shareholders: The activist
obtains private benefits γ ≥ 0 from controlling the target board as an independent firm.
We assume γ < κ. Intuitively, γ is not large enough to fully compensate the activist for the
cost of launching a proxy fight. While we do not rule out γ ≥ B, activists are likely to have
fewer private benefits than incumbents.12 Activists are also likely to own a larger stake in
the target (α ≥ n).13 Therefore, we focus the analysis on cases where γ/α < b.
Bidder: The bidder initially does not own any shares of the target. Allowing the bidder
to have a toehold will not change the main results. Apart from increasing the value of the
target by x, the bidder does not have additional benefits from the acquisition.
Passive target shareholders: Passive investors do not have private benefits from control
or any ability (or incentives) to start a proxy fight. We assume that collectively these
11Compensation contracts cannot perfectly undo the incumbent’s private benefits if, for example, these
private benefits are unknown at the time the contract is set. For additional evidence, see Walkling and Long
(1984), Martin and McConnell (1991), Agrawal and Walkling (1994), Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004),
and Wulf and Singh (2011).
12Activists often stay on the board of a portfolio company for less than a year (partly because insider
trading rules put restrictions on activists, who ultimately seek to exit and pursue other investment oppor-
tunities). A short tenure on the board limits the ability of activist hedge fund managers to consume private
benefits from keeping the firm independent (e.g., perquisites, publicity, prestige). Moreover, executives and
directors of public companies, whose human capital is often firm specific, are unlikely to find a comparable
job if they are fired following a takeover (e.g., Harford (2003)). By contrast, activist hedge fund managers
hold a portfolio of 10-15 firms and their reputation depend on the aggregate performance of their portfolio.
13Activists typically own 8-9% of the target firm when they run a campaign (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and
Thomas (2008)), while managers and non-CEO executives own much less (e.g., Murphy (2013)). Moreover,
directors typically earn annually no more than $250K, a large portion of which is in fixed salaries.
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investors hold more than 50% of the target voting rights.
2.2.2. Analysis
We study Subgame Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies and solve the game backward. All
proofs not in the main text are in Appendix A. Suppose the bidder performed due-diligence
and learned that x = ∆. Define
πz ≡ [s∆+ (1− s)z] · 1z≤∆. (2.1)
The first result describes the outcome of the second round of negotiations.
Lemma 5. Suppose the first round of negotiations failed. Then, the expected target share-
holder value in the second round of negotiations is















πb if the incumbent retains control
πγ/α if the activist controls the board
0 if the bidder controls the board.
(2.2)
Lemma 5 can be understood in three steps. First, suppose the incumbent is reelected.
Since it is the second and last round of negotiations, the incumbent can block the takeover.
Therefore, he would agree to sell the firm only if the offer embeds a premium larger than
b, his private benefits per share. On the other hand, the bidder makes a profit of ∆ − π
if he acquires the target by paying a premium of π. Therefore, the highest premium the
bidder can afford to pay is ∆. There are two sub-cases to consider. First, suppose b ≤
∆. If the incumbent is the proposer then he would demand a premium of ∆. If the
bidder is the proposer then he would offer the lowest premium that is acceptable to the
incumbent board and target shareholders, which is b. Indeed, target shareholders approve
any agreement that offers them more than the target standalone value. Note that the
bidder overcomes the incumbent’s resistance to the takeover by compensating him for the
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loss of his private benefits of control. In this case, the entrenchment of the incumbent
benefits target shareholders (at least ex-post) since it forces the bidder to offer a higher
premium without endangering the deal. Overall, if b ≤ ∆ then the incumbent and the
bidder reach an agreement and the expected takeover premium is s∆+ (1− s)b. Second, if
∆ < b then the bidder cannot afford to compensate the incumbent for the loss of his private
benefits of control. The bidder walks away from the takeover negotiations, no agreement is
reached, and the target remains independent under the incumbent’s control. In this case,
the entrenched incumbent blocks a takeover that was expected to increase target shareholder
value.14 This tension between the incumbent and target shareholders is at the core of our
analysis. Overall, the expected shareholder value under the incumbent’s control is πb.
Second, if the activist is elected to the target board then the expected shareholder value is
πγ/α. The only difference from the case in which the incumbent is reelected is that under
the activist’s control the target board has private benefits per share of γ/α instead of b.
Third, if the bidder somehow was able to win a proxy fight then the dynamic above changes.
The control of the target board gives the bidder the authority to negotiate on behalf of
target shareholders. Effectively, the bidder is sitting on both sides of the negotiating table.
Unlike the activist, the bidder is interested in acquiring the target for the lowest price
possible. Therefore, whether the proposer is the target board or the bidder, the bidder
would be tempted to offer target shareholders their reservation price, zero.15 This discussion
completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Target shareholders, who have rational expectations, expect the bidder to abuse the power
of the board once given to him. Therefore, they never elect the bidder to their board. Since
running a proxy fight is both costly and inefficacious, the bidder does not run a proxy fight
14If n∆ < B < ∆ then a takeover is the efficient outcome under the incumbent’s control even when the
incumbent’s private benefits are taken into account.
15Notice that this argument does not imply that if a bidder wins a proxy fight, the offered takeover
premium should necessarily drop. If the bidder believes that he can win a proxy fight and capture the target
board even without committing to act in the best interests of target shareholders, he would low-ball the
takeover premium in advance (in the first round), anticipating his ability to abuse the power of the target
board once elected.
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in any equilibrium of the subgame.
Proposition 8. The bidder never starts a proxy fight.
Notice that Proposition 8 holds regardless of the gains from the takeover (∆), the cost of
running a proxy fight (κ), the incumbent board’s private benefits of control (b), the activist’s
private benefits of control (γ), the size of the activist’s stake (α), and whether or not the
activist is also running a proxy fight.
Define
δ ≡ γ + (κ− γ) /s. (2.3)
The next result describes the circumstances under which the activist launches a proxy fight.
Proposition 9. Suppose the first round of negotiations failed. The activist starts a proxy
fight if and only if πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α, which is equivalent to
δ/α ≤ ∆ < b. (2.4)
If the activist starts a proxy fight, she wins the control of the target board and then sells the
firm for an expected takeover premium of πγ/α > 0.
Proposition 9 establishes our observation that although both bidders and activists can
launch a proxy fight and face the same costs of doing so, only activists can relax the
resistance of incumbents and facilitate a takeover. To understand this result, notice that
unlike the bidder, shareholders expect the activist to negotiate a premium of πγ/α if they
elect her to the board. Being on the sell-side gives the activist an advantage relative to
the bidder when campaigning against the incumbent. Nevertheless, shareholders elect the
activist only if she is expected to outperform the incumbent, that is, πγ/α > πb.
16 The
activist, however, does not necessarily start a proxy fight even if she expects to win it; a
proxy fight has to increase the activist’s net expected payoff. If the activist launches a
16Note that even though we assume γ/α < b, the indicator function in expression (2.1) implies that
πγ/α > πb is satisfied whenever γ/α ≤ ∆ < b.
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proxy fight and wins control of the board then her net payoff would be max
{
απγ/α, γ
}
−κ.
Indeed, if the activist reaches an agreement with the bidder then the takeover premium is
πγ/α. Otherwise, the target remains independent and the activist can consume her private
benefits γ. In the proof of Proposition 9 we show that if shareholders are willing to elect
the activist to the board, it must be both feasible and in the best interest of the activist
to sell the firm rather than keep it independent, that is, πγ/α > πb implies πγ/α ≥ γ/α.
Therefore, the activist starts a proxy fight if and only if απγ/α−κ ≥ απb, which is equivalent
to πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α.
Proposition 9 also shows that πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α is equivalent to δ/α ≤ ∆ < b. Since γ ≤ δ,
this observation implies that the activist’s threat to run a proxy fight is credible only if the
activist is less biased than the incumbent against the takeover, that is, γ/α < b. Intuitively,
if γ/α ≤ ∆ < b then shareholders expect the incumbent to block the takeover, but at the
same time, they expect the activist to sell the target for a strictly positive premium if she is
given the opportunity to do so. Thus, shareholders will support the activist if she decides
to run a proxy fight. The activist has incentives to run a proxy fight only if the expected
premium she can negotiate with the bidder is sufficiently high to compensate her for the cost
of running a proxy fight, which is captured by the additional condition δ/α ≤ ∆. Overall,
the activist starts a proxy fight if and only if δ/α ≤ ∆ < b.17
Given the analysis of the proxy fight stage, we turn to characterizing the equilibrium of the
game. To that end, we denote by π∗ the expected takeover premium the bidder pays in
equilibrium, conditional on reaching an acquisition agreement with the target.
Proposition 10. A unique equilibrium exists. In equilibrium, the bidder performs due
17If b < γ/α ≤ ∆ then πγ/α > πb > 0 and shareholders would like to replace the incumbent with the
activist to receive a higher takeover premium. However, as we show in the proof of Proposition 9, the
assumption γ < κ implies that the activist does not have incentives to launch a proxy fight in those cases;
the premium she is expected to negotiate is not high enough to compensate her for the cost of launching a
proxy fight. If instead we assume b+ κ/α
1−s
< γ/α ≤ ∆, then the activist can credibly threaten the incumbent
with a proxy fight if the incumbent does not demand a higher premium from the bidder (Jiang, Li, and Mei
(2018)). This case can also apply to situations in which the incumbent is too motivated to sell the firm, e.g.,
in management buyouts or when incumbents are promised large bonuses if the takeover succeeds (Grinstein
and Hribar (2004), Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004)).
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diligence if and only if min {b, δ/α} ≤ ∆ and c ≤ τ (∆− π∗), where
π∗ =







πb if b ≤ ∆
πγ/α if δ/α ≤ ∆ < b.
(2.5)
If the bidder performs due diligence and x = ∆ then the bidder and the incumbent board
reach an acquisition agreement in the first round of negotiations. Under this agreement the
bidder pays a premium of π∗ > 0 for the target shares. In all other cases, no proxy fight is
initiated and the target remains independent under the incumbent’s control.
To understand Proposition 10, suppose the bidder performed due diligence and learned that
x = ∆. If ∆ < δ/α or b ≤ ∆ then the activist has no effect on the outcome of the takeover.
Without the intervention of the activist, the bidder and the incumbent expect to reach an
agreement in the second round of negotiations if and only if b ≤ ∆, and if they reach an
agreement then the expected takeover premium is πb. By contrast, if δ/α ≤ ∆ < b then all
parties involved correctly anticipate that if the first round of negotiations fails, the activist
will start a proxy fight, win control of the target board, and then negotiate an acquisition
agreement with an expected premium of πγ/α > 0. Since the activist’s threat of running
a proxy fight is credible, any first round offer below πγ/α is rejected by shareholders, and
any offer above πγ/α is rejected by the bidder. The incumbent board understands that the
takeover is inevitable, and therefore, accepts any offer higher than πγ/α in order to avoid the
adverse consequences of losing the proxy fight (e.g., embarrassment or loss of reputation).
Overall, the activist does not need to launch a proxy fight on the equilibrium path, her
threat to do so is sufficient to facilitate the takeover. Indeed, in equilibrium, the bidder and
the incumbent board reach an acquisition agreement in the first round of negotiations, and
under this agreement the target is sold for a premium πγ/α.
Proposition 10 shows that conditional on performing due diligence, the bidder acquires the
target and makes a positive profit if and only if x = ∆ and either b ≤ ∆ or δ/α ≤ ∆ < b. In
the former case the bidder’s expected profit (gross of the due-diligence cost) is τ (∆− πb) =
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τ (1− s) (∆− b) and in the latter case it is τ
(
∆− πγ/α
)
= τ (1− s) (∆− γ/α). Therefore,
if min {b, δ/α} ≤ ∆ then the bidder performs due diligence as long as the cost is lower than
the expected profit, that is, c ≤ τ (∆− π∗). If ∆ < min {b, δ/α} then the bidder expects the
takeover to fail even if x = ∆, and therefore, he has no incentives to perform due diligence
irrespective of the cost c.
Let θ∗ and h∗ be the probability of a takeover and the expected shareholder value in equilib-
rium, respectively. Since the standalone value of the target is zero, h∗ is the probability of a
takeover times the premium the bidder pays to target shareholders conditional on reaching
an acquisition agreement, that is, h∗ = θ∗π∗. The next corollary follows immediately from
Proposition 10.
Corollary 11. In equilibrium, the probability of a takeover is given by
θ∗ =















τF (τ (1− s) (∆− b)) if b ≤ ∆
τF (τ (1− s) (∆− γ/α)) if δ/α ≤ ∆ < b
0 if ∆ < min {b, δ/α} .
(2.6)
Moreover, θ∗ increases in α and h∗ (α) ≥ h∗ (0) for every α > 0.
Intuitively, the probability of a takeover increases with the size of the activist’s stake, as a
larger stake increases the credibility of her threat to launch a proxy fight if the incumbent
does not reach an agreement with the bidder. The effect of α on h∗ is more nuanced
since a higher α also implies that the activist puts less weight on her private benefits from
controlling the target as an independent firm, which harms her ability to bargain a higher
takeover premium (πγ/α decreases in α). Nevertheless, the expected shareholder value in
equilibrium is always higher when the activist is a target shareholder than when she is not,
that is, h∗ (α) ≥ h∗ (0).
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2.2.3. Discussion
2.2.3.1. The relative advantage of activist investors
Our theory proposes that activist investors have an inherent advantage relative to bidders
in pressuring entrenched incumbents to sell. Importantly, our key observation is in relative
terms: Since the bidder is the counterparty to the takeover and the activist is not, the
conflict of interests between the bidder and target shareholders is stronger than the conflict
they may have with the activist. In practice, the conflict between the bidder and target
shareholders can be alleviated, but only imperfectly. For example, enforcement of directors’
fiduciary duties to target shareholders requires litigation which is often costly, uncertain,
and limited to verifiable outcomes. Since this intrinsic conflict cannot be easily solved,18
activist investors, who suffer from this problem to a lesser extent, maintain their advantage
in pressuring firms to sell.19 Notice that our argument does not necessarily imply that
bidders can never use proxy fights to exert pressure on their target. Instead, it suggests that
these events are significantly less frequent than campaigns in which the activist pressures the
company to sell, a prediction which is consistent with the empirical evidence of Greenwood
and Schor (2009) and Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017).
2.2.3.2. The role of a majority stake
Our model assumes that bidders cannot create value unless they acquire at least 50% of
the target’s voting rights. For example, a strategic bidder can realize a synergy only if
the target is merged into the acquiring firm’s assets, and a private equity fund can execute
its operational improvements only if the target is taken private, insulating it from public
18Bebchuk and Hart (2001) propose amending the existing rules governing mergers to allow acquirers to
bring a merger proposal directly to a shareholder vote without the approval of the board of directors. Under
this rule, the bidder can effectively commit to a certain acquisition price. Our analysis suggests that under
this proposed rule, the role of activist investors in the M&A market would be diminished.
19Notice that the incentives of activists to negotiate a high takeover premium could be distorted by
derivatives, ownership in the bidding firm, or explicit and implicit agreements with the bidder. However,
in most jurisdictions, these arrangements have to be disclosed when votes are solicited. According to SEC
Rule 14a-9, activists are required to disclose their net economic exposure to the target and the bidding firm
as part of the proxy solicitation process.
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markets. Our main result emphasizes that these bidders cannot help target shareholders
to disentrech their incumbent board by threatening to launch a proxy fight. However, in
Appendix C we show that if the bidder has the ability (and incentives) to increase the
value of the target even without acquiring a majority stake, then he can make such credible
threats. Intuitively, while these bidders may still be tempted to low-ball the takeover
offer once they get control of the target board, these attempts are doomed to fail: Target
shareholders know that if they reject the offer, the bidder will inevitably use the power of the
board to maximize the value of his own (minority) stake in the target, e.g., by implementing
a value-increasing proposal. In other words, unlike the bidders in the baseline model, here
the bidder can successfully acquire the target after winning a proxy fight only if the offered
takeover premium is fair. As a result, in this case the fundamental conflict of interests
between the bidder and target shareholders is weaker. Since shareholders would not fear
electing bidders in this category to their board, their threat to replace the target board is
more credible.
Incidentally, activist hedge funds who often make proposals to improve the governance or
the operations of their target firms fit this category. Clearly, an activist’s threat to remove
an entrenched incumbent is more credible if the only goal of the activist is to control the
operations of the target and implement value-increasing proposals. However, the discussion
above suggests that because an activist investor can act as an alternative manager to the
firm, her threat to remove the incumbent board is credible even if the activist has the ability
and will to make a takeover bid for the target. In this regard, activist hedge funds have a
weaker conflict of interests with target shareholders relative to bidders who can only create
value by acquiring a majority stake of the target.20
20Consistent with this argument, Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017) find that in 15% of the events
in their sample the activist is also making a takeover bid to the target company.
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2.3. Proxy fight in anticipation of a takeover bid
In practice, activist investors start proxy fights with the objective of selling the target even
before a specific bidder arrives. To account for this possibility, we extend our analysis by
allowing the activist to launch a proxy fight before the bidder decides whether to perform
due-diligence and start takeover negotiations with the target. As we demonstrate below,
this extension does not alter our main conclusion that bidders cannot win a proxy fight
while activists can, but it adds structure to the model that is both realistic and yields new
empirical predictions.
Specifically, when the activist decides whether to start a proxy fight before the bidder ar-
rives, she does not know c, and therefore, she faces uncertainty about the bidder’s incentives
to perform due-diligence. If the activist decides not to start a proxy fight or if shareholders
reelect the incumbent, the game unfolds as in the baseline model. Instead, if the activist
starts a proxy fight and wins the control of the board then the bidder can expect to nego-
tiate with the activist. In both cases, the bidder and the activist have the option to launch
a proxy fight if the first round of negotiations fails. To ease the exposition, let
θz ≡ τF (τ (1− s) (∆− z)) , (2.7)
which is the probability of a takeover if the bidder expects to pay a premium of πz when
learning x = ∆. The next result follows.
Proposition 11. A unique equilibrium exists. In equilibrium, the activist starts a proxy
fight before the bidder’s arrival if and only if ∆ ≥ b and
θγ/απγ/α +
(
1− θγ/α
)
γ/α− θbπb ≥ κ/α. (2.8)
(i) If the activist starts a proxy fight before the bidder’s arrival then she wins the control of
the target board and the bidder performs due diligence if and only if c ≤ τ
(
∆− πγ/α
)
.
If the bidder performs due diligence and x = ∆ then the bidder and the activist reach
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an acquisition agreement in the first round of negotiations. Under this agreement the
bidder pays a premium of πγ/α ∈ (0,∆] for the target shares. In all other cases the
target remains independent under the activist’s control.
(ii) If the activist does not start a proxy fight before the bidder’s arrival then the equilibrium
of the game unfolds as described by Proposition 10.
To understand Proposition 11 and its implications, suppose first that ∆ < b. Since in
this case the incumbent blocks the takeover unless he is pressured to do otherwise, target
shareholders support the activist whenever she starts a proxy fight. The activist, however,
has different considerations. Note that regardless of the timing at which the activist takes
control of the target board, the expected shareholder value is θγ/απγ/α. Indeed, if the
activist controls the board prior to the bidder’s arrival, the bidder will negotiate directly with
the activist. Otherwise, the bidder will negotiate with the incumbent under the activist’s
pressure to sell. Since shareholders will support the activist if she chooses to start a proxy
fight, the threat to do so is sufficient to pressure the incumbent to negotiate a takeover with
exactly the same terms that the activist would. However, since the threat of a proxy fight
is as effective as the proxy fight itself, the activist is strictly better off saving the cost κ and
not starting a proxy fight before the bidder arrives.
This dynamic changes when ∆ ≥ b. According to Proposition 10, if the incumbent still
retains control after the bidder arrives then the activist would have no effect on the outcome
of the takeover. In these cases, the bidder would reach an agreement with the incumbent
and the expected shareholder value is θbπb. By contrast, if the activist wins control of
the target board before the bidder arrives then the activist’s expected payoff (per share)
is θγ/απγ/α +
(
1− θγ/α
)
γ/α − κ/α. The comparison between this payoff and θbπb gives
condition (2.8). Therefore, if ∆ ≥ b and (2.8) holds then a proxy fight is on the equilibrium
path. The contrast between this result and Proposition 10 yields the following prediction.
Prediction 1. Proxy fights with a stated objective of selling the target to a third party are
68
launched by activist investors before a specific bidder arrives.
Importantly, if ∆ ≥ b and (2.8) hold then a proxy fight is on the equilibrium path although
the incumbent is expected to sell the target when a bidder arrives, and for a premium
which is higher than what the activist could negotiate. Indeed, in the proof of Proposition
11 we show that if condition (2.8) holds then γ/α < b, which implies πγ/α < πb. In fact,
precisely for this reason shareholders and the activist would like to replace the incumbent.
Intuitively, since in this region the incumbent is not too entrenched (i.e., b ≤ ∆), the bidder
can reach an agreement with the incumbent once the takeover negotiations start. However,
since the incumbent is not free of agency problems either (i.e., γ/α < b), the bidder will
have to compensate the incumbent for the loss of his private benefits of control, which could
be pricey to do. While the bidder expects to make a positive profit whenever he learns that
x = ∆, the expected profit is too small to justify incurring the cost of the due-diligence.
The activist launches a proxy fight in order to assure the bidder that he will face a weaker
opposition to the takeover. Since the bidder expects to pay a lower expected premium when
the activist controls the target board, the likelihood that the bidder will approach the target
following a successful proxy fight is higher. Indeed, the activist starts a proxy fight only
if it increases the incentives of the bidder to perform due diligence. In this case, a proxy
fight can be considered as a solicitation of a takeover offer, an observation that implies the
following prediction.
Prediction 2. Everything else held equal, proxy fights in which the activist’s stated goal is
selling the target to a third party increase the probability that the target receives a takeover
offer afterwards.
Prediction 2 is consistent with the data. Using the Factset Shark Watch Database, we
identify 232 proxy fights from 1994-2015 in which the activist’s stated goal was to sell the
target company to a third party. Using CRSP, we find that in 36% of these cases the target
firm is delisted due to an M&A event in the 24-months period that follows the announcement
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of the proxy fight, which is significantly larger than 5%, the unconditional probability of a
takeover of a public U.S. firm (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017)).
Proposition 11 also has implications on the market reaction to the announcement of a
proxy fight. Specifically, once a proxy fight is started the target share price is expected
to jump upward from θbπb to θγ/απγ/α. Intuitively, a proxy fight increases the expected
shareholder value by increasing the probability that the target will receive a takeover bid.
Indeed, the activist launches a proxy fight only if doing so increases the expected share
price. If following the proxy fight the target is acquired then its share price is expected
to further jump upward from θγ/απγ/α to πγ/α, reflecting the realization of the takeover.
However, if the target remains independent after the proxy fight (since the bidder decided
not to perform due-diligence or he learned that the synergy is negative) then the share price
should jump downward to zero, the standalone value of the target. These observations are
summarized in the following prediction.
Prediction 3. The announcement of a proxy fight in which the activist’s stated goal is
selling the firm to a third party generates positive abnormal returns for the target share.
Following such a proxy fight, the share price experiences additional positive abnormal returns
if the target is acquired, and negative abnormal returns otherwise.
Consistent with Prediction 3, Fos (2017) finds that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
of the target stock price around the announcement date of a proxy fight in which the
activist’s stated goal is to sell the company is 10% in a one year event-window. Moreover,
the CARs are positive for any event window that starts 6 months before the announcement
date and up to 24 months afterwards.21 These positive CARs are consistent with the
prediction that these proxy fights create shareholder value.22
21See Panel B of Figure 5 in Fos (2017).
22Note that our interpretation is different from Fos (2017). Fos (2017) finds that the CARs are zero over
a 4 year event-window and interprets this finding as an evidence that proxy fights in this category create
little or no value on average. However, the zero CARs in a 4 year event-window could also be explained by
an unavoidable survival bias: Over time, the only firms that are left in the sample are those which were not
acquired. As our evidence above suggests, around 36% of the firms are eventually delisted due to an M&A
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Finally, notice that Proposition 11 reveals a non-monotonic relationship between the fre-
quency of proxy fights and the private benefits of the incumbent from keeping the firm
private, i.e., parameter b. Indeed, if ∆ < b then a proxy fight is not observed since the
threat of doing so is sufficiently credible to pressure the entrenched incumbent to sell. If
b has an intermediate value (i.e., γ/α < b ≤ ∆), then for the aforementioned reasons, a
proxy fight is on the equilibrium path as long as (2.8) holds. However, if b is relatively
small (i.e., b ≤ min {γ/α,∆}) then a proxy fight is not observed since it is not needed; the
incumbent has enough incentives to voluntarily sell the firm to the bidder when the latter
arrives. While challenging, parameter b can be proxied by a low managerial ownership in
the target, distance of the CEO from retirement, strength of anti-takeover defenses, and
low independence of the board. The next prediction follows.
Prediction 4. The frequency of proxy fights with a stated objective of selling the target to
a third party has an inverted U-shape as a function of the private benefits of the incumbent
board.
2.4. Position building in anticipation of a takeover
In this section we endogenize the decision of the activist to become a target shareholder.
Our goal is to identify patterns that can differentiate between cases in which the activist
buys target shares because she expects the target to be acquired and cases in which the
presence of the activist on its own affects the takeover.
For this purpose, we extend the model as follows. At the outset, the activist does not
own any shares of the target, but she privately observes signal y ∈ {0, 1} on the possibility
of a takeover. Specifically, if y = 1 then the synergy from a takeover is x ∈ {∆,−∞},
where Pr [x = ∆] = τ as in the baseline model. If y = 0 then the synergy is −∞ for sure.
We assume that y is independent of x and Pr [y = 1] = µ ∈ (0, 1). Given y, the activist
event in the 24-months period that follows the announcement of the proxy fight. Since takeovers on average
create value to target shareholders (e.g., Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)), the post-announcement
CARs could be biased downward if they exclude the returns of firms which were acquired.
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submits an order to buy α ≥ 0 shares of the target. Short sales are not allowed. If the
activist is indifferent between investing and not, we assume that she does not invest. The
activist trades with a risk-neutral, competitive, and uninformed market maker. The share
price, denoted by p, is set equal to the expected value of the target conditional on the total
order flow. For simplicity, we assume that the market maker can condition the price on
the order-flow if and only if the order is strictly larger than α ∈ (0, 1). That is, the stock
is perfectly liquid (illiquid) for small (large) orders.23 Parameter α can also be interpreted
as a disclosure threshold (e.g., regulation 13D). Moreover, buying up to α shares does not
trigger a poison pill if such exists. Empirically, α ∈ [5%, 10%]. After trading, the activist’s
ownership in the target becomes public. The bidder observes the number of shares own
by the activist, signal y, and the cost c. Given all of this information, the bidder decides
whether to perform due diligence and start takeover negotiations with the target, as in the
baseline model.24,25
Proposition 12. A unique equilibrium always exists.26 In equilibrium:
(i) The activist buys α∗ target shares where
α∗ =







α if y = 1, and either δ/α ≤ ∆ < b or b < ∆
0 else.
(2.9)
23A previous version of the paper assumed the existence of liquidity traders a la Kyle (1985) and showed
that similar results hold under this alternative formulation.
24Assuming that the bidder’s decision to perform due diligence is made after the activist’s position is
revealed is consistent with Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017), who find that in 70% of the events in
their sample a takeover bid is announced within 2 years of a hedge fund initiating an activist campaign.
25Assuming that the activist cannot launch a proxy fight before the bidder arrives is for simplicity. Iden-
tifying the activist’s effect on the takeover, which is the focus of this section, is challenging when a proxy
fight is only used as a threat.
26We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium is unique if h∗ (α) is
non-decreasing in α, which is satisfied under an additional technical assumption that we specify in the proof.
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(ii) Given order flow α ≥ 0, the market maker sets the target share price to be
p∗ (α) =







µh∗ (α∗) if α ≤ α
h∗ (α∗) if α > α.
(2.10)
(iii) If y = 0 then the bidder does not perform due diligence and the target remains inde-
pendent under the incumbent control. If y = 1 and the activist owns α shares of the
target then the bidder’s decision to perform due diligence and the takeover negotiations
unfold as described by Proposition 10.
To understand Proposition 12, first notice that in order to conceal her position from the
market maker, the activist never buys more than α shares of the target. Recall that ac-
cording to Proposition 10, if ∆ < min {b, δ/α} then the target will never be acquired even
if the activist buys α shares. In those cases, the entrenched incumbent will not sell the firm
voluntarily, and the activist’s ownership is not high enough to make the threat of a proxy
fight credible. Moreover, if ∆ = b then by Corollary 11 the bidder will never perform due
diligence since he cannot profit from a takeover. Therefore, if y = 0, ∆ < min {b, δ/α}, or
∆ = b, then the activist expects any takeover to fail for sure, and since the activist cannot
profit from investing in the target, she does not buy any of its shares, that is, α∗ = 0. By
contrast, if y = 1, and δ/α ≤ ∆ < b or b < ∆, then a takeover is possible and investing in
the target can be profitable. To fully exploit her private information, the activist buys the
maximum stake that keeps her trade concealed, that is, α∗ = α. The market maker, who
is uninformed about y but has rational expectations, sets the price at µh∗ (α∗) as long as
α ≤ α, which is the fair value of the target shares.27 This explains Proposition 12.
2.4.1. Selection vs. treatment
If b ≤ ∆ then the equilibrium exhibits “selection.” Namely, the activist invests in firms that
are likely to receive a takeover offer, but her investment has no real effect on the outcome.
27Off-equilibrium, if α > α then the market maker assumes y = 1 and sets p = h∗ (α).
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In other words, knowing the target is likely to receive a takeover offer when y = 1 gives the
activist informational advantage relative to the market maker that makes the purchase of
these shares a profitable investment. While the activist’s presence as a target shareholder
is correlated with a higher probability of a takeover, the link is not causal.
By contrast, if ∆ < b and α ≥ δ/∆ then the equilibrium exhibits “treatment.” Namely, the
activist invests in firms that could be a target for a takeover, and by doing so, the activist
increases the probability that the takeover happens. In those cases, the link is causal. The
activist buys a stake that is sufficiently large to make her threat to start a proxy fight
credible. There are two effects. First, as in the baseline model, once the bidder arrives
the activist can pressure the incumbent to accept an offer that he would otherwise reject.
Second, the activist increases the likelihood that a takeover offer is made by soliciting a deal:
The presence of the activist as a target shareholder signals the bidder that the incumbent
is likely to be pressured by its shareholders to sell the firm, and therefore, the bidder has
stronger incentives to perform due diligence and start takeover negotiations. In other words,
activist investors not only facilitate takeovers once the offer is on the table, but they can
also increase the likelihood that a company becomes a takeover target in the first place.28
This observation has the following implication.
Prediction 5. Policies and regulations that undermine shareholder activism but do not
affect bidders directly will still have a negative effect on takeovers.
For example, the legalization of two-tier “anti-activism” poison pills will adversely affect
M&A even if “standard pills” that prevent takeovers are already prevalent.
The discussion above suggests that whether the equilibrium exhibits selection or treatment,
the probability of a takeover is higher when the activist is present as a target shareholder
than when she is not. This observation is the reason why identifying a causal link between
28Similarly, if the activist were to acquire a stake after the bidder approaches the target, the anticipation
that an activist would show up and pressure the target board to accept the takeover offer can also increase
the bidder’s incentives to engage in takeover negotiations.
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activist investors’ presence and the likelihood of a takeover is challenging, especially when a
proxy fight with an objective to sell the firm is not observed. Notice that the probability of
a takeover in equilibrium is θ∗∗ ≡ µθ∗ (α∗). In what follows, we show that the comparative
statics of θ∗∗ with respect to b and κ are different when the equilibrium exhibits selection and
when it exhibits treatment. These differences provide predictions that can help distinguish
between the selection and the treatment effects in data.
Corollary 12.
(i) If b ≤ ∆ then θ∗∗ is strictly decreasing in b, where θ∗∗ = 0 when b = ∆. If b > ∆ then
θ∗∗ is invariant to b, where θ∗∗ > 0 if and only if δ/ᾱ ≤ ∆.
(ii) If b ≤ ∆ then θ∗∗ is invariant to κ, and if ∆ < b then θ∗∗ is decreasing in κ.
If the equilibrium exhibits selection (b ≤ ∆) then the probability of a takeover is strictly
decreasing in b. Intuitively, in this region the bidder can reach an acquisition agreement
with the incumbent. However, higher b implies that the bidder has to pay a higher premium
in order to acquire the target, which weakens his incentives to perform due diligence in the
first place. This can be seen in the left panel of Figure 2.2 by the fact that at any point
left to the dashed vertical line, which marks the border of the selection region, the curve
is downward slopping. However, the probability of a takeover can increase with b when
the equilibrium also exhibits treatment. In fact, if γ = 0 (the activist is unbiased) then
the probability of a takeover when b > ∆ is the highest possible. Intuitively, when b > ∆
the bidder cannot afford to pay a premium high enough to convince the incumbent to
forgo his private benefits and sell. In those cases, the activist can leverage the support of
shareholders to pressure the incumbent to sell. In other words, the threat of launching a
proxy fight is credible. Since the incumbent is negotiating under the activist’s pressure in
this range, the bidder expects to pay a smaller takeover premium as determined by the
activist’s bargaining power. As a result, the bidder has stronger incentives to perform due-
diligence and the probability of a takeover is higher. This result highlights that, contrary to
the common wisdom, the probability of a takeover can increase with the private benefits that
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incumbents obtain from keeping their firm independent. This comparative static implies
that the treatment effect can be identified in the data if in the cross section of firms there
is a positive association between b (which can be proxied as described in Section 2.3) and
the probability of a takeover. The next prediction summarizes these observations.
Prediction 6. The probability of a takeover has a U-shape as a function of the private
benefits of the incumbent board. Moreover, a positive association is an indication of the
treatment effect.
According to Corollary 12 part (ii), the comparative statics with respect to κ can also help
identify the treatment effect in the data. Indeed, κ should have no effect on the probability
of a takeover in the selection region, as in this region the activist has no effect on the
takeover. However, in the treatment region, the incumbent sells the firm only if the activist
can pressure him to do so. Since a higher κ (which implies a higher δ) reduces the credibility
of the activist’s threat to run a proxy fight, her ability to pressure the incumbent to sell
decreases with κ. As a result, the probability of a takeover decreases with κ. Therefore,
the treatment effect can be identified in the data if in the cross section of firms there is
a negative association between κ and the probability of a takeover, especially when b is
large. Parameter κ can be proxied by the dispersion of ownership of the target firm, the
difficulty of proxy access, the existence of a staggered board, or low governance expertise
of the activist. The next prediction summarizes this observation.
Prediction 7. The probability of a takeover is weakly decreasing in the cost of a proxy
fight. Moreover, a negative association is an indication of the treatment effect.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper studies the role of activist investors in the M&A market. We identify a conflict
of interests between bidders and the shareholders of their target firms that prevents bidders
from unseating the resisting incumbent directors of these firms through proxy fights. Unlike
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bidders, activists are on the same side of the negotiating table as other shareholders of
the target, and hence, enjoy higher credibility when campaigning against the incumbent
board. Building on this insight, we demonstrate that although both bidders and activists
can use similar techniques to challenge corporate boards (i.e., proxy fights), activists are
more effective in relaxing the resistance of incumbent directors to takeovers. Our model is
consistent with the fact that most proxy fights are launched by activists and not by bidders,
with the large number of activist campaigns that have resulted in a takeover bid by a third
party, with the positive market reaction to announcements of proxy fights by activists whose
stated goal is selling the target firm to a third party, and with a higher probability of a
takeover following such proxy fights. Moreover, the model provides novel predictions on the
circumstances under which proxy fights of this sort are likely to be observed.
Our analysis emphasizes the benefit of separating the capacity to disentrench boards from
the capacity to increase firm value through acquisitions; one party cannot combine two roles
that rely on opposing preferences. Moreover, the analysis highlights the complementarity
between shareholder activism and takeovers: Activist investors benefit from the possibility
that companies in which they invest will become a takeover target, while bidders, who
interpret the presence of an activist as a signal that the target will show weaker resistance,
are more likely start takeover negotiations when the target has an activist as a shareholder.
We show that the model’s comparative statics (of the probability of a takeover) with respect
to the incumbent’s private benefits of control and the activist’s cost of running a proxy fight
are sensitive to the existence of the treatment effect in equilibrium, a feature which can
be used to create identification strategies for the treatment effect of shareholder activism
in takeovers. As a whole, the analysis sheds light on the interaction between M&A and
shareholder activism.
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Figure 2.1: The sequence of events in the baseline model
shareholders 
vote
agreement
approve
Proxy fight
1. bidder and activist decide whether to launch a proxy fight
2. shareholders elect directors
disagreement
Takeover negotiations - round I
bidder vs. incumbent board
reject
Target remains 
independent
agreement
approve
disagreement
Takeover negotiations - round II
bidder vs. elected board
Bidder performs due diligence and
identifies positive synergies
yes
no
Target is
acquired
shareholders 
vote
Target remains 
independent
reject
Notes: Figure depicts the sequence of events in the baseline model.
Figure 2.2: Comparative statics of probability of a takeover
Notes: The left (right) panel shows the effect of b (κ) on the probability of a takeover θ∗∗,
where γ = 0, c ∼ U [0, c], and c ≥ τ(1 − s)∆. In addition, the left (right) panel assumes
δ/α < ∆ (∆ < b).
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APPENDIX
A1. Appendix for Chapter 1
A1.1. Proofs of main results
In many of the proofs below, I prove the results with generalizing the model to any bias
bA ∈ (−∞, b) and cost of proxy fight κ > 0 of the activist. To see the details of the biased
activist modification, see the beginning of Section 1.4. Any generalization applied are noted
before each proof. For simplicity, throughout I drop the subscript B from αB and βB .
I prove Lemma 2 with the following generalization for any bA ∈ (−∞, b) and κ > 0.
Lemma 6. Suppose that the activist has demanded no settlement. Then, an equilibrium
of this subgame exists and is unique. Specifically, in equilibrium, the activist never runs a
proxy fight if κ > κ0 or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] < 0, and he always runs a proxy fight if κ < κ0 and
E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0, where
κ0(φ) ≡ φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA)dF (∆) . (A.1)
Proof. Note that in any equilibrium, at the implementation stage, if the incumbent board
has the decision authority then it never implements the action, while if the activist has
the decision authority and has received signal or is disclosed ∆, then the activist always
implements the project if ∆ > bA, never implements if ∆ < bA, and is indifferent if ∆ = bA.
Therefore, in any subgame where the activist has acquired α control, in equilibrium the
activist’s payoff (excluding the cost of proxy fight) is given by α(∆ − bA) if ∆ ≥ bA and
zero if ∆ < bA, the incumbent’s payoff is given by α (∆− b) if ∆ > bA and zero if ∆ < bA,
and the shareholders’ payoff is given by α∆ if ∆ > bA and zero if ∆ < bA. Note that the
arguments made for ∆ > bA also hold for ∆ = bA if the activist implements the project
when he is indifferent.
Suppose that κ > κ0. Since by the first step κ0 is the upperbound on the activist’s payoff
from running a proxy fight, the activist never runs a proxy fight. Note that this also implies
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that if κ = κ0, then the activist weakly prefers not running a proxy fight.
Suppose that E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] < 0. Since by the first step the shareholders’ payoff from
supporting the activist is negative, they never support the activist.
Suppose that κ < κ0 and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0. By the first step the shareholders always
support the activist in a proxy fight since E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0, and hence the activist’s the
payoff from running a proxy fight is κ0. Therefore, the activist always runs a proxy fight.
I prove Proposition 1 with the following generalization for any bA ∈ (−∞, b) and κ > 0.
Proposition 13. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then, an
equilibrium of this subgame exists, the equilibrium is unique, and in equilibrium:
(i) If κ ≥ κ0(φ) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0, then the board always rejects the settlement, and
the activist never runs a proxy fight.
(ii) If κ < κ0(φ) and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0, then:
(a) The board accepts the action settlement if ∆ > ∆∗A and rejects if ∆ < ∆
∗
A, where
∆∗A (φ, ρ
∗
A) ≡ b−
cp,1 + σ
∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗ − σ
∗φ
∈ (0, b) , (A.2)
or, equivalently,
∆∗A (φ) ≡ max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1− φ
, ∆̌A
}
∈ (0, b) , (A.3)
where ∆̂A (φ) and ∆̌A are unique and given by
∆̂A =











∆, if κ ≤ φ(∆ − bA)
x > max {∆, bA}
s.t. κ = φ 1F (x)
∫ x
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆),
otherwise
(A.4)
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∆̌A =





bA, if bA ≥ 0
x > ∆ s.t. 0 =
∫ x
bA
∆dF (∆) , otherwise
(A.5)
(b) Upon rejection, the activist runs a proxy fight with probability
ρ∗A (φ) ≡ min



1,
1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A



(A.6)
where σ̃A is unique and given by
σ̃A ≡ min





1,
κ
φ 1
F(∆̌A)
∫ ∆̌A
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆)





. (A.7)
(c) Upon proxy fight, shareholders support the activist with probability
σ∗A(φ) =

















1, if
0 ≤ bA or
∆̌A ≤ max{∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ}
max{σ̃I , σ̃A} ∈ (0, 1) , if
bA < 0 and
max{∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ} < ∆̌A
(A.8)
where
σ̃I ≡
b− ∆̌A − cp,1
φ
(
b− ∆̌A
)
+ φcp,2
. (A.9)
Proof. Suppose the activist has demanded action settlement, and κ > 0. The proof consists
of several steps:
Note that in any equilibrium, at the implementation stage, if the incumbent board has the
decision authority then it never implements the action, while if the activist has the decision
authority and has received signal or is disclosed ∆, then the activist always implements the
project if ∆ > bA, never implements if ∆ < bA, and is indifferent if ∆ = bA. Therefore, in
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any subgame where the activist has acquired α control, in equilibrium the activist’s payoff
(excluding the cost of proxy fight) is given by α (∆− bA) if ∆ ≥ bA and zero if ∆ < bA, the
incumbent’s payoff is given by α (∆− b) if ∆ > bA and zero if ∆ < bA, and the shareholders’
payoff is given by α∆ if ∆ > bA and zero if ∆ < bA. Note that the arguments made for
∆ > bA also hold for ∆ = bA if the activist implements the project when he is indifferent.
First, I show that for any given ρ and σ, in equilibrium the incumbent follows a threshold
strategy at the response stage. Denote the payoff of the incumbent by ΠI and its decision by
χ ∈ {A,R}, where A represents action settlement and R represents rejection. Suppose the
the activist runs a proxy fight upon rejection with probability ρ and shareholders support
him with probability σ. Then,
ΠI (χ|∆, ρ, σ) =























∆− b, if χ = A
ρ [−cp,1 + σ (−φcp,2 + φ (∆− b))] , if χ = R and ∆ > bA
∈ [ρ [−cp,1 + σ (−φcp,2 + φ (∆− b))] ,
ρ [−cp,1 − σφcp,2]]
, if χ = R and ∆ = bA
ρ [−cp,1 − σφcp,2] , if χ = R and ∆ < bA
(A.10)
where ΠI (R|bA, ρ, σ) depends on the probability that the activist implements the action
when he is indifferent between implementing and not implementing. Since ΠI (A|∆, ρ, σ)−
ΠI (R|∆, ρ, σ) is strictly increasing in ∆, for any ρ and σ, there exists a unique ∆A ∈ [∆, b]
such that the incumbent accepts settlement if ∆ > ∆A and rejects if ∆ < ∆A. Moreover,
• ∆A ≤ max {∆, bA} if
1
ρ − σφ ≤
cp,1+σφcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
,
• ∆A ≥ b−
cp,1+σφcp,2
1
ρ
−σφ
if 1ρ − σφ >
cp,1+σφcp,2
b−∆ , and
• ∆A = b−
cp,1+σφcp,2
1
ρ
−σφ
> ∆ if 1ρ − σφ >
cp,1+σφcp,2
b−∆ , and b−
cp,1+σφcp,2
1
ρ
−σφ
≥ bA or ∆A > bA.
Also note that if ∆A > bA, then the incumbent is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
when ∆ = ∆A.
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Second, note that for any threshold strategy ∆A > ∆ that the incumbent follows and any
σ, in equilibrium the best response of the activist is given by
ρ (∆A, σ) =











1, if ΠA (∆A, σ) > 0,
∈ [0, 1] if ΠA (∆A, σ) = 0,
0, if ΠA (∆A, σ) < 0,
(A.11)
where ΠA is the activist’s profit from running a proxy fight upon rejection, i.e.,
ΠA (∆A, σ) = σφ
1
F (max {∆A, bA})
∫ max{∆A,bA}
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆)− κ, (A.12)
and for any ∆A > ∆ and any ρ, in equilibrium the best response of the shareholders is
given by
σ (∆A) =











1, if ΠSH (∆A) > 0,
∈ [0, 1] if ΠSH (∆A) = 0,
0, if ΠSH (∆A) < 0,
(A.13)
where ΠSH is the shareholders’ payoff from supporting the activist if the activist runs a
proxy fight, i.e.,
ΠSH (∆A) = φ
1
F (max {∆A, bA})
∫ max{∆A,bA}
bA
∆dF (∆) . (A.14)
Also note that:
∆A > (<)∆̂A (σφ) ⇐⇒ ΠA (∆A, σ) > (<)0, (A.15)
∆A > ∆̌A ⇐⇒ ΠSH (∆A) > 0, (A.16)
∆A = ∆̌A or ∆A < bA ⇒ ΠSH (∆A) = 0 (A.17)
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bA < ∆A < ∆̌A ⇒ ΠSH (∆A) < 0. (A.18)
Third, I show that in any equilibrium where rejection is on the equilibrium path, ∆∗A = b if
ρ∗ = 0, and ∆∗A ∈ [0, b) if ρ
∗ > 0. The former result is straightforward since the incumbent
is strictly better off by rejecting for all ∆ if ρ∗ = 0. To see the latter result, note that if
ρ∗ > 0 in equilibrium, it must be that σ∗ > 0 and bA < b as well, because otherwise the
activist would never run a proxy fight since ΠA (∆A, σ
∗) < 0. Therefore, by the first step
it must be that ∆∗A < b. Moreover, it must also be that ∆
∗
A > 0 since ∆
∗
A ≤ 0 yields a
contradiction with σ∗ > 0 if bA < 0, and yields a contradiction with ρ
∗ > 0 if bA ≥ 0.
Fourth, I show that in any equilibrium where rejection is on the equilibrium path, the
equilibrium is as described in the Proposition. I will also show that in any such equilibrium,
∆∗A =

















b, if
κ ≥ φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆)
or
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) ≤ 0
,
max





∆̂A (φ) ,
b−
cp
1−φ , ∆̌A





∈ (0, b), otherwise.
(A.19)
There are three cases to consider:
• Suppose
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) ≤ 0. Then, in no equilibrium ρ∗ > 0, because otherwise ∆∗A < b
and hence σ∗ = 0 if ∆∗A ∈ (bA, b) and ρ
∗ = 0 if ∆∗A ≤ bA, yielding a conradiction with
ρ∗ > 0. On the other hand, ρ∗ = 0 is an equilibrium, since then by the third step
∆∗A = b, to which σ
∗ = 0 and hence ρ∗ = 0 are best responses by the second step.
• Suppose κ ≥ φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆). Then, in no equilibrium ρ
∗ > 0, because other-
wise ∆∗A < b and hence ΠA (∆
∗
A, σ
∗) < 0, yielding a contradiction. On the other hand,
ρ∗ = 0 is an equilibrium, since then by the third step ∆∗A = b, to which ρ
∗ = 0 is a
best response by the second step.
84
• Suppose κ < φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆) and
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) > 0. Note that then max{∆̂A (φ),
b−
cp
1−φ , ∆̌A} < b. I derive the equilibrium in four steps. In any equilibrium with on
equilibrium path rejection,
1. First, I show that 1ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
, which implies that ∆∗A = b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
> max {∆, bA} by the first step. To see this result, suppose
1
ρ∗−σ
∗φ ≤
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
. Then by the first step ∆∗A ≤ max {∆, bA}. However, if ∆
∗
A ≤ ∆,
it yields a contradiction with rejection being on the equilibrium path, and if
∆∗A ≤ bA, then the activist deviates to ρ = 0 by the second step, yielding a
contradiction with ∆∗A ≤ bA < b by the first step.
2. First, I show that
∆∗A = ∆A (σ
∗) ≡











b, if κ ≥ σ∗φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆) ,
max





∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) ,
b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1−σ∗φ





, otherwise.
(A.20)
where ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) ≡ ∆̂A (φσ
∗).
Suppose κ ≥ σ∗φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆). Then, in equilibrium it must be that
ρ∗ = 0, because otherwise ∆∗A < b and hence ΠA (∆
∗
A, σ
∗) < 0, yielding a con-
tradiction. On the other hand, ρ∗ = 0 is an equilibrium, since then by the third
step ∆∗A = b, to which ρ
∗ = 0 is a best response by the second step.
Suppose κ < σ∗φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆). Then, noting that ∆A (σ
∗) ∈ (bA, b) since
κ > 0, there are two cases to consider. Suppose ∆∗A > ∆A (σ
∗). Then, by
the second step ΠA (∆
∗
A, σ
∗) > 0, and therefore ρ∗ = 1. However, then by the
first substep ∆∗A = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1−σ∗φ , yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
A > ∆A (σ
∗).
Suppose ∆∗A < ∆A (σ
∗). Note that it must be ∆ < ∆∗A for rejection to be on the
equilibrium path. There are two subcases to consider. If ∆ < ∆∗A < ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗),
then by the second step ΠA (∆
∗
A, σ
∗) < 0, and therefore ρ∗ = 0, resulting in
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∆∗A = b > ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) by the first step, yielding a contradiction. If ∆ < ∆∗A <
b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1−σ∗φ , then ∆
∗
A < b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
, contradicting with the first substep.
3. Second, suppose that 0 ≤ bA, or bA < 0 and ∆̌A ≤ max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ
}
.
Then,
(a) If 0 ≤ bA, then in any equilibrium σ
∗ = 1, because otherwise by (A.20) bA <
∆A (σ
∗) since bA < b, and hence ΠSH (∆
∗
A) > 0, yielding a contradiction
with σ∗ < 1.
(b) If bA < 0 and ∆̌A ≤ max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ
}
, then in any equilibrium σ∗ =
1, because otherwise by (A.20) ∆̌A < ∆A (σ
∗) since ∆̌A < b, and hence
ΠSH (∆
∗
A) > 0, yielding a contradiction with σ
∗ < 1.
Since in any equilibrium σ∗ = 1, by (A.20) ∆∗A = max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ
}
. Since
∆∗A = b−
cp,1+φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−φ
by the first substep, this implies that in equilibrium it must
be that ρ∗ = min
{
1, 1
φ+
cp
b−∆̂A(φ)
}
.
Note that ρ∗ also satisfies ρ∗ = min
{
1, 1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
}
. To see this, there
are two cases to consider: Suppose 0 ≤ bA. Then ∆̌A = bA, and hence σ̃A =
min {1,∞} = 1. Suppose bA < 0 and ∆̌A ≤ max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ
}
. Then, there
are two subcases to consider. If ∆̌A ≤ ∆̂A (φ), then
κ
φ 1
F (∆̌A)
∫ ∆̌A
bA
(∆−bA)dF (∆)
≥ 1
and hence σ̃A = min{1,
κ
φ 1
F (∆̌A)
∫ ∆̌A
bA
(∆−bA)dF (∆)
} = 1. If ∆̂A (φ) < ∆̌A ≤ b−
cp
1−φ ,
then ρ∗ = min
{
1, 1
φ+
cp
b−∆̂A(φ)
}
= 1, and hence 1 = min
{
1, 1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
}
for
all σ̃A ∈ [0, 1] since
1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
is decreasing in σ̃A.
Note that (∆∗A, ρ
∗, σ∗) derived indeed constitute an equilibrium by the first and
second steps, because ∆∗A = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
is the incumbent’s best response since
1
ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
(because b > ∆A (σ
∗ = 1) = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
≥ ∆̂A (φ) >
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max {∆, bA}), ρ
∗ = min
{
1, 1
φ+
cp
b−∆̂A(φ)
}
is in the activist’s best response since
∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) = ∆∗A (because b −
cp
1−φ ≤ ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) = ∆∗A) if
1
φ+
cp
b−∆̂A(φ)
≤ 1 and
∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) < ∆∗A (because ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) < b −
cp
1−φ = ∆
∗
A) if
1
φ+
cp
b−∆̂A(φ)
> 1, and
σ∗ = 1 is in the shareholders’ best response since ∆̌A ≤ ∆
∗
A.
4. Third, suppose that bA < 0 and max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ
}
< ∆̌A. Then, in any
equilibrium ∆∗A = ∆̌A. Suppose that there is an equilibrium where ∆
∗
A 6= ∆̌A.
There are two cases to consider. If ∆∗A < ∆̌A, then ρ
∗ = 0 by the second step
because either ∆∗A ≤ bA, or bA < ∆
∗
A < ∆̌A and hence σ
∗ = 0. This results
in ∆∗A = b due to the first step, yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
A < ∆̌A < b.
If ∆∗A > ∆̌A, then by the second step σ
∗ = 1, and hence by (A.20) ∆∗A =
max
{
∆̂A (φ) , b−
cp
1−φ
}
< ∆̌A, yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
A > ∆̌A.
Next, I derive σ∗ and ρ∗. Note that by (A.20), σ∗ satisfies ∆̌A = ∆A (σ
∗), and
σ∗ is unique since ∆A (σ
∗) is strictly decreasing in σ∗. To derive σ∗, let σ̃A such
that it satisfies ∆̂A (φ, σ̃A) = ∆̌A, or in other words let
σ̃A ≡
κ
φ 1
F(∆̌A)
∫ ∆̌A
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆)
, (A.21)
where σ̃A > 0 since bA < 0 < ∆̌A and
∫ ∆̌A
bA
∆dF (∆) = 0, and σ̃A < 1 since
∆̂A (φ) < ∆̌A. There are two cases to consider:
(a) Suppose b −
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
1−σ̃Aφ
≥ ∆̌A. Then, in any equilibrium σ
∗ = σ̃I , where
b−
cp,1+σ̃Iφcp,2
1−σ̃Iφ
= ∆̌A, or equivalently
σ̃I ≡
b− ∆̌A − cp,1
φ
(
b− ∆̌A
)
+ φcp,2
. (A.22)
To see this, there are two cases to consider. If σ∗ < σ̃I , then b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1−σ∗φ >
∆̌A since ∆̌A < b, and hence ∆A (σ
∗) > ∆̌A by (A.20), yielding a con-
tradiction with ∆∗A = ∆̌A. If σ
∗ > σ̃I , then b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1−σ∗φ < ∆̌A, and
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∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) < ∆̌A as well since σ
∗ > σ̃A due to σ̃I ≥ σ̃A, resulting in
∆A (σ
∗) < ∆̌A by (A.20), and hence yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
A = ∆̌A.
Also, note that σ̃I > 0 since σ̃I ≥ σ̃A > 0, and σ̃I < 1 since b−
cp
1−φ < ∆̌A =
b−
cp,1+σ̃Iφcp,2
1−σ̃Iφ
.
Note that in any equilibrium ρ∗ = 1, because ∆∗A > bA implies that ∆
∗
A = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
by the first step, and σ∗ = σ̃I and ∆
∗
A = ∆̌A = b−
cp,1+σ̃Iφcp,2
1−σ̃Iφ
im-
plies that ρ∗ = 1. Also note that 1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
≥ 1 since b−
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
1−σ̃Aφ
≥
∆̌A, and therefore ρ
∗ = min
{
1, 1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
}
holds.
Note that (∆∗A, ρ
∗, σ∗) derived indeed constitute an equilibrium by the first
and second steps, because ∆∗A = b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
is the incumbent’s best
response since 1ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
(because b > b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
= ∆̌A >
0 > max {∆, bA}), ρ
∗ = 1 is in the activist’s best response since ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) ≤
∆∗A (because ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) = ∆̂A (φ, σ̃I) ≤ ∆̂A (φ, σ̃A) = ∆̌A = ∆
∗
A), and
σ∗ = σ̃I is in the shareholders’ best response since ∆
∗
A = ∆̌A.
(b) Suppose b −
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
1−σ̃Aφ
< ∆̌A. Then, in any equilibrium σ
∗ = σ̃A. To see
this, there are two cases to consider. If σ∗ < σ̃A, then ∆
∗
A ≥ ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) >
∆̌A by (A.20), yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
A = ∆̌A. If σ
∗ > σ̃A, then
b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1−σ∗φ < ∆̌A and ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) < ∆̌A, and therefore ∆
∗
A (σ
∗) < ∆̌A by
(A.20), yielding a contradiction with ∆∗A = ∆̌A.
Also note that σ̃A > σ̃I .
In any equilibrium, ∆∗A > bA implies that ∆
∗
A = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
by the first
step, and σ∗ = σ̃A and ∆
∗
A = ∆̌A implies that
ρ∗ =
1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
∈ (0, 1) . (A.23)
88
Note that (∆∗A, ρ
∗, σ∗) derived indeed constitute an equilibrium by the first
and second steps, because ∆∗A = b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
is the incumbent’s best
response since 1ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
(because b > b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
= ∆̌A >
0 > max {∆, bA}), any ρ
∗ is in the activist’s best response since ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) =
∆∗A (because ∆̂A (φ, σ
∗) = ∆̂A (φ, σ̃A) = ∆̌A = ∆
∗
A), and σ
∗ = σ̃A is in the
shareholders’ best response since ∆∗A = ∆̌A.
Also, note that ρ∗ and σ∗ derived in the second and third substeps above indeed
satisfy 1ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−∆ .
Fifth, I show that an equilibrium where the incumbent accepts action settlement for all
∆ does not exist if ∆ < b −
cp
1−φ . To see this result, suppose that ∆ < b −
cp
1−φ . Then,
by the first step, ∆∗A ≥ b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗φ
≥ b −
cp
1−φ since
1
ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−∆ (because
1
ρ∗ −σ
∗φ ≥ 1−φ >
cp
b−∆ ≥
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−∆ ). Therefore, the incumbent rejects action settlement
for all ∆ ∈ (∆, b−
cp
1−φ).
I prove Corollaries 1 and 2 with the following generalization for any κ > 0.
Corollary 13. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then, in the
equilibrium,
(i) Upon running and winning a proxy fight, the activist sometimes does not implement
the project even if he achieves the authority.
(ii) If action settlement is on the equilibrium path, then
(a) The average shareholder return of action settlement is strictly larger than the
average shareholer return of a proxy fight.
(b) The announcement return of action settlement is positive.
(iii) Compared to the equilibrium where the activist does not demand any settlement,
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(a) If κ > κ0(φ), the expected payoff of the activist and shareholder value is the same.
(b) If κ < κ0(φ), the expected payoff of the activist is strictly larger, while expected
shareholder value is strictly smaller if and only if
ρ∗A < 1−
1− φ
φ
P (∆ > ∆∗A)E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
A]
P (∆ ∈ [0,∆∗A])E
[
∆|∆ ∈ [0,∆∗A]
] (A.24)
(iv) As κ decreases,
(a) The expected shareholder value conditional on settlement as well as conditional
on proxy fight decreases.
(b) The unconditional expected shareholder value increases.
(v) As cp increases, if κ > κ0(φ), then no player’s payoff changes, and if κ < κ0(φ), then:
(a) If cp < (1− φ)(b− ∆̂A), then parts (iv.a) and (iv.b) strictly hold. Moreover, the
activist’s expected payoff strictly increases.
(b) If cp ≥ (1 − φ)(b − ∆̂A), then expected shareholder value strictly decreases, the
activist’s expected payoff does not change
Proof. Part (i) follows directly from Proposition 13.
Consider part (ii). Note that by Proposition 13, action settlement is on the equilibrium path
if and only if κ < κ0 (φ). Suppose that κ < κ0 (φ). Then, the average shareholder return
of action settlement is given by E [∆|∆ > ∆∗A] while the it is φE [max {0,∆} |∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]
for proxy fight. Since ∆∗A > 0, the former is strictly larger. The share price before the
announcement of decision of the incumbent is given by
P (∆ ≤ ∆∗A) ρ
∗
AφE [max {0,∆} |∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] (A.25)
+P (∆ > ∆∗A)E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
A] ,
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where the standalone value of the firm is normalized to zero. Since the share price increases
to E [∆|∆ > ∆∗A] upon the announcement of action settlement, the announcement return
of action settlement is strictly positive.
Consider part (iii). There are two cases to consider. Suppose that κ > κ0(φ). Then, by
Propositions 13 and 6 the activist never runs a proxy fight regardless of whether he has
demanded action settlement or nothing, giving him and the shareholders a payoff of zero in
equilibrium. Suppose that κ < κ0(φ). In this case, if the activist does not demand anything,
then by Lemma 6 in equilibrium ρ∗ = 1, and hence at any ∆ his payoff is Π∗A (∆) =
φmax{0,∆} − κ, and if the activist demands action settlement, then by Proposition 13
in equilibrium Π∗A (∆) = ∆ if ∆ > ∆
∗
A and Π
∗
A (∆) = ρ
∗
A · (φmax{0,∆} − κ) if ∆ ≤
∆∗A. Since ρ
∗
A = 1 if E [φmax{0,∆} − κ|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] > 0, and also ∆
∗
A ∈ (0, b) due to κ <
κ0(φ), E [Π
∗
A (∆)] is strictly larger if the activist demands action settlement compared to
demanding nothing. On the other hand, expected shareholder value is given by
Π∗SH =











∫ b
0 ∆dF (∆) , if activist demands nothing
ρ∗φ
∫ ∆∗A
0 ∆dF (∆)
+
∫ b
∆∗A
∆dF (∆) ,
if activist demands action settlement
(A.26)
Therefore, the shareholders strictly prefer the activist to demand nothing over demanding
action settlement if and only if
ρ∗ < 1−
1− φ
φ
∫ b
∆∗A
∆dF (∆)
∫ ∆∗A
0 ∆dF (∆)
. (A.27)
Consider part (iv). There are two cases to consider. Suppose that ρ∗A = 1 or κ > κ0(φ).
Then, by Proposition 13, there exists ε > 0 such that for all κ′ ∈ [κ− ε, κ], ρ∗ is the
same, and therefore the expected shareholder value conditional on settlement as well as
conditional on proxy fight is the same as well. Since ρ∗ does not change, unconditional
shareholder value does not change either. Suppose that ρ∗A < 1 and κ ≤ κ0(φ). Then,
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as κ decreases, ρ∗A strictly increases and ∆
∗
A strictly decreases. Therefore, the expected
shareholder value conditional on settlement E [Π∗SH(∆)|∆ > ∆
∗
A] = E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
A] as well as
conditional on proxy fight E [Π∗SH(∆)|e = 1 ∧∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] = φE [max {0,∆} |∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] strictly
decrease. However, unconditional expected shareholder value
E [Π∗SH(∆)] = ρ
∗
Aφ
∫ ∆∗A
0
∆dF (∆) +
∫ b
∆∗A
∆dF (∆) (A.28)
strictly increases.
Consider part (v). There are three cases to consider. Suppose that κ > κ0(φ). Then, by
Proposition 13, for any cp the activist never runs a proxy fight and the incumbent always
rejects the action settlement, and therefore in equilibrium each player’s payoff is zero for
all ∆. Suppose that κ < κ0(φ) and b −
cp
1−φ > ∆̂A. Then, by Proposition 13, ρ
∗
A = 1,
and as cp increases ρ
∗
A = 1 does not change while ∆
∗
A strictly decreases. Therefore, the
expected shareholder value conditional on settlement as well as conditional on proxy fight
strictly decrease, while unconditional expected shareholder value (A.28) strictly increases.
Moreover, the activist’s expected payoff in equilibrium
Π∗A =
∫ ∆∗A
∆
(φmax {0,∆} − κ) dF (∆) +
∫ b
∆∗A
∆dF (∆) (A.29)
strictly increases as well, where the first term is strictly positive since ∆∗A = b−
cp
1−φ > ∆̂A.
Finally, suppose that κ < κ0(φ) and b −
cp
1−φ ≤ ∆̂A. Then, by Proposition 13, ∆
∗
A = ∆̂A,
and as cp increases ∆
∗
A does not change while ρ
∗
A strictly decreases, and therefore the
unconditional expected shareholder value (A.28) decreases while the activist’s expected
payoff (A.29) does not change since ∆∗A = ∆̂A.
I prove Proposition 2 with the following generalization for any bA ∈ (−∞, b) and κ > 0. I
denote the set of ∆ for which the board accepts by board settlement by B.
Proposition 14. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with activist
control of α ∈ (0, 1]. Then, denoting by ρ∗B (α) the probability of the activist running a
92
proxy fight upon rejection,
(i) (Rejection equilibrium) An equilibrium where ρ∗ = 0 exists if and only if κ ≥ φ
·
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0. In any such equilibrium, the project is
never implemented for any ∆, and for all ∆ the incumbent weakly prefers to reject
the board settlement. Moreover, whenever such an equilibrium exists, there exists
an equilibrium where ρ∗ = 0, σ∗ = 1{0<E[∆|∆≥bA]}, and the incumbent rejects board
settlement for all ∆.
(ii) (Proxy fight equilibrium) An equilibrium where ρ∗B > 0 and the incumbent rejects
board settlement for some ∆ exists if and only if κ < φ 11−F (bA)
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆)
and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0. Moreover, in any such equilibrium,
(a) The incumbent accepts the settlement if ∆ ∈ (∆, bA) ∪ (∆
∗
B , b) and rejects if
∆ ∈ (bA,∆
∗
B), where ∆
∗
B ∈ (0, b) is given by
∆∗B (α) ≡





b−
cp
α−φ , if α > αL
max
{
∆̂B (φ) , ∆̌A
}
, otherwise
, (A.30)
where αL, ∆̂B (φ), and ∆̌B are unique and given by
αL ≡ φ+
cp
b−max
{
∆̂B (φ) , ∆̌A
} (A.31)
∆̂B =











∆, if κ ≤ φ(∆ − bA)
x > max {∆, bA} s.t.
κ = φE [∆− bA|bA ≤ ∆ ≤ x] ,
otherwise
(A.32)
∆̌B =





bA, if bA ≥ 0
x > ∆ s.t. 0 =
∫ x
bA
∆dF (∆) , otherwise
(A.33)
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(b) Upon rejection the activist runs a proxy fight with probability
ρ∗B (α) ≡









min
{
1, α
φ+
cp
b−∆̂B(φ)
}
, if 0 ≤ bA,
min
{
1, α
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌B(φ)
}
, if bA < 0
(A.34)
where
σ̃A ≡ min
{
1,
κ
φE
[
∆− bA|bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆̌B
]
}
(A.35)
(c) Upon proxy fight, shareholders support the activist with probability
σ∗B(α) =

















1, if
0 ≤ bA or ∆̌B ≤ ∆̂B (φ)
or φ+
cp
b−∆̌B
≤ α,
max {σ̃I , σ̃A} ∈ (0, 1) , if
bA < 0 and ∆̂B (φ) < ∆̌B,
and α < φ+
cp
b−∆̌B
,
(A.36)
where
σ̃I ≡
α
(
b− ∆̌B
)
− cp,1
φ
(
b− ∆̌B
)
+ φcp,2
. (A.37)
(iii) (Acceptance equilibrium) An equilibrium where the incumbent accepts board settle-
ment for all ∆ exists if and only if α ≤ φ+
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
and κ < φ (b− bA). Moreover,
whenever such an equilibrium exists, it also exists with σ∗ = ρ∗ = 1.
Proof. Suppose the activist has demanded board settlement with control α > 0. Through-
out, denote the set of ∆ for which the board accepts board settlement by B. The proof
consists of several steps:
First, note that in any equilibrium, at the implementation stage, if the incumbent board
has the decision authority then it never implements the action, while if the activist has
the decision authority and has received a signal or is disclosed ∆, then the activist always
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implements the project if ∆ > bA, never implements if ∆ < bA, and is indifferent if ∆ = bA.
Therefore, in any subgame where the activist has acquired α control, in equilibrium the
activist’s payoff (excluding the cost of proxy fight) is given by α (∆− bA) if ∆ ≥ bA and
zero if ∆ < bA, the incumbent’s payoff is given by α (∆− b) if ∆ > bA and zero if ∆ < bA,
and the shareholders’ payoff is given by α∆ if ∆ > bA and zero if ∆ < bA. Note that the
arguments made for ∆ > bA also hold for ∆ = bA if the activist implements the project
when he is indifferent.
Second, I prove part (i). I start with the existence of the equilibrium where ρ∗ = 0. There
are three cases to consider:
• Suppose κ ≥ φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆) and B
∗ = ∅. Then, by the first step, the activist’s
payoff from running a proxy fight is bounded by φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆) − κ ≤ 0, and
therefore ρ∗ = 0 is in the best response of the activist. B∗ = ∅ is in the best response
of the incumbent since by the first step in this equilibrium its payoff is zero for all ∆,
which is the upperbound on its payoff.
• Suppose
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) ≤ 0 and B∗ = ∅. Then, by the first step, the shareholders’
payoff from supporting the activist in a proxy fight is bounded by φ
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) ≤ 0,
and therefore σ∗ = 0 is in the best response of the shareholders. Therefore, ρ∗ = 0
is in the best response of the activist. Again, B∗ = ∅ is in the best response of the
incumbent due to same reason with the previous step.
• Suppose κ < φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆) and
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) > 0. Suppose that there is
an equilibrium where ρ∗ = 0. However, then by the first step, in any such equilib-
rium, B∗ satisfies B∗ = ∅ if bA < ∆, and B
∗ ⊆ (∆, bA] if ∆ ≤ bA. However, then
P (∆ > bA ∧∆ /∈ B
∗) > 0, E [∆|∆ > bA ∧∆ /∈ B
∗] > 0, and φE[max{0,∆ − bA}|∆ /∈
B∗] > κ. Therefore, by the first step, in any proxy fight σ∗ = 1, and therefore the
activist deviates to ρ∗ = 1.
Next, suppose that the existence condition of the equilibrium is satisfied. Note that by the
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first step the incumbent strictly prefers to reject if ∆ > bA.
• Project is never implemented for any ∆ on the equilibrium path, because if it is
implemented for some ∆, then it must be implemented through board settlement,
which results in the incumbent to deviate to rejecting the settlement.
• Since ρ∗ = 0, the incumbent’s payoff from rejecting is zero, which is the upperbound
on its payoff, and therefore in any such equilibrium the incumbent weakly prefers to
reject.
• Finally, note that by the proof of the existence of the equilibrium, B∗ = ∅, ρ∗ = 0,
and σ∗ = 1{0<E[∆|∆≥bA]} always constitute an equilibrium, where σ
∗ follows from the
first step and the off-equilibrium belief of shareholders that upon rejection ∆ ∈ (∆, b).
Third, I derive the incumbent’s best response in equilibrium for any given ρ > 0 and
σ ∈ [0, 1]. Denote the payoff of the incumbent by ΠI and its decision by χ ∈ {B (α) , R},
where B (α) represents board settlement with α and R represents rejection. If ∆ < bA,
then the incumbent accepts since by the first step its payoff from accepting is zero, while it
is negative from rejecting. If ∆ ≥ bA, then
ΠI (χ|∆, ρ, σ) =























α (∆− b) , if χ = B (α) and ∆ > bA
∈ [0, α (∆− b)] if χ = B (α) and ∆ = bA
ρ [−cp,1 + σ (−φcp,2 + φ (∆− b))] , if χ = R and ∆ > bA
∈ [ρ [−cp,1 + σ (−φcp,2 + φ (∆− b))] ,
ρ [−cp,1 − σφcp,2]]
if χ = R and ∆ = bA
,
(A.38)
where ΠI (χ|bA, ρ, σ) depends on the probability that the activist implements the action
when he is indifferent between implementing and not implementing. Since ΠI (B (α) |∆, ρ, σ)−
ΠI (R|∆, ρ, σ) is strictly increasing in ∆ > bA, for any ρ and σ, there exists a unique
∆B ∈ [max {∆, bA} , b] such that the incumbent accepts settlement if ∆B < ∆ < b and
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rejects if max {∆, bA} < ∆ < ∆B.
1 Moreover, note that
• ∆B = max {∆, bA} if
α
ρ − σφ ≤
cp,1+σφcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
, and
• ∆B = b−
cp,1+σφcp,2
α
ρ
−σφ > max {∆, bA} if
α
ρ − σφ >
cp,1+σφcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
or ∆B > max {∆, bA}.
Also note that if ∆B > max {∆, bA}, then the incumbent is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting when ∆ = ∆B.
Fourth, note that for any acceptance strategy B∗ = (∆, bA) ∪ (∆B , b) (or, B
∗ = (∆B , b)
if bA ≤ ∆) with ∆B > max {∆, bA} that the incumbent follows,
2 in equilibrium the best
response of the activist is given by
ρ (∆B, σ) =











1, if ΠA (∆B, σ) > 0,
∈ [0, 1] if ΠA (∆B, σ) = 0,
0, if ΠA (∆B, σ) < 0,
(A.39)
for any σ, where ΠA is the activist’s profit from running a proxy fight upon rejection, i.e.,
ΠA (∆B, σ) = σφE [∆|bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆B]− κ, (A.40)
and in equilibrium the best response of the shareholders is given by
σ (∆B) =











1, if ΠSH (∆B) > 0,
∈ [0, 1] if ΠSH (∆B) = 0,
0, if ΠSH (∆B) < 0,
(A.41)
for any ρ, where ΠSH is the shareholders’ payoff from supporting the activist if the activist
runs a proxy fight, i.e.,
ΠSH (∆A) = φE [∆|bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆B] . (A.42)
1If ∆ < bA < ∆B and the activist implements the project when he is indifferent, then the incumbent
strictly prefers to reject the settlement if ∆ = bA.
2Note that the best response of the activist or the shareholders does not change if B∗ includes the points
{bA} and/or {∆B}, because they are zero probability events.
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Note that
∆B > (<)∆̂B (σφ) ⇐⇒ ΠA (∆B, σ) > (<)0, (A.43)
∆B > ∆̌B ⇐⇒ ΠSH (∆B) > 0, (A.44)
∆B = ∆̌B or ∆B < bA ⇒ ΠSH (∆B) = 0 (A.45)
bA < ∆B < ∆̌B ⇒ ΠSH (∆B) < 0. (A.46)
Fifth, I derive the equilibria with ρ∗ > 0 and on the equilibrium path rejection when
κ = 0 and bA = 0. Specifically, I show that such an equilibrium always exists and in this
equilibrium part (ii.a) holds with ∆∗B = b−
cp
α−φ and ρ
∗ = σ∗ = 1 if α > φ+
cp
b , and ∆
∗
B = 0
and any (ρ∗, σ∗) such that
ρ∗ [−cp,1 + σ
∗ (−φcp,2 + φ (−b))] (A.47)
≤ α (−b) ≤ ρ∗ [−cp,1 + σ
∗ (−φcp,2)]
otherwise. Note that under either of these conditions in any equilibrium ρ∗ > 0, because
if ρ∗ = 0 then by the first step the board rejects board settlement for all ∆ ∈ (0, b), and
therefore σ = 1 and the activist deviates to ρ = 1. There are two cases to consider. Suppose
α > φ+
cp
b . Since ρ
∗ > 0, by the third step the best response of the incumbent is accepting
for all ∆ ∈ (∆, 0)∪(∆∗B , b) and rejecting for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆
∗
B), where ∆
∗
B = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α−σ∗φ > 0
since α − σ∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b for any σ
∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Since ∆∗B > 0 = bA, by the fourth step
σ∗ = 1 is the best response of the shareholders, and ρ∗ = 1 is in the best response of the
activist since κ = 0. Next, suppose α < φ+
cp
b . Then, it must be that the incumbent rejects
the settlement with positive probability if ∆ = 0, and accepts otherwise. This is because by
the third step any other strategy the incumbent follows at the response stage that includes
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rejection must include rejecting for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆B) for some ∆B > 0 and accepting for all
∆ < 0, and therefore by the fourth step the activist’s and the shareholders’ unique best
response would be ρ = σ = 1, yielding a contradiction with ∆B > 0 due to the third step.
Due to the incumbent’s equilibrium response strategy, by the third step in any equilibrium
it must be that (A.47) holds, because if ρ∗ [−cp,1 + σ
∗ (−φcp,2 + φ (−b))] > α (−b), then
the incumbent rejects for some positive ∆, and if α (−b) > ρ∗ [−cp,1 + σ
∗ (−φcp,2)], then
the incumbent accepts for all ∆. On the other hand, if (A.47) holds then there exists
xP , xB ∈ [0, 1] such that ρ
∗ [−cp,1 + σ
∗ (−φcp,2 + φxP (−b))] = αxB (−b), where xB (xP )
represents the probability that the activist implements the project when he is indifferent
between implementing and not upon board settlement (winning a proxy fight). Moreover,
any such σ∗, ρ∗, xB , and xP are in the best response of the shareholders and activist by
the first step.
Sixth, I show that in any equilibrium where ρ∗ > 0 and rejection is on the equilibrium path,
the equilibrium is as described in the Proposition. I will also show that whenever such an
equilibrium exists,
∆∗B = max
{
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
max {α,αL} − φ
, ∆̌B
}
∈ (0, b). (A.48)
Note that in any equilibrium with ρ∗ > 0, by the third step there exists a unique ∆∗B ≥ bA
such that the incumbent accepts if ∆ < bA or ∆ > ∆
∗
B, and rejects if bA < ∆ < ∆
∗
B. There
are three cases to consider:
• Suppose
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) ≤ 0. Then, in no equilibrium ρ∗ > 0, because otherwise ∆∗B < b
and hence σ∗ = 0 if ∆∗B ∈ (bA, b) and ρ
∗ = 0 if ∆∗B ≤ bA, yielding a conradiction with
ρ∗ > 0.
• Suppose κ ≥ φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆). Then, in no equilibrium ρ
∗ > 0, because other-
wise ∆∗B < b and hence ΠA (∆
∗
B, σ
∗) < 0, yielding a contradiction.
• Suppose κ < φ
∫ b
bA
(∆− bA) dF (∆) and
∫ b
bA
∆dF (∆) > 0. Note that then max{∆̂A (φ),
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b−
cp
max{α,αL}−φ
, ∆̌A} < b. I derive the equilibrium in four steps. In any equilibrium
where ρ∗ > 0 and rejection is on the equilibrium path,
1. First, I show that αρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
, which implies that ∆∗B = b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ > max {∆, bA} by the first step. To see this result, suppose
α
ρ∗−σ
∗φ ≤
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
. Then by the third step ∆∗B = max {∆, bA}. However, if ∆
∗
B = ∆,
it yields a contradiction with rejection being on the equilibrium path, and if
∆∗B = bA, then the activist deviates to ρ = 0 by the fourth step, yielding a
contradiction with ∆∗B ≤ bA < b by the third step.
2. Second, I show that κ < σ∗φE [∆− bA|∆ ≥ bA] and
∆∗B = ∆B (σ
∗) ≡ max







∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) ,
b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
max
{
α−σ∗φ,
cp,1+σ
∗φcp,2
b−∆
}







, (A.49)
where ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) ≡ ∆̂B (φσ
∗).
Suppose κ ≥ σ∗φE [∆− bA|∆ ≥ bA]. Then, in equilibrium it must be that ρ
∗ = 0,
because otherwise ∆∗B < b and hence ΠA (∆
∗
B , σ
∗) < 0, yielding a contradiction.
Suppose κ < σ∗φE [∆− bA|∆ ≥ bA]. Then, noting that ∆B (σ
∗) ∈ (bA, b) since
κ > 0, there are two cases to consider. Suppose ∆∗B > ∆B (σ
∗). Then, by the
fourth step ΠA (∆
∗
B, σ
∗) > 0, and therefore ρ∗ = 1. However, then by the first
substep ∆∗B = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α−σ∗φ > ∆, yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
B > ∆B (σ
∗).
Suppose ∆∗B < ∆B (σ
∗). Note that it must be ∆ < ∆∗B for rejection to be on the
equilibrium path. There are two subcases to consider. If ∆ < ∆∗B < ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗),
then by the fourth step ΠA (∆
∗
B, σ
∗) < 0, and therefore ρ∗ = 0, resulting in ∆∗B =
b > ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) by the third step, yielding a contradiction with ∆∗B < ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗).
If ∆ < ∆∗B < b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α−σ∗φ , then ∆
∗
B < b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ , contradicting with the
first substep.
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3. Third, suppose that 0 ≤ bA, or bA < 0 and ∆̌B ≤ max
{
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
}
}
.
Then,
(a) If 0 ≤ bA, then in any equilibrium σ
∗ = 1, because otherwise by (A.49) bA <
∆B (σ
∗) since bA < b, and hence ΠSH (∆
∗
B) > 0, yielding a contradiction
with σ∗ < 1.
(b) If bA < 0 and ∆̌B ≤ max
{
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
}
}
, then in any equilib-
rium σ∗ = 1, because otherwise by (A.49) ∆̌B < ∆B (σ
∗) since ∆̌B < b, and
hence ΠSH (∆
∗
B) > 0, yielding a contradiction with σ
∗ < 1.
Since in any equilibrium σ∗ = 1, by (A.49) ∆∗B = ∆B (σ
∗ = 1). Since ∆∗B =
b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ by the first substep, this implies that in equilibrium it must be
that ρ∗ = min
{
1, α
φ+
cp
b−∆̂B(φ)
}
.
Note that ρ∗ also satisfies ρ∗ = min
{
1, α
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌B
}
. To see this, there are
two cases. Suppose 0 ≤ bA. Then ∆̌A = bA, and hence σ̃A = min {1,∞} = 1.
Suppose bA < 0 and ∆̌B ≤ max
{
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
}
}
. Then, there are
two cases to consider. If ∆̌B ≤ ∆̂B (φ), then
κ
φE[∆−bA|bA≤∆≤∆̌B]
≥ 1 and hence
σ̃A = min{1,
κ
φE[∆−bA|bA≤∆≤∆̌B]
} = 1. If ∆̂B (φ) < ∆̌B ≤ b −
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
} ,
then ρ∗ = min
{
1, α
φ+
cp
b−∆̂B(φ)
}
= 1, and hence 1 = min
{
1, α
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌B
}
for
all σ̃A ∈ [0, 1] since
1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌B
is decreasing in σ̃A.
Note that (∆∗B, ρ
∗, σ∗) derived indeed constitute an equilibrium by the third and
fourth steps, because ∆∗B = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ is the incumbent’s best response since
α
ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
(because b > ∆B (σ
∗ = 1) = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ ≥ ∆̂B (φ) >
max {∆, bA}), ρ
∗ = min
{
1, α
φ+
cp
b−∆̂B(φ)
}
is in the activist’s best response since
∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) = ∆∗B (because b−
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
} ≤ ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) = ∆∗B) if
α
φ+
cp
b−∆̂B(φ)
≤
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1 and ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) < ∆∗B (because ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) < b −
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
} = ∆∗B) if
α
φ+
cp
b−∆̂B(φ)
> 1, and σ∗ = 1 is in the shareholders’ best response since ∆̌B ≤ ∆
∗
B .
4. Fourth, suppose that bA < 0 and max
{
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
}
}
< ∆̌B .
Then, in any equilibrium ∆∗B = ∆̌B . Suppose that there is an equilibrium where
∆∗B 6= ∆̌B . There are two cases to consider. If ∆
∗
B < ∆̌B, then ρ
∗ = 0 by the
fourth step because either ∆∗B ≤ bA, or bA < ∆
∗
B < ∆̌B and hence σ
∗ = 0.
This results in ∆∗B = b due to the third step, yielding a contradiction with
∆∗B < ∆̌B < b. If ∆
∗
B > ∆̌B, then by the fourth step σ
∗ = 1, and hence by
(A.49) ∆∗B = max
{
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
}
}
< ∆̌B, yielding a contradiction
with ∆∗B > ∆̌B.
Next, I derive σ∗ and ρ∗. Note that by (A.49), σ∗ satisfies ∆̌B = ∆B (σ
∗), and
σ∗ is unique since ∆B (σ
∗) is strictly decreasing in σ∗ if ∆B (σ
∗) > ∆. To derive
σ∗, let σ̃A such that it satisfies ∆̂A (φ, σ̃A) = ∆̌A, or in other words let
σ̃A ≡
κ
φE
[
∆− bA|bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆̌B
] , (A.50)
where σ̃A > 0 since bA < 0 < ∆̌B and
∫ ∆̌B
bA
∆dF (∆) = 0, and σ̃A < 1 since
∆̂B (φ) < ∆̌B. There are two cases to consider:
(a) Suppose α − σ̃Aφ ≥
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
. Then, in any equilibrium σ∗ = σ̃I , where
b−
cp,1+σ̃Iφcp,2
α−σ̃Iφ
= ∆̌B , or equivalently
σ̃I =
α
(
b− ∆̌B
)
− cp,1
φ
(
b− ∆̌B
)
+ φcp,2
(A.51)
To see this, there are two cases to consider. If σ∗ < σ̃I , then b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α−σ∗φ >
∆̌B since ∆̌B < b, and hence ∆B (σ
∗) > ∆̌B by (A.49), yielding a contra-
diction with ∆∗B = ∆̌B . If σ
∗ > σ̃I , then b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
max
{
α−σ∗φ,
cp,1+σ
∗φcp,2
b−∆
} < ∆̌B ,
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and ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) < ∆̌B as well since σ
∗ > σ̃A due to σ̃I ≥ σ̃A, resulting in
∆B (σ
∗) < ∆̌B by (A.49), and hence yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
B = ∆̌B .
Also, note that σ̃I > 0 since σ̃I ≥ σ̃A > 0, and σ̃I < 1 since b−
cp
max
{
α−φ,
cp
b−∆
} <
∆̌B = b−
cp,1+σ̃Iφcp,2
α−σ̃Iφ
.
Note that in any equilibrium ρ∗ = 1, because ∆∗B > max {∆, bA} implies
that ∆∗B = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ by the third step, and σ
∗ = σ̃I and ∆
∗
A = ∆̌B =
b−
cp,1+σ̃Iφcp,2
α−σ̃Iφ
implies that ρ∗ = 1. Also note that α
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌B
≥ 1 since
b−
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
α−σ̃Aφ
≥ ∆̌B, and therefore ρ
∗ = min
{
1, 1
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
}
holds.
Note that (∆∗B, ρ
∗, σ∗) derived indeed constitute an equilibrium by the third
and fourth steps, because ∆∗B = b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ is the incumbent’s best
response since αρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
(because b > b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ = ∆̌B >
0 > max {∆, bA}), ρ
∗ = 1 is in the activist’s best response since ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) ≤
∆∗B (because ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) = ∆̂B (φ, σ̃I) ≤ ∆̂B (φ, σ̃A) = ∆̌B = ∆
∗
B), and
σ∗ = σ̃I is in the shareholders’ best response since ∆
∗
B = ∆̌B .
(b) Suppose α− σ̃Aφ <
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
. Then, in any equilibrium σ∗ = σ̃A. To see
this, there are two cases to consider. If σ∗ < σ̃A, then ∆
∗
B ≥ ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) > ∆̌B
by (A.49), yielding a contradiction with ∆∗B = ∆̌B. If σ
∗ > σ̃A, then
b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
max
{
α−σ∗φ,
cp,1+σ
∗φcp,2
b−∆
} < ∆̌B and ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) < ∆̌B, and therefore
∆∗B (σ
∗) < ∆̌B by (A.49), yielding a contradiction with ∆
∗
B = ∆̌B.
Also, note that σ̃A > σ̃I .
In any equilibrium, ∆∗B > max {∆, bA} implies that ∆
∗
B = b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ by
the third step, and σ∗ = σ̃A and ∆
∗
B = ∆̌B implies that
ρ∗ =
α
σ̃Aφ+
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌B
∈ (0, 1) , (A.52)
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where ρ∗ ∈ (0, 1) follows from α− σ̃Aφ <
cp,1+σ̃Aφcp,2
b−∆̌A
.
Note that (∆∗B, ρ
∗, σ∗) derived indeed constitute an equilibrium by the third
and fourth steps, because ∆∗B = b −
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ is the incumbent’s best
response since αρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−max{∆,bA}
(because b > b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
α
ρ∗
−σ∗φ = ∆̌B >
0 > max {∆, bA}), any ρ
∗ is in the activist’s best response since ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) =
∆∗B (because ∆̂B (φ, σ
∗) = ∆̂B (φ, σ̃A) = ∆̌B = ∆
∗
B), and σ
∗ = σ̃A is in the
shareholders’ best response since ∆∗B = ∆̌A.
Also, note that ρ∗ and σ∗ derived in the second and third substeps above indeed
satisfy 1ρ∗ − σ
∗φ >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−∆ .
Seventh, I prove part (iii), i.e., that an equilibrium where the incumbent accepts board
settlement for all ∆ exists if and only if α < φ+
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
and κ < φ (b− bA). There are
three cases to consider:
• Suppose κ ≥ φ(b− bA). Then, by the first step in any equilibrium, for any µ ⊆ (∆, b)
such that the activist believes that ∆ ∈ µ upon rejection, the activist strictly prefers
not to run a proxy fight. Therefore, by the first step the incumbent rejects for all
∆ ∈ (bA, b).
• Suppose α > φ +
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
. Then, the board rejects for all ∆ ∈ (bA, b) by the
first step if ρ = 0, and for all ∆ ∈ (bA,∆B(ρ, σ)) by the third step if ρ > 0, where
∆B(ρ, σ) > max {bA,∆} for all ρ > 0 and σ ∈ [0, 1].
• Suppose α ≤ φ +
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
and κ < φ (b− bA). Then, by the first step in any
equilibrium, there exists an off-equilibrium belief µ ⊆ (∆, b) such that if the activist
and shareholders believe that ∆ ∈ µ upon rejection, then ρ∗ = 1 and σ∗ = 1. If the
activist implements the project whenever he is indifferent, then by the third step the
incumbent strictly prefers to accept board settlement if ∆ 6= bA, and weakly prefers
board settlement if ∆ = bA, concluding the argument.
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I prove Corollaries 3 and 4 with the following generalization for any κ > 0.
Corollary 14. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with activist control
of αB ∈ (0, 1]. Then, in any equilibrium of this subgame,
(i) In any equilibrium where board settlement is on the equilibrum path, upon board set-
tlement the activist sometimes does not implement the project even if he achieves the
authority. In contrast, in any equilibrium where proxy fight is on the equilibrium path,
upon running and winning a proxy fight the activist always implements the project if
he achieves the authority.
(ii) The average shareholder return of board settlement is always strictly smaller than the
average return of an action settlement. Moreover, if proxy fight is on the equilibrium
path, then ∆∗B (αB) ≤ ∆
∗
A for any αB, and
(a) The average shareholder return of board settlement is strictly smaller than the
average shareholer return of a proxy fight if and only if ∆∗B (αB) > ∆̄B(αB),
where ∆̄B(αB) ∈ (0, b) is unique and given by
αBE
[
max {0,∆} |∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̄B
]]
= φE
[
∆|∆ ∈
[
0, ∆̄B
]]
. (A.53)
(b) The announcement return of board settlement is negative if αB ≥ α̂L and ∆
∗
B(αB)
>∆̄B.
(iii) Suppose αB = 1. Then,
(a) The expected payoff of the activist is strictly larger than in the equilibrium where
he has not demanded any settlement or where he has demanded action settlement
if proxy fight or acceptance equilibrium is in play, and equal otherwise.
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(b) The expected shareholder value is strictly larger than in the equilibrium where he
the activist demanded action settlement if acceptance equilibrium is in play or
proxy fight equilibrium is in play and ρ∗A < 1, and equal otherwise.
(iv) Suppose that proxy fight equilibrium is in play. Then, as κ decreases,
(a) The expected shareholder value conditional on settlement as well as conditional
on proxy fight decreases.
(b) The unconditional shareholder value increases.
(v) Suppose that proxy fight equilibrium is in play. Then, as cp increases:
(a) If αB > αL(cp), parts (iv.a) and (iv.b) strictly hold. Moreover, the activist’s
expected payoff strictly increases, while the incumbent board’s ex-ante expected
payoff strictly decreases.
(b) If αB ≤ αL(cp), then expected shareholder value strictly decreases, the activist’s
expected payoff does not change, and the incumbent board’s ex-ante expected pay-
off strictly increases.
Proof. Part (i) follows directly from Proposition 14.
Consider part (ii). Note that by Proposition 13, if the activist demands action settlement,
settlement is on the equilibrium path if and only if κ < κ0 (φ), and if κ < κ0 (φ), then
the average shareholder return of action settlement is given by E [∆|∆ ≥ ∆∗A (φ)]. Sup-
pose that κ < κ0 (φ). Noting that then rejection equilibrium does not exist for any α
if the activist demands board settlement, there are two cases to consider. The average
shareholder value of board settlement is αE [max {0,∆}] if acceptance equilibrium is in
play and αE [max {0,∆} |∆ < 0 or ∆ > ∆∗B] if proxy fight equilibrium is in play, where
∆∗B (α) ≤ ∆
∗
A (φ) for any α. In both cases, it is strictly smaller than E [∆|∆ ≥ ∆
∗
A (φ)].
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Consider parts (ii.a). Note that by Proposition 14, if the activist demands board settlement,
proxy fight is on the equilibrium path if and only if proxy fight equilibrium is in play. Also
note that in this equilibrium board settlement is on the equilibrium path as well. The
average shareholder value upon board settlement is αE [max {0,∆} |∆ /∈ [0,∆∗B ]] while upon
proxy fight it is φE [∆|∆ ∈ [0,∆∗B ]]. Since the former is strictly larger if ∆
∗
B = 0 and is
strictly smaller if ∆∗B = b, and both are continuous in ∆
∗
B, there exists ∆̄B(α) ∈ (0, b) such
that (A.53) holds. Note that the LHS is strictly decreasing in ∆∗B for all ∆
∗
B ∈ (0, b) and
the RHS is strictly increasing in ∆∗B for all ∆
∗
B ∈ (0, b). This also implies that ∆̄B(α) is
unique.
Consider part (ii.b). The share price before the announcement of decision of the incumbent
is given by
P (∆ ∈ [0,∆∗B ]) ρ
∗φE [∆|∆ ∈ [0,∆∗B ]] (A.54)
+P (∆ /∈ [0,∆∗B ])αE [max {0,∆} |∆ /∈ [0,∆
∗
B ]] ,
where the standalone value of the firm is normalized to zero. Since the share price changes
to αE [max {0,∆} |∆ /∈ [0,∆∗B ]] upon the announcement of board settlement, the announce-
ment return of board settlement is strictly negative if ρ∗ = 1 and ∆∗B (α) > ∆̄B. Note that
by 14, in proxy fight equilibrium ρ∗ = 1 if and only if α ≥ αL.
Consider part (iii). There are three cases to consider.
• Suppose that rejection equilibrium is in play. Then, by Proposition 14, it must be
that κ ≥ κ0 (φ). Then, the expected payoffs of the activist and shareholders are zero
if he demands board settlement with α = 1 or if he demands action settlement by
Proposition 13. Moreover, by Lemma 6, if the activist does not demand anything,
then his expected payoff is zero as well (If κ = κ0(φ) and the activist has not made
any demand, then by the proof of Lemma 6 he weakly prefers not running a proxy
fight, which again gives him a payoff of zero.).
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• Suppose that acceptance equilibrium is in play. Then, the activist’s expected payoff
as well as shareholder value is E [max {0,∆}] if he demands board settlement, both
of which are strictly smaller than if the activist demands action settlement or he does
not demand anything.
• Suppose that proxy fight equilibrium is in play. If the activist does not demand
anything, then by Lemma 6 in equilibrium his expected payoff is
Π∗A = max {0, E [φmax{0,∆} − κ]} , (A.55)
and if he demands action settlement, then by Proposition 13 in equilibrium his payoff
and shareholder value are
Π∗A = max





0,
P (∆ ≤ ∆∗A)E [φmax {0,∆} − κ|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]
+P (∆ > ∆∗A)E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
A]





, (A.56)
Π∗SH = P (∆ ∈ [0,∆
∗
A]) ρ
∗
AφE [∆|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] (A.57)
+P (∆ > ∆∗A)E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
A] .
On the other hand, if the activist demands board settlement with α = 1, then by
Proposition 14 in equilibrium his expected payoff and shareholder value are
Π∗A = P (∆ ∈ [0,∆
∗
B ])E [φ∆ − κ|∆ ∈ [0,∆
∗
B ]] (A.58)
+P (∆ > ∆∗B)E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
B]
> 0,
Π∗SH = P (∆ ∈ [0,∆
∗
B ]) ρ
∗
BφE [∆|∆ ∈ [0,∆
∗
B ]] (A.59)
+P (∆ > ∆∗B)E [∆|∆ > ∆
∗
B ] ,
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where the first term in Π∗A is nonnegative since ρ
∗
B > 0. Since ∆
∗
B ∈ (0, b), ∆
∗
B ≤ ∆
∗
A
and κ > 0, Π∗A is strictly largest if the last case. Moreover, since in addition ρ
∗
B > ρ
∗
A if
ρ∗A < 1 and ρ
∗
B = 1 if ρ
∗
A = 1, Π
∗
SH is strictly larger when the activist demands board
settlement with α = 1 compared to when he demands action settlement if ρ∗A < 1 and
equal otherwise.
Consider part (iv). Suppose that proxy fight equilibrium is in play. Note that this im-
plies κ < 11−F (0)κ0 (φ). There are two cases to consider. Suppose that α ≥ αL (κ). Then,
by Proposition 14, ∀κ′ ≤ κ ρ∗ = 1, and therefore the expected shareholder value condi-
tional on settlement as well as conditional on proxy fight is the same as well. Since ρ∗
does not change, unconditional shareholder value does not change either. Suppose that
α < αL (κ). Then, as κ decreases, ρ
∗
B strictly increases and ∆
∗
B strictly decreases. There-
fore, the expected shareholder value conditional on settlement E [Π∗SH(∆)|∆ /∈ [0,∆
∗
B ]] =
αE [max {0,∆} |∆ /∈ [0,∆∗B ]] as well as conditional on proxy fight E[Π
∗
SH(∆)|e = 1 ∧∆ ∈
[0,∆∗B ]] = φE [∆|∆ ∈ [0,∆
∗
B ]] strictly decrease. However, unconditional expected share-
holder value
E [Π∗SH(∆)] = ρ
∗
Bφ
∫ ∆∗B
0
∆dF (∆) + α
∫ b
∆∗B
∆dF (∆) (A.60)
strictly increases since ρ∗Bφ < α.
Consider part (v). Suppose that proxy fight equilibrium is in play. There are two cases
to consider. Suppose that α > αL. Then, by Proposition 14, ρ
∗
B = 1, and as cp increases
ρ∗B = 1 does not change while ∆
∗
B strictly decreases. Therefore, the expected shareholder
value conditional on settlement as well as conditional on proxy fight strictly decrease, while
unconditional expected shareholder value (A.60) strictly increases since α > αL implies that
α > φ. Moreover, the activist’s expected payoff in equilibrium
Π∗A =
∫ ∆∗B
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + α
∫ b
∆∗B
∆dF (∆) (A.61)
strictly increases as well since α > φ. Also note that the incumbent’s ex-ante expected
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payoff
Π∗I =
∫ ∆∗B
0
ρ∗B [−cp + φ (∆− b)] dF (∆) (A.62)
+α
∫ b
∆∗B
(∆− b) dF (∆)
strictly decreases because ρ∗B = 1 and for a given cp, ρ
∗
B [−cp + φ (∆− b)] > α (∆− b) if
∆ < ∆∗B.
Suppose α ≤ αL. Then, as cp increases, ∆
∗
B = ∆̂B does not change while ρ
∗
B strictly
decreases. Therefore, the activist’s expected payoff in equilibrium (A.62) does not change
while the expected shareholder value (A.60) strictly decreases. Finally, the incumbent’s
expected payoff strictly increases since ∆∗B = b−
cp
α
ρ∗
B
−φ stays constant upon increasing cp,
and hence by the implicit function theorem
dρ∗B
dcp
= −
1
cp
ρ∗B
(
1−
ρ∗Bφ
α
)
. (A.63)
Therefore, taking a total derivative of (A.62) with respect to cp yields
dΠ∗I
dcp
=
dρ∗B
dcp
∫ ∆∗B
0
[−cp + φ (∆− b)] dF (∆) +
∫ ∆∗B
0
(−ρ∗B) dF (∆) (A.64)
=
ρ∗Bφ
αcp
∫ ∆∗B
0
[ρ∗B [−cp + φ (∆− b)]− α (∆− b)] dF (∆) ,
which is strictly positive since ρ∗B [−cp + φ (∆− b)] > α (∆− b) for all ∆ < ∆
∗
B .
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 14, the expected payoff ΠA (α) of the activist from
demanding board settlement with α > 0 is given by
ΠA (α) =
∫ ∆∗B(α)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + α
∫ b
∆∗B(α)
∆dF (∆) , (A.65)
which is continuous in α. Moreover, since ∆∗B (α) = ∆̂A (φ) for any α ≤ αL, ΠA (α) is
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strictly increasing in α for all α < αL. Therefore, ΠA (α) has a maximum, and Λ =
argmax0<α≤αh ΠA (α) = argmaxmin{αh,αL}≤α≤αh ΠA (α). Moreover, limα→0 ΠA (α) = 0,
and due to Corollary 14 part (iii), the activist strictly prefers demanding board settlement
with α = 1 over demanding action settlement. Since the activist’s payoff from demanding
action settlement is strictly positive due to Proposition 1, there exists a unique αl ∈ (0, 1)
such that the activist strictly prefers demanding board settlement over demanding action
settlement if and only if αh > αl. Note that by Corollary 13, the activist strictly prefers to
demand action settlement over demanding nothing, and therefore in equilibrium the activist
will always demand a settlement.
Next, consider part (i). By the previous step, α∗ ≥ min {αh, αL}. Therefore, if αL ≥
αh, then α
∗ = αh. Suppose that αL < αh, κ <
cp
2 , and f
′ (∆) ≥ 0 for all ∆ ∈
[
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
αh−φ
]
. Then, this implies that Π′′A (α) < 0 for all α ∈ (αL, αh] since
0 > Π′′A (α) ⇐⇒
f ′
(
b−
cp
α−φ
)
f
(
b−
cp
α−φ
) >
2κ
cp
− 1
b+
κ−cp
α−φ
(A.66)
Next, consider part (ii). First, I show that there exists α∗SH that maximizes shareholder
value, and α∗SH ≥ min {αh, αL}. Since expected shareholder value if the activist demands
board settlement with α > 0 is given by
ΠSH (α) = ρ
∗
B (α)
∫ ∆∗B(α)
0
φ∆dF (∆) + α
∫ b
∆∗B(α)
∆dF (∆) , (A.67)
ΠSH (α) is continuous for all α ∈ (0, αh], and also strictly increasing in α for all α ≤
min {αh, αL}. Therefore, ΠSH (α) has a maximum, and ΛSH ≡ argmaxα>0 ΠSH (α) =
argmaxmin{αh,αL}≤α≤αh ΠSH (α). Denote αSH ≡ minΛSH and ᾱ ≡ maxΛ.
Second, I show that αSH ≥ ᾱ. Suppose that αSH < ᾱ. Then, by the first step it must be
that αSH ≥ αL, and therefore ρ
∗
B (αSH) = ρ
∗
B (ᾱ) = 1 and
111
ΠA (αSH) =
∫ ∆∗B(αSH)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + αSH
∫ b
∆∗B(αSH)
∆dF (∆) (A.68)
= ΠSH (αSH)−
∫ ∆∗B(αSH)
0
κdF (∆)
> ΠSH (ᾱ)−
∫ ∆∗B(ᾱ)
0
κdF (∆)
=
∫ ∆∗B(ᾱ)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + ᾱ
∫ b
∆∗B(ᾱ)
∆dF (∆)
= ΠA (ᾱ) ,
where the inequality follows from ∆∗B (αSH) < ∆
∗
B (ᾱ) and ΠSH (αSH) ≥ ΠSH (ᾱ). However,
ΠA (αSH) > ΠA (ᾱ) contradicts with ᾱ ∈ Λ.
Third, I show that αSH > ᾱ if αL < ᾱ < αh. Suppose αL < ᾱ < αh and αSH ≤ ᾱ. Note
that by the second step it must be that αSH = ᾱ. By definition of αSH , αSH must satisfy
Π′SH (αSH) = 0 since αL < αSH = ᾱ < αh. However, this implies that Π
′
A (ᾱ) < 0, which
is a contradiction with ᾱ ∈ (αL, αh) and ᾱ ∈ Λ.
Next, consider part (iii.a). αL(κ) = φ +
cp
b− 2κ
φ
follows from ∆̂B =
2κ
φ . By part (i), α
∗ ≥
min {αh, αL}. Therefore, α
∗ = αh if αL ≥ αh. Suppose that αL < αh. Then, for all
α ∈ (αL, αh]
Π′A (α) =
1
b−∆
cp
(α− φ)2
(cp
2
− κ
)
, (A.69)
therefore the activist strictly chooses α∗ = αh if
cp
2 > κ and α
∗ = αL if
cp
2 < κ.
Finally, consider part (iii.b). Shareholder value is strictly increasing in α since
Π′SH (α) =











1
b−∆
cp
(α−φ)2
cp
2 > 0, if α > αL,
dρ∗B(α)
dα
∫ ∆∗B(α)
0 φ∆dF (∆)
+
∫ b
∆∗B(α)
∆dF (∆) > 0,
if α < αL,
(A.70)
where the inequality in the second line follows from
dρ∗B(α)
dα > 0 when α < αL. Suppose that
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κH >
cp
2 and αh > φ, which is equivalent to αL(
cp
2 ) < αh. Note that αL(κH) = αh. Then,
if κ ∈ (0,
cp
2 ] ∪ {κH}, then ΠSH (α
∗) given by (A.67) becomes Π̄SH , where
Π̄SH ≡
∫ b−
cp
αh−φ
0
φ∆dF (∆) +
∫ b
b−
cp
αh−φ
∆dF (∆) , (A.71)
since part (iii.a) and Proposition 14 imply that α∗ = αh, ρ
∗
B (α
∗) = 1, and hence ∆∗B (α
∗) =
b−
cp
αh−φ
. On the other hand, if κ ∈ (
cp
2 , κH) then under uniform distribution ΠSH (α
∗) <
Π̄SH since α
∗ = αL(κ) < αh, ΠSH (α) is strictly increasing in α, and ΠSH (α) = Π̄SH if
α = αh. If κ > κH then ΠSH (α
∗) < Π̄SH as well since α
∗ = αh, ρ
∗
B < 1, and ∆
∗
B (α) =
b−
cp
αh
ρ∗
B
−φ
.
For the next result, denote the set of α > 0 that maximize ΠA (α|κ) (ΠSH (α|κ)) by Λ (α|κ)
(ΛSH (α|κ)).
Corollary 15. Suppose that αh = 1, κ <
1
1−F (0)κ0, and proxy fight equilibrium is in play
if the activist demands board settlement. Let
κ̄ (α) ≡





φ 1
F (b−
cp
α−φ
)−F (0)
∫ b−
cp
α−φ
0 ∆dF (∆) , if α > φ+
cp
b
0, otherwise
(A.72)
Π∗SH (κ) ≡ max
α∗∈Λ(κ)
ΠSH (α
∗|κ) (A.73)
Then,
(0) ΠSH (maxΛ (κ) |κ) = Π
∗
SH (κ), and ΠSH (α|κ) < Π
∗
SH (κ) for all α < maxΛ (κ).
(i) If κ ≥ κ̄ (1), then Λ (κ) = {1}. Moreover, if κ ≤ κ̄ (1) then Π∗SH (κ) ≤ Π
∗
SH (0), and
if κ > κ̄ (1), then Π∗SH (κ) < Π
∗
SH (0) and Π
∗
SH (κ) is strictly decreasing in κ.
(ii) Suppose that κ̄ (1) > 0. If 1 ∈ Λ (κ) for all κ < κ̄ (1), then Π∗SH (κ) = Π
∗
SH (0) for all
κ ≤ κ̄ (1). If 1 /∈ Λ (κ) for some κ < κ̄ (1), then:
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(a) For all κ < κ̄ (1), as κ increases, maxΛ (κ) strictly decreases if maxΛ (κ) ∈
(αL, 1) and strictly increases if maxΛ (κ) = αL.
(b) There exist 0 ≤ κL < κH ≤ κ̄ (1) such that Π
∗
SH (κ) = Π
∗
SH (0) for all κ ∈ [0, κL]∪
{κH} and Π
∗
SH (κ) < Π
∗
SH (0) for all κ ∈ (κL, κH). Moreover, if Λ (0) 6= {1},
then κL = 0 and κH = κ̄(minΛ (0)) > 0.
Proof. Suppose that κ < 11−F (0)κ0 and proxy fight equilibrium is in play.
For any κ ≥ 0, denote the set of α > 0 that maximize ΠA (α|κ) (ΠSH (α|κ)) by Λ (α|κ)
(ΛSH (α|κ)). Note that these sets have a maximum as well as minimum since ΠA and ΠSH
are continuous functions of α, and Λ (κ), ΛSH (κ) ⊆
[
min{1, φ +
cp
b }, 1
]
since both ΠA and
ΠSH are strictly increasing in α if α < φ+
cp
b ≤ αL by Proposition 14.
First, I show that α ≥ (>)αL (κ) if and only if α ≥ φ +
cp
b and κ ≤ (<)κ̄ (α). There
are three cases to consider: Suppose α < φ +
cp
b . Then, since ∆̂B ≥ 0 is always satisfied,
α < φ +
cp
b ≤ αL. Suppose α = φ +
cp
b . Then κ̄ (α) = 0, and hence ∆̂B = 0 if and only
if κ = κ̄ (α). Therefore, α = αL (κ) if κ = κ̄ (α), and α < αL (κ) if κ > κ̄ (α). Suppose
α > φ+
cp
b . Then, α ≥ (>)αL (κ) ⇐⇒ κ ≤ (<)κ̄ (α) since κ̄ (α) > 0 and
κ ≤ (<)κ̄ (α) (A.74)
⇐⇒ κ ≤ (<)φ
1
F (b−
cp
α−φ)− F (0)
∫ b−
cp
α−φ
0
∆dF (∆)
⇐⇒ ∆̂B (κ) ≤ (<)b−
cp
α− φ
⇐⇒ φ+
cp
b− ∆̂B (κ)
≤ (<)α ⇐⇒ α ≥ (>)αL (κ)
Second, I show that αL (κ) ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ κ ≥ κ̄ (1). There are two cases to consider. First,
suppose κ̄ (1) = 0. Then, 1 ≤ φ +
cp
b ≤ αL, and κ ≥ κ̄ (1) for any κ. Suppose κ̄ (1) > 0.
Then, 1 > φ+
cp
b , and hence αL (κ) ≥ (>)1 ⇐⇒ κ ≥ (>)κ̄ (1) by the previous step.
Consider part (0). There are two cases to consider:
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• Suppose maxΛ (κ) ≤ αL. Then, by Proposition 14, for any α ≤ αL, ΠSH (α|κ) strictly
decreases as α decreases.
• Suppose maxΛ (κ) > αL. Then, there are two subcases to consider:
– αL ≤ α < maxΛ (κ): Then, it must be that ΠSH (α|κ) < ΠSH (maxΛ (κ) |κ),
because if ΠSH (α|κ) ≥ ΠSH (maxΛ (κ) |κ) then by Proposition 14,
ΠA (α|κ) = ΠSH (α|κ) −
[
F
(
b−
cp
α− φ
)
− F (0)
]
κ (A.75)
> ΠSH (maxΛ (κ) |κ)
−
[
F
(
b−
cp
maxΛ (κ)− φ
)
− F (0)
]
κ
= ΠA (maxΛ (κ) |κ) ,
yielding a contradiction with maxΛ (κ) ∈ argmaxα>0 ΠA (α|κ).
– α < αL: Then, by Proposition 14, for any α ≤ αL, ΠSH (α|κ) strictly decreases
as α decreases.
Consider part (i). Note that if κ ≥ κ̄ (1) then Λ (κ) = {1} due to the previous proposition
and κ ≥ κ̄ (1) ⇐⇒ αL ≥ 1. Next, I show that if κ ≤ κ̄ (1) then Π
∗
SH (κ) ≤ Π
∗
SH (0),
and if κ > κ̄ (1), then Π∗SH (κ) < Π
∗
SH (0) and Π
∗
SH (κ) is strictly decreasing in κ. First,
note that if κ = 0, then the maximization problem of the shareholders and activists are
identical. Therefore, if κ = 0, for any α∗ the activist demands in equilibrium, it must be
that ΠSH (α
∗|κ = 0) = maxα∈(0,1]ΠSH (α|κ = 0). Second, note that the shareholder value
in equilibrium is not directly affected by κ, but rather is determined by α, ρ, and ∆B .
By Proposition 14, any given α > 0 and κ ≥ 0 yield unique subgame ρ∗ and ∆∗B. Recall
that α ≥ αL (κ) if and only if α ≥ φ +
cp
b and κ ≤ κ̄ (α). Since κ̄ (α) = 0 if α ≤ φ +
cp
b ,
by Proposition 14, for any α > 0, ρ∗ (κ) = ρ∗ (0) and ∆∗B (κ) = ∆
∗
B (0) if κ ≤ κ̄ (α),
while ρ∗ (κ) < ρ∗ (0) is strictly decreasing and ∆∗B (κ) > ∆
∗
B (0) is strictly increasing in
κ for all κ > κ̄ (α) (as long as proxy fight equilibrium exists). Therefore, for any α > 0,
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ΠSH (α|κ) = ΠSH (α|0) for all κ ≤ κ̄ (α), and ΠSH (α|κ) < ΠSH (α|0) and ΠSH (α|κ) is
strictly decreasing in κ for all κ > κ̄ (α). Noting that κ̄ (α) is weakly increasing in α
concludes part (i).
Before proceeding to part (ii), I show three steps for any equilibrium:
1. First, I show that in any equilibrium, if κ ≤ κ̄ (1), then ΠSH (α
∗|κ) = Π∗SH (0) if and
only if α∗ ∈ Λ (0). There are two cases to consider. Suppose κ̄ (1) = 0. Then the
statement holds trivially. Suppose κ̄ (1) > 0. Then, if κ ≤ κ̄ (1) , then αL ≤ 1 and
hence ρ∗ = 1 by Proposition 14. Note that due to part (i), this also implies that
Π∗SH (κ) = Π
∗
SH (0) if Λ (0) ∩ Λ (κ) 6= ∅, and Π
∗
SH (κ) < Π
∗
SH (0) if Λ (0) ∩ Λ (κ) = ∅.
2. Second, I show that for any κ > 0, maxΛ (κ) ≤ minΛSH (κ). There are two cases to
consider:
(a) Suppose κ ≥ κ̄ (1). Then, αL ≥ 1, and hence Λ (κ) = ΛSH (κ) = {1} by part (i).
(b) Suppose κ < κ̄ (1). Then, κ̄ (1) > 0, and hence κ < κ̄ (1) implies that αL <
1. Note that minΛSH (κ) ≥ αL by Proposition 14. Moreover, for any α >
minΛSH (κ), ρ
∗
B = 1 and
ΠA (α|κ) = ΠSH (α|κ) −
[
F
(
b−
cp
α− φ
)
− F (0)
]
κ (A.76)
< ΠSH (minΛSH (κ) |κ)
−
[
F
(
b−
cp
minΛSH (κ)− φ
)
− F (0)
]
κ
= ΠA (minΛSH (κ) |κ)
3. Third, I show that for any α ∈ Λ (0), Λ (κ (α)) = {α}. Note that minΛ (0) > φ+
cp
b
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since if κ = 0, then by Proposition 14
Π∗SH (α) =











α
∫ b
b−
cp
α−φ
∆dF (∆)
+φ
∫ b−
cp
α−φ
0 ∆dF (∆) ,
if α ≥ φ+
cp
b
α
∫ b
0 ∆dF (∆) , if α < φ+
cp
b
, (A.77)
which implies that dΠSH(α)dα =
∫ b
0 ∆dF (∆) > 0 for all α ∈ (0, φ +
cp
b ]. Suppose
κ = κ̄ (α′) for some α′ ∈ Λ (0). Then, by the proof of part (i), ρ∗(α′) = 1, and
ΠSH(α
′|κ = κ̄ (α′)) = Π∗SH (0). Since Π
∗
SH (κ) ≤ Π
∗
SH (0) for all κ ≥ 0 by part (i), this
implies that α′ ∈ ΛSH (κ). By the second step, maxΛ (κ) ≤ α
′. Since αL (κ̄ (α
′)) = α′,
any α′′ ∈ Λ (κ) satisfies α′′ ≥ α′ by Proposition 3. Hence, Λ (κ) = {α}.
Consider part (ii), i.e., κ̄ (1) > 0. Suppose 1 ∈ Λ (κ) for all κ < κ̄ (1). Note that Λ (κ̄ (1)) =
{1} by part (i). Since 1 ∈ Λ (0), by the first step above ΠSH (α
∗|κ) = Π∗SH (0) for all
κ ≤ κ̄ (1) if α∗ = 1. Since 1 ∈ Λ (κ) for all κ ≤ κ̄, Π∗SH (κ) = Π
∗
SH (0) for all κ ≤ κ̄ (1).
Next, consider part (ii.a), i.e., suppose that κ < κ̄ (1). Then, αL < 1. Therefore, by
Proposition 3, as κ increases, maxΛ (κ) strictly increases if maxΛ (κ) = αL. To see that
maxΛ (κ) strictly decreases in κ if maxΛ (κ) ∈ (αL, 1), suppose that κ
′ < κ̄ (1) and α′ ≡
maxΛ (κ′) ∈ (αL (κ
′) , 1). Consider any ε > 0 such that αL (κ
′ + ε) < α′. Note that such
ε > 0 always exists since αL (κ) is a continuous function of κ. Moreover, then αL (κ
′′) < α′
for all κ′′≤ κ′ + ε since αL (κ) is a weakly increasing function of κ. Consider any κ
′′ ∈
(κ′, κ′ + ε]. Note that α′ > max {αL (κ
′) , αL (κ
′′)}. Denoting α′′ ≡ maxΛ (κ′′), there are
two cases to consider:
• Suppose that α′′ > α′. However, since min {α′, α′′} > max {αL (κ
′) , αL (κ
′′)}, ΠA(α
′′|
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κ′′) ≥ ΠA (α
′|κ′′) implies by Proposition 14 that
ΠA
(
α′′|κ′
)
= ΠA
(
α′′|κ′′
)
+
[
F
(
b−
cp
α′′ − φ
)
− F (0)
]
(
κ′′ − κ′
)
(A.78)
> ΠA
(
α′|κ′′
)
+
[
F
(
b−
cp
α′ − φ
)
− F (0)
]
(
κ′′ − κ′
)
= ΠA
(
α′|κ′
)
,
yielding a contradiction with α′ ∈ Λ (κ′).
• Suppose α′′ = α′. However, α′ ∈ (αL (κ
′) , 1) implies that dΠA(α|κ
′)
dα
∣
∣
∣
α=α′
= 0, and
hence
dΠA (α|κ
′′)
dα
∣
∣
∣
∣
α=α′
=
dΠSH (α|κ
′)
dα
∣
∣
∣
∣
α=α′
(A.79)
−
cp
(α′ − φ)2
f
(
b−
cp
α′ − φ
)
(
κ′′ − κ′
)
< 0.
Therefore, since α′ ∈ (αL (κ
′′) , 1), there exists α̃ ∈ (αL (κ
′′) , α′) such that ΠA (α̃|κ
′′) >
ΠA (α
′|κ′′), yielding a contradiction with α′ ∈ Λ (κ′).
Next, consider part (ii.b), i.e., 1 /∈ Λ (κ) for some κ < κ̄ (1), there are two cases to consider:
1. Λ (0) = {1}: Then, it must be that:
• If κ ∈ [0, κ̄ (1)], by part (i) and the first step above, Π∗SH (κ) = Π
∗
SH (0) if and
only if 1 ∈ Λ (κ).
• Since 1 ∈ Λ (0), 1 /∈ Λ (κ) for some κ < κ̄ (1) implies that 1 /∈ Λ∗ (κ) for some
κ ∈ (0, κ̄ (1)).
By the third step above, 1 ∈ Λ (κ̄ (1)). Hence, Π∗SH (κ) = Π
∗
SH (0) if κ ∈ {0, κ̄ (1)}.
Since Π∗A (α, κ) is a continuous function of α and κ, there exists a compact set K ⊆
[0, κ̄ (1)] such that given κ ≤ κ̄ (1), 1 ∈ Λ (κ) if and only if κ ∈ K. Since {0, κ̄ (1)} ⊆ K
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and there exists κ ∈ (0, κ̄ (1)) such that κ /∈ K, this concludes the argument for this
case.
2. Λ (0) 6= {1}: Then,
• maxΛ (κ) < minΛ(0) for all κ ∈ (0, κH), where κH = κ̄ (minΛ(0)) ≤ κ̄ (1). To
see this result, note that ΛSH(κ) = Λ(0) for all κ ∈ (0, κH), because by the proof
of part (i):
– For any α, ΠSH (α|κ) ≤ ΠSH (α|0) for all κ ≥ 0.
– For any α ∈ Λ(0), ΠSH (α|κ) = ΠSH (α|0) for all κ < κH since κH ≤ κ̄ (α).
Therefore, by the second step above, maxΛ (κ) ≤ minΛ(0). Moreover, since
(a) minΛ (0) > φ +
cp
b by the third step above, (b) 1 > minΛ (0), and (c)
αL (0) = φ+
cp
b , by Proposition 14 it must be that
dΠSH(α|κ=0)
dα
∣
∣
∣
α=minΛ(0)
= 0. If
κ ∈ (0, κH ), since minΛ(0) > αL (κ), it follows that:
dΠA (α|κ)
dα
∣
∣
∣
∣
α=minΛ(0)
=
dΠSH (α|κ = 0)
dα
∣
∣
∣
∣
α=minΛ(0)
(A.80)
−
cp
(minΛ(0) − φ)2
f
(
b−
cp
minΛ(0)− φ
)
κ
< 0
Therefore, combined with maxΛ (κ) ≤ minΛ(0), it must be that maxΛ (κ) <
minΛ(0). Since κH ≤ κ̄ (1), by part (i) and the first step above this implies that
Π∗SH (κ) < Π
∗
SH (0) for all κ ∈ (0, κH ).
• Since κH = κ̄ (minΛ(0)), by the third step above Λ(κ) = {minΛ(0)}. Since
κH ≤ κ̄ (1), by the first step above this implies that Π
∗
SH (κ) = Π
∗
SH (0) if
κ ∈ {0, κH}.
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I prove Lemma 3 with the following generalization for any bA ∈ (−∞, b) and κ > 0.
Lemma 7. Suppose that the activist has acquired α > 0 control.3
(i) Suppose that the activist implements the project with probability γ ∈ [0, 1] if he achieves
decision authority and does not learn ∆. Then, at the disclosure stage,
(a) If ∆ < bA, then the incumbent strictly prefers to disclose if γ > 0, and is
indifferent between disclosing and not dislosing if γ = 0.
(b) If ∆ > bA, then the incumbent strictly prefers not to disclose if γ < 1, and is
indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing γ = 1.
(ii) After acquiring board seats, if the the activist believes that ∆ > bA with positive
probability, then in any equilibrium γ∗ = 1 or γ∗ = 0, and if the activist believest that
∆ < bA, then in any equilibrium γ
∗ = 0.
(iii) Consider any equilibrium with γ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
(a) If γ∗ = 0, the project is not implemented if the activist does not receive a signal.
(b) If γ∗ = 1, the project is implemented if the activist has decision authority and
∆ > bA, and is not implemented if ∆ < bA.
Proof. Consider part (i).
• Suppose ∆ < bA. Then, disclosure is the weakly dominant strategy for the incumbent,
because the activist does not implement the action if ∆ is disclosed. Specifically, the
incumbent strictly prefers to disclose if γP > 0, and it is indifferent between disclosing
and not disclosing if γP = 0.
3The statements made for ∆ > bA are also valid for ∆ = bA if the activist implements the action when
he is indifferent between implementing and not.
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• Suppose ∆ > bA. Then, nondisclosure is the weakly dominant strategy for the in-
cumbent, because the activist implements the action if ∆ is disclosed. Specifically,
the incumbent strictly prefers not to disclose if γP < 1, and it is indifferent between
disclosing and not disclosing if γP = 1.
• Suppose ∆ = bA. If the activist implements the action when he is indifferent between
implementing and not, then the arguments made for ∆ > bA holds. Otherwise, the
incumbent’s payoff and disclosure strategy depends on γP compared to the probability
that the activist implements the action if ∆ is disclosed. Specifically, the incumbent
discloses if γP is larger, does not disclose if γP is smaller, and is indifferent otherwise.
Consider part (ii). Suppose that the activist believes that ∆ > bA with positive probability.
To see the result, suppose that there is an equilibrium where after acquiring board seats,
the activist believes that ∆ > bA with positive probability, and γ
∗ ∈ (0, 1). However, then
by part (i), the incumbent board discloses to the activist if ∆ < bA. Therefore, upon
nondisclosure, the activist updates his beliefs to ∆ ≥ bA. Since the activist believes that
∆ > bA with positive probability, he deviates to γ = 1. Note that the argument works with
∆ ≥ bA if the activist implements the action when he is indifferent between implementing
and not.
Suppose that the activist believest that ∆ < bA. Then, γ
∗ = 0 follows immediately.
Consider part (iii). Suppose that γ∗ = 0, and there exists ∆′ such that the project is
implemented with positive probability if ∆ = ∆′ and the activist does not receive a signal.
Since the incumbent never implements the project and γ∗ = 0, then it must be that if
∆ = ∆′ then the incumbent discloses to the activist and the activist implements the project
with positive probability. However, then the incumbent strictly prefers to not disclosing
since γ∗ = 0, yielding a conradiction.
Suppose γ∗ = 1. If ∆ > bA, then the activist implements the project regardless of disclosure
since γ∗ = 1. Note that this is true also when ∆ = bA if the activist implements the action
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when he is indifferent between implementing and not. If ∆ < bA, then incumbent’s unique
best response by part (i) is to disclose, and therefore the activist does not implement the
project. Since the incumbent never implements the project, the project is never implemente
if ∆ < bA.
I prove Lemma 4 with the following generalization for any bA ∈ (−∞, b) and κ > 0. I denote
the set of ∆ for which the incumbent discloses after proxy fight (board settlement) by DP
(DB).
Lemma 8. Suppose that the activist has not demanded any settlement. Then, an equilib-
rium of this subgame exists, in any equilibrium γ∗P ∈ {0, 1}, and in equilibrium
(i) The activist never runs a proxy fight if κ > κ0(β
∗
p) or E [∆ ≥ bA] < 0, and he always
runs a proxy fight if κ < κ0(β
∗
p) and E [∆ ≥ bA] > 0.
(ii) (Disclosure equilibrium) An equilibrium where γ∗P = 1 always exists. Moreover,
(a) In equilibrium, β∗p = φ.
(b) There exists an equilibrium where γ∗P = 1 and D
∗
P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and
D∗P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆..
(iii) (Nondisclosure equilibrium) An equilibrium where γ∗P = 0 exists if and only if
E [∆] < bA.
4 Moreover, whenever such an equilibrium exists,
(a) In equilibrium, β∗p = φq.
(b) There exists an equilibrium where γ∗P = 0 and D
∗
P = ∅.
Proof. First, note that for any given γP , the results listed in the proof of Proposition 6
hold, where φ everywhere is replaced with βp ≡ q+(1− q) γP . Note that the change in the
payoffs the players in the first step follows from disclosure strategy of the incumbent, given
4This inequality holds weakly without the focus on the equilibria where the activist implements the
project when he is indifferent between implementing and not implementing.
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in Lemma 7 part (i). Specifically, if the activist wins a proxy fight, the incumbent always
discloses if ∆ < 0 and γP > 0, and never discloses if ∆ > 0 and γP < 1.
Next, note that in any equilibrium γ∗P = 0 or γ
∗
P = 1. This follows from P (∆ > bA) > 0
and Lemma 7 part (ii). This completes part (i).
Next, I prove part (ii). Consider the equilibrium given γ∗P = 1. Given γ
∗
P = 1, if the activist
implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA, then by Lemma 7 D
∗
P is in the best
response of the incumbent to γ∗P = 1 if it satisfies D
∗
P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = ∅ if
bA ≤ ∆. Since P (∆ /∈ D
∗
P ) > 0 and E [∆|∆ /∈ D
∗
P ] = E [∆|∆ ∈ [bA,∆
∗
A]] > bA, γ
∗
P = 1 is
the unique best response of the activist.
Next, I prove part (iii). Consider the equilibrium given γ∗P = 0. There are two cases to
consider.
• Suppose that E [∆] > bA. I show that γ
∗
P = 0 cannot be in the best response of the
activist. Note that nondisclosure is on the equilibrium path, because by Lemma 7,
D∗P = ∅ if bA < ∆ and D
∗
P ⊆ (∆, bA] if ∆ ≤ bA. Moreover, due to E [∆] > bA, this
also implies that P (∆ /∈ D∗P ) > 0 and E [∆|∆ /∈ D
∗
P ] ≥ E [∆] > bA. Therefore, the
activist strictly prefers to deviate to γP = 1.
• Suppose that E [∆] ≤ bA. Given γ
∗
P = 0, if the activist implements the project
upon disclosure of ∆ = bA, then by Lemma 7 D
∗
P = ∅ is in the best response of
the incumbent to γ∗P = 0. Since P (∆ /∈ D
∗
P ) > 0 and E [∆|∆ /∈ D
∗
P ] = E [∆] ≤ bA,
γ∗P = 0 is a best response of the activist (Note that upon nondisclosure the activist is
indifferent between implementing and not implementing if and only if E [∆] = bA).
I prove Proposition 4 with the following generalization for any bA ∈ (−∞, b) and κ > 0. I
denote the set of ∆ for which the incumbent discloses after proxy fight (board settlement)
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by DP (DB).
Proposition 15. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then, an
equilibrium of this subgame exists, and in any equilibrium, γ∗P ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover,
(i) If E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0 or κ ≥ κ0(β
∗
p), then the board always rejects the settlement, and
the activist never runs a proxy fight.
(ii) If E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0 and κ < κ0(β
∗
p), the incumbent accepts action settlement if and
only if ∆ > ∆∗A(β
∗
p , ρ
∗
A), upon proxy fight the shareholders support the activist with
probability σ∗A(β
∗
p), and upon rejection the activist runs a proxy fight with probability
ρ∗A
(
β∗p
)
.
(iii) (Disclosure equilibrium) An equilibrium where γ∗P = 1 always exists. Moreover,
(a) In equilibrium, β∗p = φ.
(b) There exists an equilibrium where γ∗P = 1 and D
∗
P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and
D∗P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆..
(iv) (Nondisclosure equilibrium) An equilibrium where γ∗P = 0 exists if and only if
E[∆ | ∆ ≤ ∆∗A(β
∗
p)] ≤ bA. Moreover, whenever such an equilibrium exists,
(a) In equilibrium, β∗p = φq.
(b) There exists an equilibrium where γ∗P = 0 and D
∗
P = ∅.
Proof. Suppose the activist has demanded action settlement, and κ > 0. The proof consists
of several steps.
First, note that for any given γP , the results listed in the proof of Proposition 13 hold,
where φ everywhere is replaced with βp ≡ q + (1− q) γP . Note that the change in the
profit functions ΠI , ΠA, and ΠSH follow from disclosure strategy of the incumbent, given
in Lemma 7 part (i). Specifically, if the activist wins a proxy fight, the incumbent always
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discloses if ∆ < bA and γP > 0, and never discloses if ∆ > bA and γP < 1.
Next, note that in any equilibrium where rejection is on the equilibrium path, γ∗P = 0 or
γ∗P = 1. This follows from ∆
∗
A > bA and Lemma 7 part (ii). Note that ∆
∗
A > bA because
otherwise ρ∗ = 0, which implies by the best response of the incumbent that ∆∗A = b,
contradicting with ∆∗A ≤ bA < b.
Next, I show that an equilibrium where the incumbent accepts action settlement for all ∆
does not exist if ∆ < b−
cp
1−φ . To see this result, suppose that ∆ < b−
cp
1−φ . Then, by the first
step in this proof and the first step in the proof of Proposition 13, ∆∗A ≥ b−
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
1
ρ∗
−σ∗βp
≥
b −
cp
1−βp
≥ b −
cp
1−φ since
1
ρ∗ − σ
∗βp >
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−∆ (because
1
ρ∗ − σ
∗βp ≥ 1 − φ >
cp
b−∆ ≥
cp,1+σ∗φcp,2
b−∆ ). Therefore, the incumbent rejects action settlement for all ∆ ∈ (∆, b −
cp
1−φ).
This completes parts (i) and (ii).
Next, I prove part (iii). Consider the equilibrium given γ∗P = 1. Given γ
∗
P = 1, if the
activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA, then by Lemma 7 D
∗
P is in
the best response of the incumbent to γ∗P = 1 if it satisfies D
∗
P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and
D∗P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Since P (∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A ∧∆ /∈ D
∗
P ) > 0 and E [∆|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A ∧∆ /∈ D
∗
P ] =
E [∆|∆ ∈ [bA,∆
∗
A]] > bA, γ
∗
P = 1 is the unique best response of the activist.
Next, I prove part (iv). Consider the equilibrium given γ∗P = 0. There are two cases to
consider.
• Suppose that E
[
∆ ≤ ∆∗A(β
∗
p)
]
> bA. I show that γ
∗
P = 0 cannot be in the best
response of the activist. Note that rejection and nondisclosure is on the equilibrium
path, because ∆∗A > max {∆, bA} and by Lemma 7, D
∗
P = ∅ if bA < ∆, and D
∗
P ⊆
(∆, bA] if ∆ ≤ bA. Moreover, due to E
[
∆ ≤ ∆∗A(β
∗
p)
]
> bA, this also implies that
P (∆ ≤ ∆∗A ∧∆ /∈ D
∗
P ) > 0 and
E [∆|∆ ≤ ∆∗A ∧∆ /∈ D
∗
P ] ≥ E
[
∆ ≤ ∆∗A(β
∗
p)
]
> bA. (A.81)
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Therefore, the activist strictly prefers to deviate to γP = 1.
• Suppose that E
[
∆ ≤ ∆∗A(β
∗
p)
]
≤ bA. Given γ
∗
P = 0, if the activist implements the
project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA, then by Lemma 7 D
∗
P = ∅ is in the best response
of the incumbent to γ∗P = 0. Since P (∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A ∧∆ /∈ D
∗
P ) > 0 and
E [∆|∆ ≤ ∆∗A ∧∆ /∈ D
∗
P ] = E [∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] ≤ bA, (A.82)
γ∗P = 0 is a best response of the activist (Note that upon nondisclosure the activist is
indifferent between implementing and not implementing if and only if E [∆ ≤ ∆∗A] =
bA).
I prove Corollary 5 with the following generalization for any κ > 0.
Corollary 16. Suppose that the activist has demanded action settlement. Then,
(i) Consider the disclosure or the nondisclosure equilibrium. Then, Corollary 13 except
for part (iii) holds for any q ∈ (0, 1), where φ everywhere is replaced with φβ∗P .
(ii) Suppose that q < 1 and nondisclosure equilibrium exists. Then,
(a) The activist and shareholders prefer the disclosure equilibrium. Moreover, this
holds strictly if κ < κ0 (φ).
(b) The incumbent board strictly prefer the nondisclosure equilibrium if κ < κ0 (φq)
and ∆̂A (φ) ≤ b−
cp
1−φ , or κ ∈ [κ0 (φq) , κ0 (φ)).
(iii) Suppose that κ < κ0 (φ), and nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists.
Then, the activist’s expected payoff is strictly maximized at q = 1 if E [∆] < 0 and at
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any q ∈ (0, qA] ∪ {1} if E [∆] > 0, where qA is unique and given by
E
[
∆|∆ ≤ max
{
∆̂A (φqA) , b−
cp
max{1− φqA,
cp
b−∆}
}]
= 0. (A.83)
Proof. Part (i) holds because any equilibrium described in Proposition 15 is identical to the
equilibrium described in Proposition 13, where φ everywhere is replaced with β∗p .
Consider part (ii), and suppose that nondisclosure equilibrium exist. Note that the disclo-
sure equilibrium always exists, and in disclosure equilibrium no player’s payoff changes with
q. There are three cases to consider.
• Suppose that κ ≥ κ0 (φ). Then, by Proposition 15, in both equilibria ρ
∗ = 0 and each
player’s payoff is zero for all ∆.
• Suppose that κ ∈ [κ0 (φq) , κ0 (φ)). Then, ρ
∗ > 0 in the disclosure equilibrium and
ρ∗ = 0 in the nondisclosure equilibrium, and in the nondisclosure equilibrium each
player’s payoff is zero for all ∆, while in the disclosure equilibrium the expected payoff
of the incumbent is negative and the expected payoff of the activist and shareholders
is positive.
• Suppose that κ < κ0 (φq). Then, the incumbent follows a threshold strategy ∆
∗
A(β
∗
p , ρ
∗
A)
< b in both equilibria. Denote the disclosure and nondisclosure equilibrium with
(
∆D, ρD
)
and
(
∆N , ρN
)
, respectively, where ∆i represents the threshold strategy of
the incumbent. Note that by the proof of Proposition 15 ∆∗A
(
β∗p
)
= max{∆̂A
(
β∗p
)
, b−
cp
1−β∗p
}, and therefore it must be that ∆D < ∆N . This further implies that
b−
cp
1
ρD
− φ
< b−
cp
1
ρN
− φq
⇐⇒ (A.84)
1
ρN
− φq >
1
ρD
− φ ⇐⇒ q
(
1
qρN
− φ
)
>
1
ρD
− φ,
which in turn implies that ρD > qρN .
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– Consider the incumbent’s payoff, and suppose that ∆̂A (φ) ≤ b−
cp
1−φ . Note that
by Proposition 15 ∆̂A (φ) ≤ b−
cp
1−φ implies that ρ
D = 1. Since the incumbent’s
payoff is ∆−b from accepting and ρ∗
[
−cp + 1{∆≥0}β
∗
p (∆− b)
]
from rejecting, in
any equilibrium the incumbent strictly prefers accepting if ∆ > ∆∗A and strictly
prefers rejecting if ∆ < ∆∗A. Therefore, the incumbent’s payoff is equal in two
equilibria if ∆ ≥ ∆N , is strictly smaller in the disclosure equilibrium if ∆ ∈
[0,∆N ), and weakly smaller in the disclosure equilibrium if ∆ < 0. Therefore,
the incumbent’s expected payoff is strictly smaller in the disclosure equilibrium.
– Consider the expected shareholer value, which is given by
Π∗SH = ρ
∗β∗p
∫ ∆∗A
0
∆dF (∆) +
∫ b
∆∗A
∆dF (∆) . (A.85)
Since ρD > ρNq and ∆D < ∆N , the shareholders strictly prefer the disclosure
equilibrium.
– Consider the expected payoff of the activist, which is given by
Π∗A =
∫ ∆∗A
∆
(
β∗p max {0,∆} − κ
)
dF (∆) +
∫ b
∆∗A
∆dF (∆) . (A.86)
Note that the first term is nonnegative in both equilibria since ρ∗ > 0 in both
equilibria. Since β∗p is strictly larger in the disclosure equilibrium and ∆
D < ∆N ,
the activist strictly prefers the disclosure equilibrium.
Consider part (iii). Note that if q = 1, at any ∆, each player’s equilibrium payoff is the same
in the disclosure and nondisclosure equilibria. First, I show that within the nondisclosure
equilibrium, as q increases the activist’s payoff is strictly increases if κ ≤ κ0 (φq) and does
not change if κ > κ0 (φq). Note that by Proposition 15, the expected payoff of the activist
in the nondisclosure equilibrium is zero if κ ≥ κ0 (φq), and is positive and given by (A.86)
if κ < κ0 (φq), where κ0 (φq) is strictly increasing in q. Noting that if κ < κ0 (φq) then the
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activist’s expected payoff strictly increases with q since ∆∗A(φq, ρ
∗
A) strictly decrease and
β∗p = φq strictly increase with q concludes the argument.
Next, there are three cases to consider.
• Suppose that κ ≥ κ0 (φ). Then, by Proposition 15, in both disclosure and nondisclo-
sure equilibria the activist’s expected payoff is zero for all q.
• Suppose that κ < κ0 (φ) and E [∆] < 0. Then, by Proposition 15, nondisclosure equi-
librium exists for all q. Therefore, by the first step, the activist’s payoff is maximized
if and only if q = 1.
• Suppose that κ < κ0 (φ) and E [∆] > 0. Note that combining the first step with
part (ii), the activist’s expected payoff is maximized if and only if q = 1 or disclosure
equilibrium is in play. By Proposition 15, nondisclosure equilibrium exists if and only
if E [∆ ≤ ∆∗A(φq)] < 0, or equivalently, since
∆∗A(φq) =





b, if κ > κ0 (φq)
max
{
∆̂A (φq) , b−
cp
max{1−φq,
cp
b−∆
}
}
, otherwise,
(A.87)
by the proof of Proposition 15, if and only if q > qA (This inequality holds weakly
without the focus on the equilibria where the activist implements the project when
he is indifferent between implementing and not implementing.).
I prove Proposition 5 with the following generalization for any bA ∈ (−∞, b) and κ > 0. I
denote the set of ∆ for which the incumbent discloses after proxy fight (board settlement)
by DP (DB).
Proposition 16. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with activist
control of α ∈ (0, 1]. Then, an equilibrium of this subgame exists, and
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(i) (Rejection equilibrium) An equilibrium where ρ∗ = 0 exists if and only if κ ≥ κ0(φ),
or E [∆] ≤ bA and κ ≥ κ0(φq), or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0. In any such equilibrium, the
project is never implemented for any ∆, and for all ∆ the incumbent weakly prefers
to reject the board settlement. Moreover,
(a) (Disclosure equilibrium) If κ ≥ κ0(φ) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0, then there
exists an equilibrium where ρ∗ = 0, the incumbent rejects for all ∆, σ∗ =
1{0<E[∆|∆≥bA]}, γ
∗
P = 1, γ
∗
B = 1, and D
∗
P = D
∗
B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and
D∗P = D
∗
B = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆.
(b) (Nondisclosure equilibrium) If E [∆] ≤ bA, and κ ≥ κ0(φq) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤
0, then there exists an equilibrium where ρ∗ = 0, the incumbent rejects for all ∆,
σ∗ = 1{0<E[∆|∆≥bA]}, γ
∗
P = 0, D
∗
P = ∅, γ
∗
B = 1, and D
∗
B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA
and D∗B = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆.
(ii) (Proxy fight equilibrium) An equilibrium where ρ∗ > 0 and the incumbent rejects
for some ∆ exists if and only if κ < 11−F (bA)κ0(φ) and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0. Moreover, in
any such equilibrium, ρ∗ = ρ∗B(β
∗), σ∗ = σ∗B(β
∗), γ∗P = 1, γ
∗
B ∈ {0, 1}, and the board
accepts the settlement if ∆ ∈ (∆, bA) ∪ (∆
∗
B (β
∗) , b) and rejects if ∆ ∈ (bA,∆
∗
B (β
∗)),
where
β∗ = α [q + (1− q) γ∗B ] . (A.88)
and ∆∗B (β
∗) ∈ (0, b). Moreover,
(a) (Disclosure equilibrium) Such an equilibrium with γ∗B = 1 exists if and only
if κ < 11−F (bA)κ0(φ) and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0. Moreover, whenever this equilibrium
exists, it also exists with D∗P = D
∗
B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = D
∗
B = ∅ if
bA ≤ ∆.
(b) (Nondisclosure equilibrium) Such an equilibrium with γ∗B = 0 exists if and
130
only if κ < 11−F (bA)κ0(φ), E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0, and
∫ max{bA,∆}
∆
∆dF (∆) +
∫ b
∆∗B(αq)
∆dF (∆) ≤ bA. (A.89)
Moreover, whenever this equilibrium exists, it also exists with D∗B = ∅, and
D∗P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆.
(iii) (Acceptance equilibrium) An equilibrium where the incumbent accepts board set-
tlement for all ∆ exists if and only if κ < φ (b− bA) and α ≤ φ +
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
, or
κ < φ (b− bA) and αq ≤ φ +
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
and E [∆] ≤ bA. Moreover, in any such
equilibrium γ∗B ∈ {0, 1}, and
(a) (Disclosure equilibrium) Such an equilibrium with γ∗B = 1 exists if and only if
κ < φ (b− bA) and α ≤ φ+
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
. Moreover, whenever such an equilibrium
exists, it also exists with ρ∗ = σ∗ = 1, γ∗P = 1, and D
∗
P = D
∗
B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA
and D∗P = D
∗
B = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆.
(b) (Nondisclosure equilibrium) Such an equilibrium with γ∗B = 0 exists if and
only if κ < φ (b− bA), αq ≤ φ+
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
and E [∆] ≤ bA. Moreover, whenever
such an equilibrium exists, it also exists with ρ∗ = σ∗ = 1, γ∗P = 1, D
∗
B = ∅, and
D∗P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆.
Proof. Suppose the activist has demanded board settlement with control α > 0. Through-
out, denote the set of ∆ for which the board accepts board settlement by B. The proof
consists of several steps:
First, for any given γP and γB, the results listed in the proof of Proposition 14 hold,
where φ and α everywhere is replaced with βp ≡ q + (1− q) γP and β ≡ q + (1− q) γB ,
respectively. Note that the changes in the payoffs the players in the first step and in the
profit functions ΠI , ΠA, and ΠSH in the third and fourth steps follow from disclosure
strategy of the incumbent, given in Lemma 7 part (i). Specifically, if the activist wins a
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proxy fight (reaches a board settlement), the incumbent always discloses if ∆ < bA and
γP > 0 (γB > 0), and never discloses if ∆ > bA and γP < 1 (γB < 1).
Next, I prove part (i).
1. First, by Proposition 14, in any equilibrium with ρ∗ = 0, the project is never imple-
mented for any ∆, and for all ∆ the incumbent weakly prefers to reject the board
settlement.
2. Second, note that in any equilibrium with ρ∗ = 0, it must be that γ∗P ∈ {0, 1} due to
Lemma 7, because in any such equilibrium the incumbent strictly prefers to reject if
∆ > bA by the second step in the proof of Proposition 14.
3. Third, consider any equilibrium with ρ∗ = 0 given γ∗P = 1. There are two cases to
consider:
• Suppose κ < κ0(φ) and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0. Then, this equilibrium cannot exist
by Proposition 14 and the first step.
• Suppose κ ≥ κ0(φ) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0. I show that the equilibrium described
by part (i.a) exists. Note that given γ∗P = 1, by Proposition 14 and the first step
this equilibrium exists with B∗ = ∅ and σ∗ = 1{0<E[∆|∆≥bA]}. Moreover, note
that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA, then by
Lemma 7 D∗P is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
P = 1 if it satisfies
D∗P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA andD
∗
P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Since P (∆ /∈ B
∗ ∪D∗P ) > 0 and
E [∆|∆ /∈ B∗ ∪D∗P ] = E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > bA, γ
∗
P = 1 is the unique best response of
the activist.
Also note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA,
then by Lemma 7 D∗B is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
B = 1 if it
satisfies D∗B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
B = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Therefore, if the
activist has an off-equilibrium belief of ∆ ∈ ν upon board settlement such that
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P (∆ > bA|∆ ∈ ν) > 0, then under any such belief γ
∗
B = 1 is the activist’s best
response.
4. Fourth, consider any equilibrium with ρ∗ = 0 given γ∗P = 0. There are three cases to
consider:
• Suppose E [∆] > bA. I show that γ
∗
P = 0 cannot be in the best response of
the activist. Note that by the first step in the proof of Proposition 14 and the
first step in this proof, in any such equilibrium, B∗ satisfies B∗ = ∅ if bA < ∆,
and B∗ ⊆ (∆, bA] if ∆ ≤ bA. Therefore rejection is on the equilibrium path,
and E [∆] > bA implies that P (∆ /∈ B
∗) > 0 and E [∆|∆ /∈ B∗] ≥ E [∆] > bA.
Moreover, in the subgame where the activist runs and wins a proxy fight, nondis-
closure is also on the equilibrium path since the board rejects for all ∆ > bA
and by Lemma 7, D∗P = ∅ if bA < ∆, and D
∗
P ⊆ (∆, bA] if ∆ ≤ bA. More-
over, due to E [∆] > bA this also implies that P (∆ /∈ B
∗ ∪D∗P ) > 0 and
E [∆|∆ /∈ B∗ ∪D∗P ] ≥ E [∆] > bA. Therefore, the activist strictly prefers to
deviate to γP = 1.
• Suppose κ < κ0 (φq) and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0. Then, this equilibrium cannot exist
by Proposition 14 and the first step.
• Suppose E [∆] ≤ bA, and κ ≥ κ0(φq) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0. I show that the
equilibrium described by part (i.b) exists. Then, given γ∗P = 0, by Proposition 14
and the first step this equilibrium exists with B∗ = ∅ and σ∗ = 1{0<E[∆|∆≥bA]}.
Moreover, note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of
∆ = bA, then by Lemma 7 D
∗
P = ∅ is in the best response of the incumbent
to γ∗P = 0. Since P (∆ /∈ B
∗ ∪D∗P ) > 0 and E [∆|∆ /∈ B
∗ ∪D∗P ] = E [∆] ≤ bA,
γ∗P = 0 is a best response of the activist (Note that upon nondisclosure the
activist is indifferent between implementing and not implementing if and only if
E [∆] = bA).
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Also note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA,
then by Lemma 7 D∗B is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
B = 1 if it
satisfies D∗B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
B = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Therefore, if the
activist has an off-equilibrium belief of ∆ ∈ ν upon board settlement such that
P (∆ > bA|∆ ∈ ν) > 0, then under any such belief γ
∗
B = 1 is the activist’s best
response.
Next, I prove part (ii).
1. First, by Proposition 14, in any equilibrium with ρ∗ > 0 andB∗ 6= (∆, b), ρ∗ = ρ∗B(β
∗),
σ∗ = σ∗B(β
∗), and the board accepts the settlement if ∆ ∈ (∆, bA) ∪ (∆
∗
B (β
∗, ρ∗B) , b)
and rejects if ∆ ∈ (bA,∆
∗
B (β
∗, ρ∗B)), where ∆
∗
B (β
∗, ρ∗B) ∈ (0, b), and the incumbent
is indifferent between accepting and not if ∆ = ∆∗B. Also note that if the activist
implements the project when he is indifferent, then the incumbent strictly prefers to
reject if ∆ = bA.
2. Second, note that in any equilibrium with ρ∗ > 0 and B∗ 6= (∆, b), it must be that
γ∗P = 1. To see this, suppose that γ
∗
P < 0. Then, upon the activist running and
winning a proxy fight, by Lemma 7 the incumbent strictly prefers to not disclose ∆ if
bA < ∆. However, since the activist knows that upon rejection ∆ ≥ max {∆, bA} and
with positive probability ∆ > max {∆, bA}, the activist deviates to γP = 1.
3. Third, note that in any equilibrium with ρ∗ > 0 and B∗ 6= (∆, b), it must be that γ∗B ∈
{0, 1} due to Lemma 7, because upon board settlement P (∆ > bA) = P (∆ > ∆
∗
B) >
0.
4. Fourth, consider any equilibrium with ρ∗ > 0 and B∗ 6= (∆, b), given γ∗B = 1. There
are two cases to consider:
• Suppose κ ≥ 11−F (bA)κ0(φ) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0. Then, this equilibrium cannot
exist by Proposition 14 and the first step.
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• Suppose κ < 11−F (bA)κ0(φ) and E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0. I show that the equilibrium
described by part (ii.a) exists. Note that given γ∗B = 1, if the activist implements
the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA, then by Lemma 7 D
∗
B is in the best
response of the incumbent to γ∗B = 1 if it satisfies D
∗
B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA
and D∗B = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Since P (∆ ∈ B
∗\D∗B) > 0 and E [∆|∆ ∈ B
∗\D∗B ] =
E [∆|∆ ≥ ∆∗B] > bA, γ
∗
B = 1 is the unique best response of the activist.
Also note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA,
then by Lemma 7D∗P is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
P = 1 if it satis-
fies D∗P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Since P (∆ /∈ B
∗ ∪D∗P ) > 0
and E [∆|∆ /∈ B∗ ∪D∗P ] = E [∆|∆ ∈ [bA,∆
∗
B ]] > bA, γ
∗
P = 1 is the unique best
response of the activist.
5. Fifth, consider any equilibrium with ρ∗ > 0 and B∗ 6= (∆, b), given γ∗B = 0. There are
three cases to consider:
• Suppose
∫ bA
∆ ∆dF (∆)+
∫ b
∆∗B
∆dF (∆) > bA. I show that γ
∗
B = 0 cannot be a best
response of the activist. Note that nondisclosure upon board settlement is on the
equilibrium path since by Lemma 7, D∗B = ∅ if bA < ∆, andD
∗
B ⊆ (∆, bA] if ∆ ≤
bA. However, then P (∆ ∈ B
∗ ∧∆ /∈ D∗B) > 0 and E [∆|∆ ∈ B
∗ ∧∆ /∈ D∗B ] >
bA. Therefore, the activist strictly prefers to deviate to γB = 1.
• Suppose κ ≥ 11−F (bA)κ0(φ) or E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] ≤ 0. Then, this equilibrium cannot
exist by Proposition 14 and the first step.
• Suppose κ < 11−F (bA)κ0(φ), E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > 0, and
∫ bA
∆ ∆dF (∆)+
∫ b
∆∗B
∆dF (∆) ≤
bA. I show that the equilibrium described by part (ii.b) exists. Note that given
given γ∗B = 0, if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA,
then by Lemma 7 D∗B = ∅ is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
B = 0.
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Since P (∆ ∈ B∗\D∗B) > 0 and
E [∆|∆ ∈ B∗\D∗B ] =
∫ bA
∆
∆dF (∆) +
∫ b
∆∗B(αq,ρ
∗
B)
∆dF (∆) ≤ bA, (A.90)
γ∗B = 0 is a best response of the activist (Note that upon nondisclosure the
activist is indifferent between implementing and not implementing if and only if
the E [∆|∆ ∈ B∗\D∗B ] = bA).
Also note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA,
then by Lemma 7D∗P is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
P = 1 if it satis-
fies D∗P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Since P (∆ /∈ B
∗ ∪D∗P ) > 0
and E [∆|∆ /∈ B∗ ∪D∗P ] = E [∆|∆ ∈ [bA,∆
∗
B ]] > bA, γ
∗
P = 1 is the unique best
response of the activist.
Next, I prove part (iii).
1. First, note that in any equilibrium with B∗ = (∆, b), it must be that γ∗B ∈ {0, 1} due
to Lemma 7, because P (∆ > bA) > 0.
2. Second, consider any equilibrium with B∗ = (∆, b) given γ∗B = 1. There are two cases
to consider:
• Suppose κ ≥ φ (b− bA) or α > φ +
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
. Then, this equilibrium cannot
exist for any γ∗P ∈ [0, 1] by Proposition 14 and the first step.
• Suppose κ < φ (b− bA) and α ≤ φ +
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
. I show that the equilibrium
described by part (iii.a) exists. Note that given γ∗B = 1, by Proposition 14
and the first step this equilibrium exists with σ∗ = ρ∗ = 1. Moreover, note
that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA, then by
Lemma 7 D∗B is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
B = 1 if it satisfies
D∗B = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
B = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Since P (∆ ∈ B
∗\D∗B) > 0 and
E [∆|∆ ∈ B∗\D∗B ] = E [∆|∆ ≥ bA] > bA, γ
∗
B = 1 is the unique best response of
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the activist.
Also note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA,
then by Lemma 7 D∗P is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
P = 1 if it
satisfies D∗P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Moreover, there exists
ε > 0 such that if the activist and the shareholders have the off-equilibrium belief
of ∆ ∈ ν = (b− ε, b) upon rejection, then under this belief γ∗P = 1 and ρ
∗ = 1 is
the activist’s best response and σ∗ = 1 is the shareholders’ best response, where
ρ∗ and σ∗ are best responses by the first step in the proof of Proposition 14 and
the first step in this proof.
3. Third, consider any equilibrium with B∗ = (∆, b) given γ∗B = 0. There are three cases
to consider:
• SupposeE [∆] > bA. I show that γ
∗
B = 0 cannot be a best response of the activist.
Note that nondisclosure upon board settlement is on the equilibrium path since
by Lemma 7, D∗B = ∅ if bA < ∆, and D
∗
B ⊆ (∆, bA] if ∆ ≤ bA. Due to E [∆] >
bA, this implies that P (∆ ∈ B
∗ ∧∆ /∈ D∗B) > 0 and E [∆|∆ ∈ B
∗ ∧∆ /∈ D∗B ] >
bA. Therefore, the activist strictly prefers to deviate to γB = 1.
• Suppose κ ≥ φ (b− bA) or αq > φ+
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
. Then, this equilibrium cannot
exist for any γ∗P ∈ [0, 1] by Proposition 14 and the first step.
• Suppose E [∆] ≤ bA, κ < φ (b− bA), and αq ≤ φ +
cp
b−max{bA,∆}
. I show that
the equilibrium described in part (iii.b) exists. Note that given γ∗B = 0, by
Proposition 14 and the first step this equilibrium exists with σ∗ = ρ∗ = 1.
Moreover, note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of
∆ = bA, then by Lemma 7 D
∗
B = ∅ is in the best response of the incumbent
to γ∗B = 0. Since P (∆ ∈ B
∗\D∗B) > 0 and E [∆|∆ ∈ B
∗\D∗B ] = E [∆] ≤ bA,
γ∗B = 0 is in the best response of the activist (Note that upon nondisclosure the
activist is indifferent between implementing and not implementing if and only if
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E [∆] = bA).
Also note that if the activist implements the project upon disclosure of ∆ = bA,
then by Lemma 7 D∗P is in the best response of the incumbent to γ
∗
P = 1 if it
satisfies D∗P = (∆, bA) if ∆ < bA and D
∗
P = ∅ if bA ≤ ∆. Moreover, there exists
ε > 0 such that if the activist and the shareholders have the off-equilibrium belief
of ∆ ∈ ν = (b− ε, b) upon rejection, then under this belief γ∗P = 1 and ρ
∗ = 1 is
the activist’s best response and σ∗ = 1 is the shareholders’ best response, where
ρ∗ and σ∗ are best responses by the first step in the proof of Proposition 14 and
the first step in this proof.
I prove Corollary 6 with the following generalization for any κ > 0.
Corollary 17. Suppose that the activist has demanded board settlement with αB ∈ (0, 1].
Then,
(i) Consider the disclosure or nondisclosure equilibrium. Then, Corollary 14 except for
part (iii) holds, where αB is replaced with β
∗
B (αB) given by Proposition 16.
(ii) Within the proxy fight or acceptance equilibrium, the incumbent’s ex-ante expected
payoff is strictly decreasing with β∗B.
Proof. Consider part (i). Then, by the proof of Corollary 14, all statements except for
part (iii) hold where α is replaced with β∗ (α) given by Proposition 16, and if the activist
demands action settlement φ is replaced with β∗p given by Proposition 15.
Consider part (ii). There are three cases to consider. Suppose that acceptance equilibrium
is in play. Then, the incumbent’s ex-ante expected payoff is given by
Π∗I = E [Π
∗
I (∆)] = β
∗P (∆ ≥ 0)E [∆− b|∆ ≥ 0] , (A.91)
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which is strictly decreasing with β∗. Suppose that proxy fight equilibrium is in play, and
β∗ < αL, then by Proposition 16
Π∗I =
∫ ∆̂B
0
ρ∗B (β
∗) [−cp + φ (∆− b)] dF (∆) + β
∗
∫ b
∆̂B
(∆− b) dF (∆) , (A.92)
which strictly decreases with β∗ since ρ∗B strictly increases with β
∗ if β∗ < αL. Suppose
that proxy fight equilibrium is in play, and β∗ ≥ αL. Then, by Proposition 16, ρ
∗
B = 1
and ∆∗B (β
∗) = b −
cp
β∗−φ is strictly increasing with β
∗. Therefore the incumbent’s ex-ante
expected payoff
Π∗I =
∫ ∆∗B(β
∗)
0
[−cp + φ (∆− b)] dF (∆) + β
∗
∫ b
∆∗B(β
∗)
(∆− b) dF (∆) (A.93)
strictly decreases with β∗ because ρ∗B = 1 and for a given β
∗, −cp + φ (∆− b) < β
∗ (∆− b)
if ∆ > ∆∗B (β
∗).
Proof of Corollary 7. Consider part (i). By Proposition 16, within the proxy fight equilib-
rium, nondisclosure equilibrium exists if and only if
E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0,max
{
∆̂B, b−
cp
qα− φ
}]]
< 0, (A.94)
which always holds if E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̂B
]]
< 0. Suppose that E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̂B
]]
≥ 0.
Then, α satisfies
E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, b−
cp
qα− φ
]]
= 0 (A.95)
if and only if α = αD(q), where αD (q) is unique. Moreover, max
{
∆̂B , b−
cp
qα−φ
}
> b −
cp
qαD(q)−φ
if and only if α > αD(q). Therefore, (A.94) holds if and only if α > αD(q). Finally,
since αD (q) is unique, it is strictly decreasing in q.
Consider part (ii). There are three cases to consider.
• Suppose that E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̂B
]]
< 0. Then, for all α ∈ (0, 1] and q ∈ (0, 1], by
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Proposition 16 nondisclosure equilibrium is in play, and therefore β∗ (α) = αq.
• Suppose that E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̂B
]]
≥ 0 and αD (1) ≥ 1. Then, by part (i) for any
q ∈ (0, 1], αD (q) ≥ 1 and hence nondisclosure equilibrium is not in play for any
α ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, β∗ (α) = α for any q ∈ (0, 1].
• E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̂B
]]
≥ 0 and αD (1) < 1. Then, since qαD (q) ∈ (αL, 1) is a constant
for all q ∈ (0, 1], there exist unique qBL , q
B
H ∈ (0, 1) such that αD(q
B
H) = q
B
H and
αD(q
B
L ) = 1. Moreover, q
B
L < q
B
H since qαD (q) is a constant. Note that since αD(q)
is strictly decreasing in q by part (i), αD(q) > (<)q if and only if q < (>)q
B
H , and
αD(q) > (<)1 if and only if q < (>)q
B
L . Therefore, by part (i) and Proposition 16,
there are two subcases to consider:
– Suppose q ∈ (0, qBL ]. Then β
∗ (α) = α for any α ∈ (0, 1].
– Suppose q ∈ (qBL , 1]. Then αD (q) < 1 and
β∗ (α) =





αq, if α > αD (q)
α, if α ≤ αD (q)
. (A.96)
Therefore, β∗ (α) = β for some α ∈ (0, 1] if and only if β ∈ (0,max {q, αD (q)}].
Therefore, β̄ (q) = max {q, αD (q)}, and moreover,
β̄ (q) =





q, if qBH ≤ q,
αD (q) , if q
B
L < q < q
B
H .
(A.97)
Proof of Corollary 8. Note that by Corollary 7, β∗ (α) = β for some α ∈ (0, 1] if and only
if β ∈ (0, β̄].
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By Proposition 16, the expected payoff ΠA (β) of the activist for any β > 0 is given by
ΠA (β) =
∫ ∆∗B(β)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + β
∫ b
∆∗B(β)
∆dF (∆) , (A.98)
which is continuous in β. Moreover, since ∆∗B (β) = ∆̂A (φ) for any β ≤ αL, ΠA (β) is
strictly increasing in β for all β < αL. Therefore, ΠA (β) has a maximum, and Λ (q) =
argmaxβ∈(0,β̄(q)]ΠA (β) = argmaxβ∈[min{β̄(q),αL},β̄(q)]ΠA (β).
Next, consider part (i). By the previous step, β∗ ≥ min
{
β̄, αL
}
. Therefore, if αL ≥ β̄,
then β∗ = β̄. Suppose that αL < β̄, κ <
cp
2 , and f
′ (∆) ≥ 0 for all ∆ ∈
[
∆̂B (φ) , b−
cp
β̄−φ
]
.
Then, this implies that Π′′A (β) < 0 for all β ∈ (αL, β̄] since
0 > Π′′A (β) ⇐⇒
f ′
(
b−
cp
β−φ
)
f
(
b−
cp
β−φ
) >
2κ
cp
− 1
b+
κ−cp
β−φ
(A.99)
Next, consider part (ii). First, I show that there exists β∗SH that maximizes shareholder
value, and β∗SH ≥ min
{
β̄, αL
}
. Since expected shareholder value if the activist demands
board settlement with β > 0 is given by
ΠSH (β) = ρ
∗
B (β)
∫ ∆∗B(β)
0
φ∆dF (∆) + β
∫ b
∆∗B(β)
∆dF (∆) , (A.100)
ΠSH (β) is continuous for all β ∈ (0, β̄], and also strictly increasing in β for all β ≤ αL.
Therefore, ΠSH (β) has a maximum, and
ΛSH (q) ≡ arg max
β∈(0,β̄(q)]
ΠSH (β) = arg max
β∈[min{β̄(q),αL},β̄(q)]
ΠSH (β) (A.101)
. Denote ΛSH ≡ minΛSH and Λ̄ ≡ maxΛ.
Second, I show that ΛSH ≥ Λ̄. Suppose that ΛSH < Λ̄. Then, by the first step it must be
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that ΛSH ≥ αL, and therefore ρ
∗
B (ΛSH) = ρ
∗
B
(
Λ̄
)
= 1 and
ΠA (ΛSH) =
∫ ∆∗B(ΛSH)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + ΛSH
∫ b
∆∗B(ΛSH)
∆dF (∆) (A.102)
= ΠSH (ΛSH)−
∫ ∆∗B(ΛSH)
0
κdF (∆)
> ΠSH
(
Λ̄
)
−
∫ ∆∗B(Λ̄)
0
κdF (∆)
=
∫ ∆∗B(Λ̄)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + Λ̄
∫ b
∆∗B(Λ̄)
∆dF (∆)
= ΠA
(
Λ̄
)
,
where the inequality follows from ∆∗B (ΛSH) < ∆
∗
B
(
Λ̄
)
and ΠSH (ΛSH) ≥ ΠSH
(
Λ̄
)
. How-
ever, ΠA (ΛSH) > ΠA
(
Λ̄
)
contradicts with Λ̄ ∈ Λ.
Third, I show that ΛSH > Λ̄ if αL < Λ̄ < β̄. Suppose αL < ᾱ < β̄ and ΛSH ≤ Λ̄. Note
that by the second step it must be that ΛSH = Λ̄. By definition of ΛSH , ΛSH must satisfy
Π′SH (ΛSH) = 0 since αL < ΛSH = Λ̄ < β̄. However, this implies that Π
′
A
(
Λ̄
)
< 0, which is
a contradiction with Λ̄ ∈
(
αL, β̄
)
and Λ̄ ∈ Λ.
Next, consider part (iii). By part (i), β∗ ≥ min
{
β̄, αL
}
. Therefore, β∗ = β̄ if αL ≥ β̄.
Suppose that αL < β̄. Then, for all β ∈ (αL, β̄]
Π′A (β) =
1
b−∆
cp
(β − φ)2
(cp
2
− κ
)
, (A.103)
therefore the activist strictly chooses β∗ = β̄ if
cp
2 > κ and β
∗ = αL if
cp
2 < κ. Finally,
shareholder value is strictly increasing in β since
Π′SH (β) =











1
b−∆
cp
(β−φ)2
cp
2 > 0, if β > αL,
dρ∗B(β)
dα
∫ ∆∗B(β)
0 φ∆dF (∆)
+
∫ b
∆∗B(β)
∆dF (∆) > 0,
if β < αL,
(A.104)
where inequality in the second line follows from
dρ∗B(β)
dα when β < αL.
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I prove Proposition 6 with the following generalization for any κ > 0.
Proposition 17. Suppose that κ < φE [∆|∆ ≥ 0], and that if the activist demands board
settlement, proxy fight equilibrium is in play. Moreover, suppose that subject to this selection,
nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, an equilibrium always exists.
Moreover,
(i) If κ ≥ κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ ≥ κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0, then the activist demands
board settlement in any equilibrium.
(ii) If κ < κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ < κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0, then there exists unique
β ∈ (0, 1) such that there is an equilibrium where the activist demands board settlement
if and only if β̄ ≥ β.
Proof. Denote the expected payoff of the activist from demanding nothing by Π0A, from
demanding action settlement by ΠAA, and from demanding board settlement with α by
ΠBA(β
∗ (α)).
Consider part (i). Π0A = Π
A
A = 0 by Lemma 8 and Proposition 15, while Π
B
A(α) > α for
all α > 0 by Proposition 16. Therefore, the activist strictly chooses to demand board
settlement.
Consider part (ii). Then, Π0A,Π
A
A > 0 by Lemma 8 and Proposition 15. By Proposi-
tion 16, ΠBA(β) is continuous in β and limβ↓0 Π
B
A(β) = 0. Also note that Π
B
A(β = 1) >
max
{
Π0A,Π
A
A
}
since by Proposition 15 ΠBA(β = 1) is equal to the activist’s expected payoff
with α = 1 in Proposition 14, which is weakly larger than his expected payoff if he does
not demand anything or demands action settlement due to Corollary 14 part (iii). Note
that for the last point, I utilize that the activist’s expected payoff if he demands action
settlement or does not make any demand is weakly larger in the disclosure equilibrium due
to Corollary 16 and Lemma 8. Finally, by Corollary 7, β∗ (α) = β for some α ∈ (0, 1] if and
only if β ∈ (0, β̄]. Therefore, maxβ∈(0,β̄]Π
B
A(β) is weakly increasing in β̄. Combining all of
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these, there exists a unique β ∈ (0, 1) such that maxβ∈(0,β̄]Π
B
A(β) ≥ max
{
Π0A,Π
A
A
}
if and
only if β̄ ≥ β.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that bA ≥ b. I show that for any η ∈ {∅, A,B (α)}, there is
an equilibrium where the project is never implemented. First, note that in any equilibrium,
it must be that the project is implemented with zero probability. To see this, suppose that
the project is implemented with positive probability in equilibrium. There are two cases to
consider. If the project is implemented by a player’s (i.e., the activist or the incumbent)
decision authority in the board, then that player is strictly better of by deviating to not
implementing the project since ∆ < bA for all ∆ < b. If the project is implemented with
positive probability due to action settlement, then the expected payoff of the activist is
negative, and therefore the activist strictly prefers demanding nothing and not running
a proxy fight, which gives him a payoff of zero. Second, note that if the activist has
demanded nothing, the equilibrium is unique and the activist does not run a proxy fight
since the project is never implemented by the first step. Third, I show that if the activist
has demanded action settlement or board settlement with any α > 0, there exists an
equilibrium where the incumbent rejects for all ∆, and the activist never runs a proxy
fight upon rejection. Note that the latter is the unique best response for the activist since
upon running a proxy fight the project is never implemented by the first step. Therefore,
the payoff of the incumbent from rejection is zero, which is the upperbound on its payoff.
Hence, rejecting is in a best response of the incumbent for all ∆.
Suppose that b < bA. Then, each result follows directly from Lemmas 6 and 8 and Propo-
sitions 13, 14, 15, and 16.
Proof of Corollary 10. I prove the result in three steps. First, suppose that if the activist
demands board settlement with α = 1, rejection equilibrium is in play. Then, the activist’s
payoff from making such a demand is zero. Moreover, by Proposition 13, the activist’s
payoff from demanding action settlement is zero as well.
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Second, suppose that if the activist demands board settlement with α = 1, acceptance
equilibrium is in play. Then, the activist’s payoff from making this demand is strictly larger
than his payoff from demanding action settlement. Denoting the activist’s equilibrium
payoff at ∆ by Π∗A(∆), this is because E [Π
∗
A(∆)|∆ > ∆
∗
A] is the same in both equilibrium,
however E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] is strictly larger if he has demanded board settlement.
Third, suppose that if the activist demands board settlement with α = 1, proxy fight
equilibrium is in play. I start by showing that in this case it has to be that ∆∗B ≤ ∆
∗
A (Here,
I set ∆∗A = b if the board rejects for all ∆ when the activist demands action settlement.).
Suppose that ∆∗B > ∆
∗
A. Then, since ∆
∗
A ≥ ∆̆A = ∆̆B, it must be that σ
∗
B = 1. However,
since ∆∗i = b−
cp,1+σ∗i φcp,2
1
ρ∗
i
−σ∗i φ
, this implies that ρ∗B < ρ
∗
A. However, by the proof of Proposition
13 this implies that ∆̂A(σ
∗
Aφ) ≤ ∆
∗
A < b since 0 < ρ
∗
A, and by the proof of Proposition 13 it
also implies that ∆̂B(σ
∗
Bφ) = ∆
∗
B < b since ρ
∗
B ∈ (0, 1) (because proxy fight equilibrium is in
play). However, then b > ∆̂B(σ
∗
Bφ) = ∆
∗
B > ∆
∗
A ≥ ∆̂A(σ
∗
Aφ), where ∆̂B(σ
∗
Bφ) > ∆̂A(σ
∗
Aφ)
yields a contradiction with σ∗B = 1 ≥ σ
∗
A.
Next, to show the result, by Propositions 13 and 14, there are two cases to consider:
1. Suppose that bA ≤ ∆. Then, the activist’s payoff from demanding board settlement
with α = 1 is equal to his payoff from demanding action settlement.
2. Suppose that bA > ∆. Note that ρ
∗
B > 0, and therefore the activist’s payoff in
the proxy fight equilibrium is positive. If ρ∗A = 0, then the activist’s payoff from
demanding action settlement is zero, yielding the desired result. Suppose ρ∗A > 0.
Note that if the activist demands action settlement, then
E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ > ∆
∗
A] = E [∆− bA|∆ > ∆
∗
A] , (A.105)
E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] = σ
∗
AφE [max {0,∆− bA} |∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]− κ (A.106)
≥ 0
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since ρ∗A > 0. However, if the activist demands board settlement with α = 1, then
E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ > ∆
∗
A] = E [∆− bA|∆ > ∆
∗
A] , (A.107)
E [Π∗A(∆)|∆
∗
B < ∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] = E [∆− bA|∆
∗
B < ∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] , (A.108)
E [Π∗A(∆)|bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆
∗
B ] = σ
∗
BφE [∆− bA|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]− κ (A.109)
≥ 0,
E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ < bA] = 0, (A.110)
since ρ∗B > 0, where ∆
∗
B ≤ ∆
∗
A. Next, to prove the result, there are three subcases to
consider:
(a) Suppose that σ∗B ≥ σ
∗
A. Then, E [Π
∗
A(∆)] is strictly larger if the activist has
demanded board settlement with α = 1, because if he has made this demand
then
E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ < ∆
∗
A] = P (∆ < bA)E [Π
∗
A(∆)|∆ < bA] (A.111)
+P (bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆
∗
B)E [Π
∗
A(∆)|bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆
∗
B]
= P (bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆
∗
B) (σ
∗
BφE [∆− bA|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]− κ)
> P (bA ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆
∗
B) (σ
∗
BφE [∆− bA|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]− κ)
+P (∆ < bA) (−κ)
= σ∗BφE [max {0,∆ − bA} |∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]− κ
≥ σ∗AφE [max {0,∆− bA} |∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A]− κ.
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(b) Suppose that σ∗B < σ
∗
A and ∆̆A ≤ ∆̂A (φσ
∗
A). Then, it must be that ∆
∗
B = ∆̆A ≤
∆̂A (φσ
∗
A) ≤ ∆
∗
A. ∆
∗
B ≤ ∆
∗
A implies that ρ
∗
A < ρ
∗
B since σ
∗
B < σ
∗
A, and therefore
it must be that
E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
A] = 0. (A.112)
Since E [Π∗A(∆)|∆ ≤ ∆
∗
B ] ≥ 0 and ∆
∗
B ≤ ∆
∗
A, this implies that E [Π
∗
A(∆)] is
weakly larger if the activist has demanded board settlement with α = 1.
(c) Suppose that σ∗B < σ
∗
A and ∆̂A (φσ
∗
A) < ∆̆A. I will reach a contradiction. Note
that this implies ∆∗B = ∆̆A. Since ∆̆A ≤ ∆
∗
A, it has to be that ∆̂A (φσ
∗
A) < ∆
∗
A
and hence ρ∗A = 1, which implies that
∆∗A = b−
cp,1 + σ
∗
Aφcp,2
1− σ∗Aφ
< b−
cp,1 + σ
∗
Bφcp,2
1
ρ∗B
− σ∗Bφ
(A.113)
= ∆∗B = ∆̆A, (A.114)
which is a contradiction with ∆̆A ≤ ∆
∗
A.
A1.2. Supplemental Proofs
Proposition 18. Suppose bA = 0.
(i) Suppose that κ < 11−F (0)κ0(φ), and acceptance equilibrium is in play whenever it exists
and proxy fight equilibrium is in play otherwise. Then, an equilibrium always exists,
and in any equilibrium the activist demands board settlement. Moreover, denoting the
set of equilibrium demand α∗ of the activist by Λ,
(a) If φ+
cp
b < 1 and ΠA(φ+
cp
b ) < Π
∗
A,PF , then Λ = ΛPF , where
Π∗A,PF ≡ max
α≥min{1,αL}
ΠA (α) (A.115)
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ΛPF ≡ arg max
α≥min{1,αL}
ΠA (α) (A.116)
(b) If φ+
cp
b ≥ 1, or φ+
cp
b < 1 and ΠA(φ+
cp
b ) > Π
∗
A,PF , then Λ =
{
φ+
cp
b
}
.
(c) There exists α∗SH that maximizes shareholder value, and α
∗
SH ≥ maxΛ for all
α∗SH .
(d) α∗ is unique and strictly increasing in κ if αL < 1, ΛPF (κ) = {αL (κ)}, and
ΠA(φ+
cp
b ) < ΠA (αL (κ)).
(ii) Suppose that κ ∈ (κ0(φ), φb), and acceptance equilibrium is in play whenever it exists
and rejection equilibrium is in play otherwise. Then, an equilibrium always exists, is
unique, and in equilibrium the activist demands booard settlement with α∗ = φ +
cp
b ,
which also strictly maximizes the shareholder value.
(iii) Suppose that κ > κ0(φ) and rejection equilibrium is in play. Then, for any demand
of the activist, expected shareholder value and activist’s payoff is zero in equilibrium.
Proof. Consider part (i). By Corollary 14 part (iii), the activist strictly chooses board
settlement. By Proposition 14, acceptance equilibrium exists if and only if α ≤ φ +
cp
b .
Therefore, the expected payoff ΠA (α) of the activist and expected shareholder value are
given by
ΠA (α) =











ρ∗B (α)
∫∆∗B(α)
0 (φ∆− κ) dF (∆)
+α
∫ b
∆∗B(α)
∆dF (∆) ,
if α > φ+
cp
b
αE [max {0,∆}] , otherwise,
(A.117)
ΠSH (α) =











ρ∗B (α)
∫ ∆∗B(α)
0 φ∆dF (∆)
+α
∫ b
∆∗B(α)
∆dF (∆) ,
if α > φ+
cp
b
αE [max {0,∆}] , otherwise,
(A.118)
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which are continuous in α for all α 6= φ +
cp
b . There are two cases to consider. Suppose
that φ +
cp
b ≥ 1. Then, ΠA (α) and ΠSH (α) are strictly increasing in α for all α ≤ 1, and
therefore the activist and shareholders strictly prefer α∗ = 1. Suppose that φ +
cp
b < 1.
Then, since ΠA (α) and ΠSH (α) are strictly increasing in α for all α < φ +
cp
b and α ∈
(
φ+
cp
b ,min {1, αL}
)
, both of ΠA (α) and ΠSH (α) have a maximum and
ΛSH ≡ argmax
α>0
ΠSH (α) = arg max
α∈{φ+
cp
b
}∪[min{1,αL},1]
ΠSH (α) (A.119)
Λ ≡ argmax
α>0
ΠA (α) = arg max
α∈{φ+
cp
b
}∪[min{1,αL},1]
ΠA (α) (A.120)
Therefore, if ΠA(φ +
cp
b ) < Π
∗
A,PF , then Λ = ΛPF , and if ΠA(φ +
cp
b ) > Π
∗
A,PF , then
Λ =
{
φ+
cp
b
}
.
Next, I show that minΛSH ≥ maxΛ, where ΛSH ≡ argmaxα>0 ΠSH (α). Denote ᾱ ≡
maxα∗ and αSH ≡ minΛSH . Suppose that αSH < ᾱ. Then, it must be that φ+
cp
b ≤ αSH .
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that αSH = φ+
cp
b < ᾱ. However, then
ΠA (αSH) = ΠSH (αSH) (A.121)
> ΠSH (ᾱ)− ρ
∗
B (ᾱ)
∫ ∆∗B(ᾱ)
0
κdF (∆)
= ρ∗B (ᾱ)
∫ ∆∗B(ᾱ)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + ᾱ
∫ b
∆∗B(ᾱ)
∆dF (∆)
= ΠA (ᾱ) ,
where the inequality follows from ρ∗B (ᾱ) > 0. However, ΠA (αSH) > ΠA (ᾱ) contradicts
with ᾱ ∈ Λ. Second, suppose that φ +
cp
b < αSH < ᾱ. However, then it must be that
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αSH ≥ αL, and therefore ρ
∗
B (αSH) = ρ
∗
B (ᾱ) = 1 and
ΠA (αSH) =
∫ ∆∗B(αSH)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + αSH
∫ b
∆∗B(αSH)
∆dF (∆) (A.122)
= ΠSH (αSH)−
∫ ∆∗B(αSH)
0
κdF (∆)
> ΠSH (ᾱ)−
∫ ∆∗B(ᾱ)
0
κdF (∆)
=
∫ ∆∗B(ᾱ)
0
(φ∆− κ) dF (∆) + ᾱ
∫ b
∆∗B(ᾱ)
∆dF (∆)
= ΠA (ᾱ) ,
where the inequality follows from ∆∗B (αSH) < ∆
∗
B (ᾱ) and ΠSH (αSH) ≥ ΠSH (ᾱ). However,
ΠA (αSH) > ΠA (ᾱ) contradicts with ᾱ ∈ Λ.
Next, I show that α∗ is unique and strictly increasing in κ if αL (κ) < 1, ΛPF (κ) = {αL (κ)},
and ΠA(φ +
cp
b ) < ΠA (αL (κ)). Note that this implies that ΠA (αL (κ)) > ΠA (α) for all
α > 0. By parts (i.a) and (i.b), Λ (κ) = ΛPF (κ) = {αL (κ)}, and combined with the
continuity of ΠA (α) for all α 6= φ +
cp
b , there exists ε > 0 such that αL (κ+ ε) < 1 and
Λ (κ+ ε) = ΛPF (κ+ ε) = {αL (κ+ ε)} since Λ (κ+ ε) ⊆ {φ +
cp
b } ∪ [αL (κ+ ε) , 1]. The
fact that αL (κ+ ε) > αL (κ) concludes the argument.
Consider part (ii). Since κ > κ0(φ), by Propositions 6 and 13, shareholder value and
the activist’s payoff are zero if the activist does not demand anything, demands action
settlement, or demands board settlement with α > φ+
cp
b . On the other hand, if the activist
demands board settlement with α ≤ φ +
cp
b , then ΠA (α) = ΠSH (α) = αE [max {0,∆}].
Therefore, the activist demands board settlement with α∗ = φ +
cp
b , which also strictly
maximizes the shareholder value.
Consider part (iii). Since κ > κ0(φ), by Propositions 6 and 13, shareholder value and
the activist’s payoff are zero if the activist does not demand anything, demands action
settlement, or demands board settlement with any α. Therefore, for any demand of the
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activist, expected shareholder value and activist’s payoff is zero in equilibrium.
Corollary 18. Suppose that the activist can only demand board settlement.
(i) Suppose that κ < 11−F (0)κ0 (φ), and acceptance equilibrium is in play whenever it exists
and proxy fight equilibrium is in play otherwise. Moreover, suppose that subject to this
selection, nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then,
(a) Suppose that φ +
cp
b ≥ 1. Then, for all α ∈ (0, 1] acceptance equilibrium is in
play. Moreover, for given β ∈ (0, 1] there exists α ∈ (0, 1] such that β∗ (α) = β
if and only if β ∈ (0, β̄ac], where β̄ac (q) = q if 0 > E [∆] and β̄ac (q) = 1 if
E [∆] ≥ 0.
(b) Suppose that φ +
cp
b < 1. Then, for given β ∈ (0, 1], there exists α ∈ (0, 1]
such that the acceptance equilibrium with β∗ (α) = β is in play if and only if
β ∈ (0, β̄ac], where
β̄ac (q) =





min{q, φ +
cp
b }, if 0 > E [∆]
φ+
cp
b , if E [∆] ≥ 0
(A.123)
and for given β ∈ (0, 1], there exists α ∈ (0, 1] such that the proxy fight equilibrium
with β∗ (α) = β is in play if and only if βpf < β ≤ β̄pf , where
βpf (q) =































min
{
q, φ+
cp
b
}
, if 0 > E [∆] ,
q ·
(
φ+
cp
b
)
, if E [∆] ≥ 0 > E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]],
φ+
cp
b , if
E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0
and αD (1) ≥ 1
φ+
cp
b , if
E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0
and αD (1) < 1
(A.124)
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β̄pf (q) =































q, if 0 > E [∆] ,
q, if E [∆] ≥ 0 > E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]],
1, if
E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0
and αD (1) ≥ 1
min{1,max{q, αD (q)}}, if
E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0
and αD (1) < 1
(A.125)
Moreover, if E
[
∆|∆ /∈
[
0, ∆̂B
]]
≥ 0 and αD (1) < 1, then there exist unique
qBL , q
B
H ∈ (0, 1) such that q
B
L < q
B
H and
β̄pf (q) =











q, if qBH ≤ q,
αD (q) , if q
B
L < q < q
B
H ,
1, if q ≤ qBL ,
(A.126)
(c) The activist’s expected payoff is maximized if φ+
cp
b < 1 and
q ∈











{1} , if 0 > E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]],
(0, 1], if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and αD (1) ≥ 1,
(0, qBL ] ∪ {1} , if E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and αD (1) < 1,
(A.127)
or φ+
cp
b ≥ 1 and
q ∈





{1} , if 0 > E[∆],
(0, 1], if E[∆] ≥ 0.
(A.128)
(ii) Suppose that κ < φb, and acceptance equilibrium is in play whenever it exists and
rejection equilibrium is in play otherwise. Moreover, suppose that subject to this se-
lection, nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then,
(a) For given β ∈ (0, 1], there exists α ∈ (0, 1] such that the acceptance equilibrium
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with β∗ (α) = β is in play if and only if β ∈ (0, β̄ac], where
β̄ac (q) =





min{q, φ+
cp
b }, if 0 > E [∆]
min{1, φ+
cp
b }, if E [∆] ≥ 0
(A.129)
(b) The activist’s expected payoff is maximized if
q ∈





[min{1, φ +
cp
b }, 1], if 0 > E[∆],
(0, 1], if E[∆] ≥ 0.
(A.130)
(iii) Suppose that κ ≥ κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ ≥ κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0. Moreover,
suppose that rejection equilibrium is in play, and subject to this selection, nondisclosure
equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, the activist’s expected payoff is zero
for all q ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Consider part (i.a). Due to Proposition 16, for all α ∈ (0, 1] acceptance equilibrium
is in play, and β∗ = αq if E [∆] < 0 and β∗ = α if E [∆] ≥ 0. Therefore, for given β ∈ (0, 1]
there exists α ∈ (0, 1] such that β∗ (α) = β if and only if β ∈ (0, β̄ac], where
β̄ac (q) =





q, if 0 > E [∆] ,
1, if E [∆] ≥ 0.
(A.131)
Since in the acceptance equilibrium the activist’s expected payoff is strictly increasing in
β∗, the activist’s expected payoff is maximized if
q ∈





{1} , if 0 > E[∆],
(0, 1], if E[∆] ≥ 0.
(A.132)
Consider parts (i.b) and (i.c). There are four cases to consider. Suppose 0 > E [∆].
Then, for any α ∈ (0, 1] and q ∈ (0, 1], due to Proposition 16 acceptance equilibrium with
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nondisclosure is in play if αq ≤ φ+
cp
b , resulting in β
∗ (α) = αq, and proxy fight equilibrium
with nondisclosure is in play if αq > φ +
cp
b , resulting in β
∗ (α) = αq. This yields the
described β̄ac, βpf , and β̄pf , and concludes part (i.b) for this case. To see part (i.c), there
are two subcases to consider.
• Suppose q ≤ φ+
cp
b . Then, due to Proposition 16 acceptance equilibrium is in play for
all α ∈ (0, 1], and β̄ac (q) is strictly decreases as q decreases. Moreover, the activist
strictly prefers α = 1, which yields β∗(1) = β̄ac. Therefore, the activist’s expected
payoff is strictly increasing in q within q ≤ φ+
cp
b .
• Suppose q ≥ φ +
cp
b . Then, β̄
ac (q) and βpf (q) do not change with q, while β̄pf (q)
strictly increases with q. Therefore, the activist weakly prefers larger q within q ≥
φ+
cp
b .
All of the remaining three cases fall under E [∆] ≥ 0. Then, for any α ∈ (0, 1] and q ∈ (0, 1],
due to Proposition 16 acceptance equilibrium with disclosure is in play if α ≤ φ+
cp
b , resulting
in β∗ (α) = α, and proxy fight equilibrium is in play if α > φ+
cp
b . This yields the described
β̄ac = φ +
cp
b . Note that β̄
ac does not change with q, and therefore what q the activist
prefers is solely determined by its effects when proxy fight equilibrium is in play, i.e, when
α > φ+
cp
b .
Suppose E [∆] ≥ 0 > E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]]. Then, for any α > φ +
cp
b and q ∈ (0, 1], due to
Proposition 16 proxy fight equilibrium with nondisclosure is in play if α > φ+
cp
b , resulting
in β∗ (α) = αq. This yields the described βpf and β̄pf , and concludes part (i.b) for this
case. To see part (i.c), since for all α > φ+
cp
b proxy fight equilibrium is in play, there are
two subcases to consider:
• Suppose q ≤ αL. Then, for any given α > φ+
cp
b , the activist’s expected payoff strictly
decreases as q decreases due to Proposition 16.
• Suppose q ≥ αL. Then, due to Proposition 16 the activist strictly prefers α =
1
qαL
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(which yields β∗ (α) = αL) over all α ∈ (q · (φ +
cp
b ),
1
qαL), where
1
qαL > q · (φ +
cp
b )
for all q ∈ (0, 1] since αL > φ+
cp
b . Since β̄
pf strictly increases in q and βpf (q) ≤ αL
for all q ≥ αL, the activist weakly prefers larger q within q ≥ αL.
Suppose E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and αD (1) ≥ 1. Then, for any α > φ+
cp
b and q ∈ (0, 1], due
to Proposition 16 proxy fight equilibrium with disclosure is in play if α > φ+
cp
b , resulting
in β∗ (α) = α. This yields the described βpf and β̄pf , and concludes part (i.b) for this case.
To see part (i.c), note that βpf and β̄pf do not change with q.
Suppose E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 and αD (1) < 1. Then, for any α > φ +
cp
b and q ∈ (0, 1],
due to Corollary 7 part (i) proxy fight equilibrium with disclosure is in play if αD (q) ≥ α,
resulting in β∗ (α) = α, and proxy fight equilibrium with nondisclosure is in play if α >
αD (q), resulting in β
∗ (α) = αq. Since qαD (q) ∈ (αL, 1) is a constant for all q ∈ (0, 1], there
exist unique qBL , q
B
H ∈ (0, 1) such that αD(q
B
H) = q
B
H and αD(q
B
L ) = 1. Moreover, q
B
L < q
B
H
since qαD (q) is a constant. Note that since αD(q) is strictly decreasing in q by Corollary 7
part (i), αD(q) > (<)q if and only if q < (>)q
B
H , and αD(q) > (<)1 if and only if q < (>)q
B
L .
Therefore, by Corollary 7 part (i) and Proposition 16, there are two subcases to consider:
• Suppose q ∈ (0, qBL ]. Then αD (q) ≥ 1, and hence β
∗ (α) = α for any α ∈ (φ +
cp
b , 1].
This yields βpf = φ+
cp
b and β̄
pf = 1, and concludes part (i.b) for this subcase.
• Suppose q ∈ (qBL , 1]. Then αD (q) < 1, and hence β
∗ (α) = α if α ∈ (φ +
cp
b , αD (q)]
and β∗ (α) = αq if α ∈ (αD (q) , 1]. Moreover, β
∗ (α) > φ+
cp
b for all α > φ+
cp
b since
qαD (q) ≥ αL > φ +
cp
b . Therefore, β
∗ (α) = β for some α ∈ (φ +
cp
b , 1] if and only if
β ∈ (φ+
cp
b ,max {q, αD (q)}], which is not an empty set because φ+
cp
b < αL ≤ αD (q).
Therefore, βpf = φ+
cp
b and β̄
pf (q) = max {q, αD (q)}, and moreover,
β̄pf (q) =





q, if qBH ≤ q,
αD (q) , if q
B
L < q < q
B
H .
(A.133)
This concludes part (i.b) for this subcase.
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To see part (i.c) for this case, note that βpf (q) does not change with q, while β̄pf (q) = 1 if
and only if q ∈ (0, qBL ] ∪ {1}.
Consider part (ii). There are two cases to consider. Suppose that E [∆] < 0. Then, by
Proposition 16, acceptance equilibrium is in play if αq ≤ φ +
cp
b , resulting in β
∗ (α) = αq,
and rejection equilibrium is in play if α > φ +
cp
b . Therefore, for given β ∈ (0, 1], there
exists α ∈ (0, 1] such that the acceptance equilibrium with β∗ (α) = β is in play if and only
if β ∈ (0,min{q, φ +
cp
b }]. Since the activist’s expected payoff is positive and is strictly
increasing with β∗ in the acceptance equilibrium and it is zero in the rejection equilibrium,
the activist’s expected payoff is strictly increasing in β̄ac. Therefore, the activist’s expected
payoff is maximized with respect to q if and only if q ≥ min{1, φ +
cp
b }.
Suppose that E [∆] ≥ 0. Then, by Proposition 16, acceptance equilibrium is in play if
α ≤ φ+
cp
b , resulting in β
∗ (α) = α, and rejection equilibrium is in play if α > φ+
cp
b . Since
the activist’s expected payoff is positive in the acceptance equilibrium for all α ∈ (0, φ+
cp
b ]
and is zero in the rejection equilibrium for all α > φ+
cp
b , the activist’s expected payoff in
equilibrium does not change with q.
Consider part (iii). By Proposition 16 the project is never implemented and the activist
never runs a proxy fight upon rejection for any q ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, the activist’s expected
payoff is zero for all q ∈ (0, 1].
Proposition 19. Suppose bA = 0, the activist can only demand board settlement, and
∆ ∼ U(∆, b).
(i) Suppose that
(
2κ
φ
)2
≤ b2 − ∆2,
√
b2 −∆2 < b −
cp
1−φ , and acceptance equilibrium is
in play whenever it exists and proxy fight equilibrium is in play otherwise. Moreover,
subject to this selection, suppose that nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it
exists. Then, an equilibrium always exists, is unique, and given by
(a) If φ +
cp
b ≥ 1, then α
∗ = 1. Moreover, the activist’s expected payoff does not
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change with q.
(b) If φ +
cp
b < 1 and κ >
cp
2 , then α
∗ = φ +
cp
b . Moreover, the activist’s expected
payoff is maximized if and only if q ∈ [φ+
cp
b , 1].
(c) If φ+
cp
b < 1 and κ <
cp
2 , then
α∗ =















φ+
cp
b , if min {1,max {αD (q) , q}} <
φ+
cp
b
1−
(
2κ/φ
b
)2
αD (q) , if αD (q) ≥
φ+
cp
b
1−
(
2κ/φ
b
)2 and αD (q) ∈ [q, 1],
1, otherwise,
(A.134)
where
φ+
cp
b
1−
(
2κ/φ
b
)2 < αL. Moreover, the activist’s expected payoff is maximized if
and only if q ∈ (0, qBL ] ∪ {1}, where
qBL = φ+
cp
b−
√
b2 −∆2
< 1. (A.135)
(ii) Suppose that κ ∈ [κ0(φ), φb), and acceptance equilibrium is in play whenever it exists
and rejection equilibrium is in play otherwise. Moreover, subject to this selection, sup-
pose that nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, an equilibrium
always exists, is unique, and in equilibrium the activist strictly prefers α∗ = φ +
cp
b
if E [∆] ≥ 0 and α∗ = 1q
(
φ+
cp
b
)
if E [∆] < 0, which also strictly maximizes the
shareholder value. Moreover, the expected payoff of the activist is maximized if and
only if q ∈ [min
{
1, φ+
cp
b
}
, 1].
(iii) Suppose that κ ≥ κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ ≥ κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0. Moreover,
suppose that rejection equilibrium is in play, and subject to this selection, suppose that
nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, for any α > 0, expected
shareholder value and activist’s payoff is zero in equilibrium.
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Proof. Consider part (i). Note that
(
2κ
φ
)2
≤ b2 −∆2 ⇐⇒ E[∆|∆ /∈ [0, ∆̂B ]] ≥ 0 (A.136)
αD (q) =
1
q
(
φ+
cp
b−
√
b2 −∆2
)
(A.137)
√
b2 −∆2 < b−
cp
1− φ
⇐⇒ αD (1) < 1 (A.138)
Also, κ < 11−F (0)κ0(φ) because ∆̂B =
2κ
φ < b. In addition, note that by Proposition
16 acceptance equilibrium with nondisclosure never exists since E [∆] > 0, acceptance
equilibrium with disclosure is in play if α ≤ φ +
cp
b , and proxy fight equilibrium is in play
if α > φ +
cp
b . Therefore, given α ∈ (0, 1], the activist’s expected payoff in equilibrium is
given by
ΠA (α, q) =
1
b−∆
· (A.139)











bα b2 , if α ≤ φ+
cp
b ,



∆∗B (β
∗ (α))
(
φ
∆∗B(β
∗(α))
2 − κ
)
+β∗ (α) (b−∆∗B (β
∗ (α)))
(
b+∆∗B(β
∗(α))
2
)



if α > φ+
cp
b ,
Therefore, within all α ≤ φ+
cp
b , the activist strictly prefers α = φ+
cp
b .
Consider part (i.a), i.e., suppose that φ+
cp
b ≥ 1. Then, by (A.139), ΠA (α, q) is maximized
if and only if α∗ = 1, and moreover, ΠA (1, q) does not change with q.
Consider part (i.b), i.e., suppose that φ+
cp
b < 1 and κ >
cp
2 . First, note that by Proposition
16 and the proof of Corollary 3 part (iii), within the proxy fight equilibrium, among any
β ∈ (0, 1] the activist strictly prefers β = min {1, αL}. Denote by Π
∗
A,PF the activist’s
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expected payoff in the proxy fight equilibrium with β = min {1, αL}, yielding
Π∗A,PF =
1
2 (b−∆)
min {1, αL}
(
b2 −
(
2κ
φ
)2
)
(A.140)
since ∆∗B (min {1, αL}) =
2κ
φ . Second, I show that ΠA
(
φ+
cp
b , q
)
> Π∗A,PF . This holds
because
ΠA
(
φ+
cp
b
, q
)
> Π∗A,PF ⇐⇒ min {1, αL} <
φb2 + cpb
b2 −
(
2κ
φ
)2 ⇐ κ >
cp
2
(A.141)
Since ΠA (α, q) < ΠA
(
φ+
cp
b , q
)
for all α < φ +
cp
b , for any q ∈ (0, 1] the activist strictly
prefers α∗ = φ+
cp
b . Moreover, note that ΠA
(
φ+
cp
b , q
)
does not change with q.
Consider part (i.c), i.e., φ+
cp
b < 1 and κ <
cp
2 . First, I show that for given β ∈ (0, 1], there
exists α ∈ (φ+
cp
b , 1] such that the proxy fight equilibrium with β
∗ (α) = β is in play if and
only if βpf ≡ φ+
cp
b < β ≤ β̄
pf (q) ≡ min {1,max {αD (q) , q}}. To see this, note that proxy
fight equilibrium with disclosure is in play if αD (q) ≥ α > φ+
cp
b , yielding β
∗ (α) = α, and
proxy fight equilibrium with nondisclosure is in play if α > αD (q), yielding β
∗ (α) = αq.
Moreover, qαD (q) > φ+
cp
b since
qαD (q) = φ+
cp
b−
√
b2 −∆2
≥ αL = φ+
cp
b− 2κcp
> φ+
cp
b
, (A.142)
where the first inequality follows from
(
2κ
φ
)2
≤ b2 − ∆2. Therefore, βpf < β̄pf (q) for all
q ∈ (0, 1].
Second, denoting by ΠA,PF (β) the activist’s expected payoff in the proxy fight equilibrium
for given β, note that by Proposition 16 and the proof of Corollary 3 part (iii), ΠA,PF (β)
is strictly increasing with β since ΠA,PF (β) is continuous in β and
Π′A,PF (β) =





β
∫ b
∆̂B
∆dF (∆) , if β < αL,
1
b−∆
cp
(α−φ)2
( cp
2 − κ
)
, if β > αL,
(A.143)
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where the second line follows from (A.69). Combining with the previous step, this also
implies that within any α > φ +
cp
b in equilibrium the activist strictly prefers α such that
β∗ (α) = β̄pf .
Third, suppose that β̄pf < αL. Then, since ∆
∗
B (β) =
2κ
φ for all β ≤ αL by Proposition 16,
(A.139) implies that
ΠA
(
α = φ+
cp
b
)
> ΠA,PF
(
β = β̄pf
)
⇐⇒ β̄pf <
φ+
cp
b
1−
(
2κ/φ
b
)2 , (A.144)
where κ <
cp
2 implies that
φ+
cp
b
1−
(
2κ/φ
b
)2 < αL. Therefore, the activist strictly chooses α
∗ = φ+
cp
b if β̄
pf <
φ+
cp
b
1−
(
2κ/φ
b
)2 , and chooses α > φ+
cp
b such that which yields β
∗ (α) = β̄pf otherwise.
Specifically, in the latter case, there are two subcases to consider. If αD (q) ∈ [q, 1], then
β∗ (αD (q)) = β̄
pf , and hence the activist’s expected payoff is maximized at α∗ = αD (q). If
αD (q) /∈ [q, 1], then β
∗ (1) = β̄pf , and hence the activist’s expected payoff is maximized at
α∗ = 1.
Fourth, suppose that αL ≤ β̄
pf . Then, since βpf < αL by the first step, there exists α
′ >
φ+
cp
b such that β
∗ (α′) = αL. Moreover, by (A.144), ΠA
(
α = φ+
cp
b
)
> ΠA,PF (β = αL).
Therefore, the activist strictly chooses some α > φ +
cp
b over α = φ +
cp
b . Moreover,
similar to previous step, if αD (q) ∈ [q, 1] then the activist’s expected payoff is maximized
at α∗ = αD (q), and if αD (q) /∈ [q, 1] then it is maximized at α
∗ = 1.
Fifth, I show that the activist’s expected payoff is maximized if and only if q ∈ (0, qBL ]∪{1}.
Note that αL = φ+
cp
b− 2κ
φ
≤ 1 since
2κ
φ
≤
√
b2 −∆2 < b−
cp
1− φ
(A.145)
There are two cases to consider. Suppose that q ∈ (0, qBL ] ∪ {1}. Then, by the first step
β̄pf (q) = 1 ≥ αL since q ≤ q
B
L implies that αD (q) ≥ 1, and hence by the fifth step the
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activist’s expected payoff in equilibrium is ΠA,PF (β = 1). Suppose that q ∈ (q
B
L , 1). Then,
αD (q) < 1, and hence by the first step β̄
pf (q) < 1. Recall that α∗ ≥ φ+
cp
b in equilibrium.
Therefore, in equilibrium if α∗ = φ +
cp
b then ΠA (α
∗) < ΠA,PF (β = 1) by (A.144), and if
α∗ > φ+
cp
b then ΠA (α
∗) = ΠA,PF (β
∗ (α∗)) < ΠA,PF (β = 1), where the inequality follows
from β∗ (α∗) ≤ β̄pf (q) due to the first step and that ΠA,PF (β) is strictly increasing in β by
the second step.
Consider part (ii). Since κ ≥ κ0(φ), rejection equilibrium is in play whenever acceptance
equilibrium is not, and hence by Proposition 16, shareholder value and the activist’s payoff
are zero if α > φ +
cp
b and E [∆] ≥ 0, or αq > φ +
cp
b and E [∆] < 0. On the other
hand, if α ≤ φ +
cp
b and E [∆] ≥ 0, then ΠA (α) = ΠSH (α) = αE [max {0,∆}], and if
αq ≤ φ +
cp
b and E [∆] < 0, then ΠA (α) = ΠSH (α) = αqE [max {0,∆}]. Therefore, the
activist strictly prefers α∗ = φ +
cp
b if E [∆] ≥ 0, and α
∗ = 1q
(
φ+
cp
b
)
if E [∆] < 0, which
also strictly maximizes the shareholder value. Moreover, the expected payoff of the activist
is
(
φ+
cp
b
)
E [max {0,∆}] if q ∈ [min
{
1, φ+
cp
b
}
, 1], and strictly smaller otherwise.
Consider part (iii). Rejection equilibrium exists for all α > 0 by Proposition 16, and hence
shareholder value and the activist’s payoff are zero for any α > 0.
Proposition 20. (i) Suppose that κ < 11−F (0)κ0 (φ), and that if the activist demands
board settlement, then acceptance equilibrium is in play whenever it exists and proxy
fight equilibrium is in play otherwise. Moreover, suppose that subject to this selection,
nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it exists. Then, an equilibrium always
exists. Moreover,
(a) If κ ≥ κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ ≥ κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0, then the activist
demands board settlement in any equilibrium.
(b) If κ < κ0 (φ), φ+
cp
b ≥ 1, E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ < κ0 (φq), φ+
cp
b ≥ q, E [∆] < 0, then
there exists unique β
1
∈ (0, 1) such that there is an equilibrium where the activist
demands board settlement if and only if β̄ac ≥ β
1
.
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(c) If κ < κ0 (φ), φ +
cp
b < 1, E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ < κ0 (φq), φ +
cp
b < q, E [∆] < 0,
then there exist unique β
1
, β
2
∈ (0, 1) such that there is an equilibrium where the
activist demands board settlement if and only if β̄ac ≥ β
1
or β̄pf ≥ β
2
.
(ii) Suppose that κ < φb, and that if the activist demands board settlement, then acceptance
equilibrium is in play whenever it exists and rejection equilibrium is in play otherwise.
Moreover, suppose that subject to this selection, nondisclosure equilibrium is in play
whenever it exists. Then, an equilibrium always exists, and the activist demands board
settlement in any equilibrium.
(iii) Suppose that κ ≥ κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ ≥ κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0. Moreover,
suppose that if the activist demands board settlement then rejection equilibrium is in
play, and subject to this selection, nondisclosure equilibrium is in play whenever it
exists. Then, for any demand of the activist, the activist’s expected payoff is zero.
Proof. Denote the expected payoff of the activist from demanding nothing by Π0A, from
demanding action settlement by ΠAA, and from demanding board settlement with α by
ΠBA(β
∗ (α)). Further, for given β ∈ (0, 1], if the activist demands board settlement with
effective control of β, denote the activist’s expected payoff by ΠB,acA (β) in the acceptance
equilibrium and by ΠB,pfA (β) in the proxy fight equilibrium.
Consider part (i). There are two cases to consider. Suppose that κ ≥ κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0,
or κ ≥ κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0. Then, Π
0
A = Π
A
A = 0 by Lemma 8 and Proposition 15,
while ΠBA(α) > α for all α > 0 by Proposition 16. Therefore, the activist strictly chooses to
demand board settlement. This completes part (i.a).
Suppose that κ < κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0, or κ < κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0. Then, Π
0
A,Π
A
A > 0 by
Lemma 8 and Proposition 15. By Proposition 16, ΠB,pfA (β) and Π
B,ac
A (β) are continuous in
β and limβ↓0 Π
B,pf
A (β) = limβ↓0 Π
B,ac
A (β) = 0. Also note that min{Π
B,pf
A (β = 1),Π
B,ac
A (β =
1)} > max
{
Π0A,Π
A
A
}
since by Proposition 15 ΠB,iA (β = 1) is equal to the activist’s expected
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payoff given α = 1 in the corresponding equilibrium in Proposition 14, which is weakly larger
than his expected payoff if he does not demand anything or demands action settlement due
to Corollary 14 part (iii). Note that for the last point, I utilize that the activist’s expected
payoff if he demands action settlement or does not make any demand is weakly larger in
the disclosure equilibrium due to Corollary 16 and Lemma 8. Note that by Corollary 7, for
given β ∈ (0, 1] there exists α ∈ (0, 1] such that the acceptance equilibrium with β∗ (α) = β
is in play if and only if β ∈ (0, β̄ac]. Moreover, by due to Proposition 16 the activist’s
expected payoff in the acceptance equilibrium is strictly increasing with β. Therefore,
maxβ∈(0,β̄ac]Π
B,ac
A (β) is strictly increasing in β̄
ac. Combining all of these, there exists a
unique β
1
∈ (0, 1) such that maxβ∈(0,β̄ac]Π
B,ac
A (β) ≥ max
{
Π0A,Π
A
A
}
if and only if β̄ac ≥ β
1
.
To complete part (i), there are two subcases to consider.
• Suppose that φ+
cp
b ≥ 1 and E [∆] ≥ 0, or φ+
cp
b ≥ q and E [∆] < 0. Then, acceptance
equilibrium is in play for all α > 0 due to Proposition 16. This completes part (i.b).
• Suppose that φ +
cp
b < 1 and E [∆] ≥ 0, or φ +
cp
b < q and E [∆] < 0. Then, due
to Proposition 16, acceptance equilibrium is in play if α ≤ α and proxy fight equi-
librium is in play if α > α, where α = φ +
cp
b if E [∆] ≥ 0 and α =
1
q
(
φ+
cp
b
)
if
E [∆] < 0. Moreover, by Corollary 7, for given β ∈ (0, 1] there exists α ∈ (0, 1]
such that the acceptance equilibrium with β∗ (α) = β is in play if and only if
β ∈ (βpf , β̄pf ], where βpf < β̄pf and βpf < αL. Moreover, by Proposition 16,
ΠB,pfA (β) is continuous for all β ∈ (0, 1] and strictly increasing in β for all β < αL.
Therefore, maxβ∈(βpf ,β̄pf ]Π
B,pf
A (β) = maxβ∈[min{αL,β̄pf},β̄pf ]Π
B,pf
A (β) is weakly in-
creasing in β̄pf . Combining all of these, there exists a unique β
2
∈ (0, 1) such that
maxβ∈(βpf ,β̄pf ]Π
B,pf
A (β) ≥ max
{
Π0A,Π
A
A
}
if and only if β̄pf ≥ β
2
. This completes part
(i.c).
Consider part (ii). There are three cases to consider. Suppose that κ ≥ κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0,
or κ ≥ κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0. Then, Π
0
A = Π
A
A = 0 by Lemma 8 and Proposition 15, while
ΠBA(α) > α for all α < φ+
cp
b by Proposition 16. Therefore, the activist strictly chooses to
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demand board settlement.
Suppose that κ < κ0 (φ) and E [∆] ≥ 0. Then, since rejection equilibrium does not exist by
Proposition 16, it must be that acceptance equilibrium with disclosure exists for all α > 0,
i.e., φ+
cp
b ≥ 1. Therefore, the activist’s expected payoff from demanding board settlement
with α = 1 is E [max {0,∆}], strictly larger than his expected payoff from demanding action
settlement or demanding nothing due to Lemma 8 and Proposition 15.
Suppose that κ < κ0 (φq) and E [∆] < 0. Then, since rejection equilibrium does not exist
by Proposition 16, it must be that acceptance equilibrium with nondisclosure exists for all
α > 0, i.e., φ +
cp
b ≥ q. Therefore, the activist’s expected payoff from demanding board
settlement with α = 1 is qE [max {0,∆}], which is strictly larger than his expected payoff
from demanding action settlement or demanding nothing since nondisclosure equilibrium is
in play in both of these due to Lemma 8 and Proposition 15.
Consider part (iii). If the activist demands board settlement, rejection equilibrium exists
for all α > 0 by Proposition 16, and the activist’s payoff is zero for any α > 0. Due to
Lemma 8 and Proposition 15, the activist’s payoff is also zero if he demand nothing or
demands action settlement.
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A2. Appendix for Chapter 2
A2.1. Proofs of main results
Proof of Proposition 9. We first prove that πγ/α > πb implies πγ/α ≥ γ/α. To see why, note
that πγ/α > πb and πb ≥ 0 imply πγ/α > 0. According to (2.1), πγ/α > 0 requires ∆ ≥ γ/α.
Since πγ/α is a weighted average of ∆ and γ/α, ∆ ≥ γ/α implies πγ/α ≥ γ/α. Therefore,
πγ/α > πb implies πγ/α ≥ γ/α.
Next, we prove that πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α is equivalent to δ/α ≤ ∆ < b. Note that if ∆ < γ/α
then πγ/α = 0. Since κ > 0, ∆ < γ/α implies that πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α does not hold. Suppose
γ/α ≤ ∆. If in addition b ≤ ∆ then πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α is equivalent to
[s∆+ (1− s)γ/α]− [s∆+ (1− s)b] ≥ κ/α ⇔ (1− s) (γ/α− b) ≥ κ/α, (A.146)
which never holds since γ < κ. Instead, suppose γ/α ≤ ∆ and ∆ < b. In this case,
πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α is equivalent to
s∆+ (1− s)γ/α ≥ κ/α ⇔ γ/α+ (κ/α − γ/α) /s ≤ ∆, (A.147)
which is the same as δ/α ≤ ∆. Since γ ≤ δ, πγ/α − πb ≥ κ/α is equivalent to δ/α ≤ ∆ < b,
as required. The rest of the proposition follows from the discussion in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose the bidder performed due diligence and x = ∆. We con-
sider several cases. First, suppose δ/α ≤ ∆ < b. Based on Proposition 9, if the first round
of the negotiations fails then the activist will run and win a proxy fight. Moreover, based
on Lemma 5, in the second round of the negotiations the activist and the bidder will reach
an agreement in which the bidder is expected to pay πγ/α. Therefore, in the first round
of negotiations, the incumbent board will reject any offer lower than πγ/α. Similarly, the
bidder will not agree to pay more than πγ/α per share, since he can always wait for the
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second round of negotiations, and pay πγ/α ∈ (0,∆] after the activist wins the proxy fight.
Overall, if there are arbitrarily small waiting costs to either the bidder or the incumbent
board, they will reach an agreement in the first round of negotiations in which the bidder
pays a premium of πγ/α. Second, suppose b ≤ ∆. Based on Proposition 9, if the first round
of the negotiations fails, the activist will not run a proxy fight. Therefore, if the first round
of the negotiations fails, the incumbent retains control of the board. Based on Lemma 5,
if b ≤ ∆ then in the second round of the negotiations the incumbent and the bidder will
reach an agreement in which the bidder is expected to pay πb ∈ (0,∆]. Therefore, similar
to the argument above, the bidder and the incumbent board will reach an agreement in the
first round in which the bidder pays a premium of πb.
The two cases above imply that if the bidder learns that x = ∆ and min {b, δ/α} ≤ ∆ then
the target is acquired by the bidder in the first round of negotiations, and the bidder will
pay a premium of πγ/α if δ/α ≤ ∆ < b and a premium of πb if b ≤ ∆. Since Pr [x = ∆] = τ ,
the bidder’s expected payoff is τ
(
∆− πγ/α
)
in the former case, and τ (∆− πb) in the latter
case. In both cases, the premium is lower than ∆, and therefore the expected profit is
non-negative. The bidder will therefore perform a due-diligence if and only if c is smaller
than the expected profit.
Finally, suppose ∆ < min {b, δ/α}. Based on Proposition 9, the activist never runs a proxy
fight. Therefore, if the first round of the negotiations fails, the incumbent retains control
of the board. Based on Lemma 5, if ∆ < b then the incumbent board and the bidder will
not reach an agreement in the second round of negotiations, and the target will remain
independent. Therefore, in the first round of negotiations, the incumbent board will reject
any offer lower than b, and the bidder will not agree to pay more than ∆ per share. Since
∆ < b, the parties will not reach an agreement in the first round as well, and the target
remains independent. Since the bidder cannot expect to acquire the target and make any
profit from the acquisition even if x = ∆, the bidder never performs a due-diligence.
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Proof of Proposition 11. Suppose the activist wins a proxy fight before the bidder arrives.
Since Lemma 5 continues to hold and the bidder cannot win a proxy fight, the expected
shareholder value if the first round of negotiations fails is πγ/α. Therefore, if γ/α > ∆ then
πγ/α = 0 and the target will remain independent under the activist’s control. If γ/α ≤ ∆
then πγ/α > 0 and similar to Proposition 10, the bidder and the activist will reach an
acquisition agreement in the first round of negotiations in which the takeover premium is
πγ/α. Since the expected profit of the bidder in this case is τ
(
∆− πγ/α
)
, the probability
of a takeover is θγ/α. Therefore, if the activist wins a proxy fight before the bidder arrives
the expected shareholder value is θγ/απγ/α and the activist’s expected payoff per share is
θγ/απγ/α +
(
1− θγ/α
)
γ/α − κ/α.
At the same time, if the incumbent retains control before the bidder arrives then according
to Corollary 11, the expected shareholder value is θ∗π∗. There are three cases to consider.
First, if ∆ < min {b, δ/α}, then θ∗ = 0, but the activist never starts a proxy fight since
θγ/απγ/α +
(
1− θγ/α
)
γ/α− κ/α < 0. Note that this inequality holds since either πγ/α = 0
and γ < κ, or πγ/α = s∆ + (1 − s)γ/α and ∆ < δ/α. Second, if δ/α ≤ ∆ < b then
θ∗π∗ = θγ/απγ/α. Since γ < κ, θγ/απγ/α+
(
1− θγ/α
)
γ/α−κ/α < θγ/απγ/α, and the activist
never starts a proxy fight. Third, if ∆ ≥ b then θ∗π∗ = θbπb. The activist starts a proxy
fight if and only if she is expected to be elected and θγ/απγ/α+
(
1− θγ/α
)
γ/α−κ/α ≥ θbπb.
The latter condition is equivalent to (2.8). Note that in those circumstances shareholders
prefer the activist over the incumbent if and only if θγ/απγ/α > θbπb. However, if condition
(2.8) holds, then γ < κ implies that θγ/απγ/α > θbπb and therefore shareholders always elect
the activist when she starts a proxy fight. This completes the proof.
Finally, we show that if ∆ ≥ b and (2.8) holds then γ/α < b. Suppose on the contrary
γ/α ≥ b. Since ∆ ≥ b and γ < κ, condition (2.8) requires ∆ ≥ γ/α. Condition (2.8) can be
rewritten as
πγ/α −
θb
θγ/α
πb ≥
κ/α−
(
1− θγ/α
)
γ/α
θγ/α
. (A.148)
Recall that in the baseline model (in the proof of Proposition 9) we proved that if b ≤
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γ/α ≤ ∆ then πγ/α − πb < κ/α. Since γ/α ≥ b, we have
θb
θγ/α
≥ 1. Since κ ≥ γ, we have
κ/α−(1−θγ/α)γ/α
θγ/α
≥ κ/α. Therefore, πγ/α − πb < κ/α implies that condition (2.8) cannot
hold if γ/α ≥ b, yielding a contradiction. As a final remark, note that condition (2.8) is not
vacuous; for example, as b ր ∆ and κ ց γ, it holds if γ/α ≤ ∆.
Proof of Proposition 12. We start by noting that part (iii) follows directly from observation
that if y = 0 then the synergy is −∞ and a takeover can never take place. Since the share
price cannot be smaller than the firm’s standalone value of zero, regardless of the beliefs
of the market maker (on or off the equilibrium path), the activist’s expected profit from
submitting any order α > 0 is non-positive. Therefore, the activist does not invest. If y = 1
then the game is reduced to the one in the baseline model. We let α∗ be the number of
shares the activist buys in equilibrium conditional on y = 1. The proof has several steps.
First, we prove α∗ ≤ α. Suppose on the contrary α∗ > α. Then, on the equilibrium path
the market maker observes that the activist bought α∗ shares before the price is set, and
hence, the market maker sets the price to be h∗ (α∗). Indeed, since in any equilibrium
y = 0 ⇒ α = 0 (the previous step), the market maker infers that y = 1. However, in this
case, the activist’s profit is non-positive, yielding a contradiction.
Second, we prove that the price function is given by (2.10). Since the market maker expects
the activist to buy no shares if y = 0 and α∗ ≤ α shares if y = 1, the market maker sets
the price at µh∗ (α∗) if the activist buys α shares or less. Indeed, the market maker expects
the takeover to take place only if y = 1 which happens with probability µ. Conditional on
y = 1, the expected takeover premium is h∗ (α∗). If the activist buys more than α shares,
which is an off-equilibrium event, then the market maker observes α and sets the price to be
µ (α) h∗ (α) where µ (α) is the off-equilibrium beliefs of the market maker about y = 1 given
that the activist decided to buy α > α shares. We assume µ (α) = 1, which guarantees
that such deviation is not profitable (i.e., the market maker assumes y = 1) as the activist’s
profit would be non-positive. This argument proves part (ii).
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Third, we prove that if min {b, δ/α} > ∆ or b = ∆ then α∗ = 0. Based on the first
step it cannot be α∗ > α. Suppose on the contrary α∗ > 0. If b > ∆ then the target is
taken over only if δ/α∗ ≤ ∆. However, since δ/α > ∆ and α ≥ α∗, it must be δ/α∗ >
∆. Therefore, the target is never acquired and the activist’s profit must be non-positive,
yielding a contradiction. Similarly, if b = ∆ then according to Corollary 11 the target is
never acquired (i.e., θ∗ = 0). Since the activist’s profit must be non-positive, we get a
contradiction.
Fourth, we prove that h∗ (α) is non-decreasing in α. Indeed, if b ≤ ∆ then h∗ (α) = θbπb ≥ 0,
which is independent of α. If b > ∆ then
h∗ (α) = θγ/απγ/α =







v (α) if δ/∆ ≤ α
0 else,
(A.149)
where v (α) = τF (τ(1− s) (∆− γ/α)) [s∆+ (1− s)γ/α]. Note that if δ/∆ < α, then
v′ (α) = τf (τ(1− s) (∆− γ/α)) [s∆+ (1− s)γ/α] τ(1− s)γ/α2 (A.150)
−τF (τ(1− s) (∆− γ/α)) (1− s)γ/α2.
Hereafter, we assume either γ = 0 or s is sufficiently close to one, which guarantees v′ (α) ≥ 0
and that θγ/απγ/α is non-decreasing in α.
Fifth, we prove that if δ/α ≤ ∆ < b or b < ∆ then α∗ = α. Based on the first step it
cannot be α∗ > α. Suppose on the contrary α∗ < α. Based on part (ii), the share price
must be µh∗ (α∗) in this equilibrium, and the activist’s profit when she buys α∗ shares is
α∗ (h∗ (α∗)− µh∗ (α∗)). We argue that the activist has a profitable deviation to buying α
shares. First note that
α∗ (h∗ (α∗)− µh∗ (α∗)) ≤ α∗ (h∗ (α)− µh∗ (α∗)) , (A.151)
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which follows from h∗ (α) being non-decreasing in α. Second, note that
α∗ (h∗ (α)− µh∗ (α∗)) < α (h∗ (α)− µh∗ (α∗)) . (A.152)
Indeed, since δ/α ≤ ∆ < b or b < ∆, it must be h∗ (α) > 0. Since α∗ < α and h∗ (α) is non-
decreasing in α, it must be h∗ (α) ≥ h∗ (α∗). Combined, it must be h∗ (α)− µh∗ (α∗) > 0.
Therefore, this deviation is profitable, yielding a contradiction.
Sixth, we prove that an equilibrium exists. Based on previous steps, if an equilibrium exists
then α∗ is given by (2.9). We show that no profitable deviation exists for the activist. If
the activist buys α > α shares then the share price is h∗ (α) and the activist’s profit is
non-positive. If y = 0, min {b, δ/α} > ∆, or b = ∆, then the probability of a takeover is
zero if the activist buys less than α shares. Since the share price cannot be less than the
target’s standalone value, the activist’s profit will be necessarily non-positive if she buys
α ∈ (0, α] shares. Therefore, it is optimal to buy no shares, as the equilibrium prescribes.
Suppose y = 1, and δ/α ≤ ∆ < b or b < ∆. Consider a deviation to α < α. Note that if the
activist buys α shares than her profit is α (h (α)− µh (α)) > 0. It is strictly positive since
δ/α ≤ ∆ < b or b < ∆ implies h (α) > 0. Therefore, for any α < α,
α (h (α)− µh (α)) > α (h (α)− µh (α)) (A.153)
≥ α (h (α)− µh (α)) .
The first inequality follows from h (α) − µh (α) > 0 and α < α, and the second inequality
follows from h∗ (α) being non-decreasing in α. Therefore, such a deviation is always sub-
optimal.
Proof of Corollary 12. If b ≤ ∆ then θ∗∗ = µτF (τ (1− s) (∆− b)), which is decreasing in
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b, invariant to κ, and equal to zero when b = ∆. If b > ∆ then
θ∗∗ =







µτF (τ (1− s) (∆− γ/α)) if δ/α ≤ ∆
0 else
(A.154)
Note that δ/α ≤ ∆ is more likely to hold for small κ. Also note that if δ/α ≤ ∆, then
µτF (τ (1− s) (∆− γ/α)) > 0. The two claims follow from these observations.
A2.2. Limited veto power
Assuming that bidders can never bypass the target board and go straight to shareholders
by making a tender offer is not necessary for our main results. Our arguments only require
that corporate boards can partially resist a takeover. To illustrate this point, we extend
the baseline model as follows. We assume that if no acquisition agreement is reached
at the second round of negotiations then with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] the target remains
independent and whoever controls the target board can consume his private benefits. With
probability 1 − λ the bidder can make a tender offer. In this case, whoever controls the
target cannot consume his private benefits. Whether a tender offer is possible is revealed at
the beginning of the second round of negotiations. For simplicity, we focus on conditional
offers for all target shares. The possibility of making a tender offer affects the analysis of
the baseline model only if the bidder can at least partly overcome the free-riding problem
of Grossman and Hart (1980). That is, the bidder must make some profit, otherwise, the
option of making a tender offer is never exercised. Therefore, we assume that the bidder
can consume a fraction 1−φ ∈ (0, 1) of ∆ as private benefit.5 We prove the following result.
Proposition 21. Suppose the first round of negotiations has failed. Then:
(i) The bidder never runs a proxy fight.
5The free-rider problems in takeovers effectively gives target shareholders a bargaining power. If b ≤ ∆
then the target board might have incentives to leverage this a bargaining power by allowing a tender offer.
For simplicity, we assume this possibility away. This assumption would not change qualitatively the main
result since the credibility of the activist arises only when ∆ < b.
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(ii) The activist runs a proxy fight if and only if
πγ/α − πb ≥ (κ/α) /λ. (A.155)
where πγ/α and πb are given by (2.2). If the activist runs a proxy fight, she wins the
control of the target board and then reaches an acquisition agreement with an expected
takeover premium of (1− λ)φ∆+ λπγ/α.
(iii) If the activist does not run a proxy fight then the incumbent retains control and the
target remains independent if and only if a tender offer is not feasible and b > ∆.
Similar to the baseline model, the bidder never runs a proxy fight because of the conflict
of interests with the target shareholders. The activist runs a proxy fight if and only if
the condition πγ/α − πb ≥ (κ/α) /λ holds. Intuitively, if λ is low then the bidder has an
alternative mean by which he can overcome the resistance of the board, and therefore, the
activist has fewer incentives to run a proxy fight in order to facilitate the takeover. In other
words, there is substitution between the bidder’s ability to bypass the target board through
tender offers and the activist’s ability or need to unseat the incumbent through a proxy
fight. Ceteris paribus, one would expect activists to play a smaller role in the market for
corporate control in jurisdictions in which boards have weaker power to block deals, such
as the U.S. in the 1980s or the U.K.
Proof of Proposition 21 . Suppose the second round of negotiations failed. If the bidder
cannot make a tender offer, the target remains independent. If the bidder can make a
tender offer, because of the free-rider problem, shareholders tender their shares if and only
if the offer is higher than φ∆ (shareholders are not playing weakly dominated strategies and
they cannot free-ride on the private benefit component of ∆, which is (1− φ)∆). Therefore,
the bidder makes a tender offer of φ∆ per share, target shareholders tender their shares,
and the bidder takes over the target.
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Consider the second round of negotiations. All parties involved rationally expect that if
the second round fails, the above dynamic would unfold. Therefore, if the bidder cannot
make a tender offer, the outcome of the negotiations in this stage is identical to the baseline
model. Suppose that the bidder can make a tender offer. Since the bidder can buy the
firm with a tender offer φ∆ if the second round of negotiations fails, the highest premium
the bidder would be willing to pay is φ∆. Similarly, the incumbent will not agree to sell
the firm for a premium lower than φ∆. Therefore, the bidder and the incumbent will reach
an agreement in the second round with a premium of φ∆. This concludes part (iii) of the
proposition. The negotiations between the bidder and the activist in the second round (if
the latter controls the board) are the same as above, where b is replaced by γ/α.
Next, suppose the bidder controls the target board. When tender offer is possible he cannot
consume his private benefits unless he takes over the firm, and hence he will offer φ∆ to
the shareholders, since this is the lowest price that the shareholders accept. However, if
tender offer is not possible, then he will consume his private benefits (including extracting
firm value of η) and offer shareholders the lowest price that is acceptable to them, which
is −η.6 For all of these reasons, in the second round of negotiations, the expected target
shareholder value in Lemma 5 can be rewritten as (1− λ)φ∆+ λπb under the incumbent’s
control, as (1− λ)φ∆+λπγ/α under the activist’s control, and as (1− λ)φ∆+λ (−η) under
the bidder’s control. These observations imply that the bidder can never win a proxy fight,
which proves part (i). Moreover, they imply that the activist will run a proxy fight if and
only if
(1− λ)φ∆+ λπγ/α − (1− λ)φ∆+ λπb ≥ κ/α ⇔ πγ/α − πb ≥ (κ/α) /λ, (A.156)
which concludes part (ii).
6The bidder has no incentives to make a tender offer to shareholders due to the free-rider problem.
Knowing this, shareholders will agree to any price higher than −η if the bidder is already controlling their
board. Alternatively, if the bidder could completely freeze out target shareholders and solve the free-rider
problem, shareholders cannot expect any positive premium once the bidder takes control of their board.
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A2.3. The role of a majority stake
Following the discussion in Section 2.2.3.2 in the main text, in this appendix we show that
the ability of a bidder to increase the standalone value of the target (as a substitute to a
takeover) reduces its conflict of interests with target shareholders, compared to bidders who
need to own majority of the target to realize synergies. For this purpose, consider a variant
of the baseline model where there is no activist (or alternatively, there is no bidder and the
activist has the capacity to create value and make a takeover bid herself). The bidder owns
α > 0 shares of the target (a toehold) prior to making a bid. The bidder has a proposal
to increase the target value by ∆. The proposal can be successfully implemented either by
the incumbent or by the bidder. If the proposal is implemented, the incumbent loses his
private benefits of control. The key assumption is that the proposal can be implemented
even if the target remains independent after the failure of the second round of negotiations.
Proposition 22. Suppose the first round of negotiations has failed and the bidder can
increase the standalone value of the target. The bidder runs a proxy fight if and only if
κ/α
1− α
≤
∆
1− α
< b, (A.157)
and whenever the bidder runs a proxy fight, she wins.
Proof. If the second round of negotiations succeeded and the target is acquired by the bid-
der, then the bidder implements his proposal if it has not been implemented yet. Therefore,
the post takeover target value is ∆. If the second round of negotiations failed and the firm
remains independent (that is, its ownership structure did not change), there are two cases.
First, if the bidder controls the target board then he implements the proposal if it has not
been implemented yet, and the target value is ∆. Second, if the incumbent board retains
control then he implements the proposal if and only if b ≤ ∆, and hence, the target value
is 1{b≤∆}∆.
Consider the second round of negotiations. There are two cases. First, suppose that either
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the bidder controls the target board or the incumbent retains control and b ≤ ∆. The
bidder’s proposal is implemented whether or not the bid fails. For this reason, the bidder
will not offer more than ∆ per share. Moreover, target shareholders will not accept offers
lower than ∆, since they can always reject the bid and obtain a value of ∆ once the proposal
is implemented. Therefore, whether or not target is acquired, the bidder’s payoff is α∆ and
the shareholder value is ∆. Second, suppose the incumbent board retains control and b > ∆.
If the negotiations fail, the proposal will not be implemented and the bidder’s payoff would
be zero. If the bidder acquires the firm, his payoff is ∆−(1− α) π, where π is the offer made
to target shareholders. Therefore, the bidder is willing to offer up to ∆1−α per share. The
incumbent board and the bidder will reach an agreement if and only if b ≤ ∆1−α . If
∆
1−α < b
then the takeover fails and the shareholder value is zero. If ∆ < b ≤ ∆1−α then the incumbent
and the bidder reach an agreement in which π ≥ b > ∆. Therefore, target shareholders
approve any agreement reached by the bidder and the incumbent, and the target is acquired
by the bidder. In this case, the expected shareholder value is s ∆1−α + (1− s) b.
Consider the proxy fight stage. There are three cases to consider. First, if b ≤ ∆ then the
bidder’s payoff is α∆ whether or not she gets the control of the board. Therefore, he has no
reason to run and incur the cost of a proxy fight. Second, if ∆ < b ≤ ∆1−α then the bidder
always loses the proxy fight if he decides to start one. The reason is that shareholders know
that if they elect the bidder they will get ∆ whereas if they reelect the incumbent, the
bidder will take over the target and pay shareholders on average s ∆1−α + (1− s) b, which is
strictly higher. Anticipating his defeat, the bidder never runs a proxy fight in this region.
Third, if ∆1−α < b then the shareholder value is ∆ if the bidder gets the control of the board,
and zero otherwise. Therefore, shareholders always elect the bidder if she runs a proxy
fight. The bidder’s payoff is α∆− κ if he runs a proxy fight, and zero otherwise. Therefore
the bidder runs a proxy fight only if κ/α ≤ ∆. Combining this condition with b > ∆1−α
yields (A.157).
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